Gairy and the General Strike of 1951:
as Gleaned from British and US Sources

Fitzroy Baptiste

Introduction

Eric Matthew Gairy, or "Uncle Gairy" to his grass-root supporters, dominated the politics of Grenada for approaching 50 years from his meteoric rise in the general strike of February-March, 1951. This episode in the post-World War II history of Grenada and, indeed, the Commonwealth Caribbean, has been the subject of scholarly contributions by writers such as Simon Rottenberg, M.G. Smith and A.W. Singham.¹ Given the existing official restrictions in Britain and the United States in the 1950s and 1960s, these writers were unable to access primary, archival records on political and socio-economic developments in the Commonwealth Caribbean. This is no longer the case. The so-called "30 year rule" in Britain allows researchers access to records up to about 1970-1. There is no comparable rule in the United States. However, the author's experience is that records are now available for research up to the same time. Here, as well as in Britain, the Authorities still classify certain records or items within records as "National Security."

Drawing on data in the US National Archives in Washington, D.C. and in Maryland and records of the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence in the British Archives in London, the author revisits the general strike that was called by Gairy in Grenada between February 19 and March 19, 1951. He also locates the disturbances in Grenada within a regional pattern of working-class unrest in the 5-6 years after the end of World War II. Finally, he shows how the "official mind" in Washington and London, given the onset of the Cold War with the USSR and the missile age of warfare, tended to label leaders such as Gairy as "communist".

The Strike through the Lens of the Official Archives

At the start of the general strike on February 19, 1951 and until March 5, 1951, Sir Robert Arundell, the Governor of the Windward Islands, was on leave in Britain. Acting for him was Mr. G.C. Green, the Administrator of Grenada. The burden of dealing with Gairy and his strikers fell on him and Colonel Donald, his chief Security Adviser. In a stream of telegrams between February 22 and March 4, 1951, Green reported on developments in Grenada to the Colonial Office and to his Governor-on-leave in Britain. On February 22, 1951, he had this to say:

Grenada Strike

Order in Council brought into force by proclamation is the Emergency Powers Order in Council 1939, dated 9th March 1939. Regulations under paragraph 6 were made similar to your paragraphs 1 and 2 of Regulation 18B of Defence (General) Regulations 1939. Authority for detention of person named is my Order made under the above Regulations, copies of which are being sent by air mail. Detention effected to-day, Thursday.

Your paragraph 3.

Labour Officer has kept in regular contact with both parties. Last year Gairy made certain demands on the Agricultural Employers Association who were then dealing with the Trade Union Council and with whom they concluded agreement to which reference is made in my telegram No. 55 and which expires in September next. Certain correspondence took place between the parties at the time but, since October, there was no further correspondence and the Association adhered to agreement with the Trade Union Council. When stoppage of work referred to in my telegram No. 55 occurred, every endeavour was made to discover the cause of stoppage but Gairy said that time would show what he wanted and he would make the Employers Association recognise him. Association held meeting and decided they would not break existing agreement. Gairy's general attitude has been strike first and force negotiation afterwards urging violence and intimidation. Labour Officer is fully satisfied from personal investigation since the strike commenced, that large number of the workers are willing and want to work but are being terrorised by Gairy and his henchmen. In such circumstances, conciliation is not possible until tranquillity is restored. I am advised that there is reason to believe that Gairy adopted these measures in order to force the Association to break the agreement with the Trade Union Council who themselves have made no request for its variation. In this connection, your attention is invited to conclusion VI (c) of Report of Conference of British West Indies Labour Officers held in Barbados in May 1950.

Labour Officer has given several broadcasts on the principle of negotiation and there was a joint appeal by the churches to the workers and I have also issued an appeal.²

The day had not ended when Green reported:

Grenada strike.

H.M.S. DEVONSHIRE arrived morning of 22nd February and took over guarding of vulnerable points in St. George and the air port. Gairy and Blaize picked up yesterday afternoon. Former transferred last night to Carriacou but this is not generally known. Two incidents involving crowds which might have been serious were successfully dealt by the police. Situation in the country was confused and gave cause for anxiety. Communications difficult owing to landslide already reported, sabotage of telephone lines and some road blocks. In one estate owner fired on hostile crowd and three persons wounded.

Last night following buildings on outskirts of St. George were destroyed by fire.

Belmont Government School Woburn Medical Station Governor's Bathing Hut Another bathing hut privately owned Cattle pens and watchman's house (partly) on sugar estate.

Unsuccessful attempt also made to burn St. George pier and one Government secondary school building at Tanteen. This morning police compelled to fire on hostile crowd which attacked them in sugar transportation area. One man and one woman were wounded.

General situation is menacing because despite help from St. Lucia disorders are too widespread and scattered to be effectively handled. I have appealed to the Governor of Trinidad for more police help. Captain of H.M.S. DEVONSHIRE informs me that he he is asking C(ommander) in C(hief) America and West Indies to consider sending H.M.S. SNIPE to give him assistance and later relieve him.

On the advice of the Executive Council I intend detaining two more ringleaders.³

In a third message on February 23, 1951, Green informed London that "One officer and twenty five men of the Trinidad police due to arrive tomorrow morning".⁴

The US Consul in Port of Spain, Hale, corroborated the report about the arrival of the British warship in Grenada, in a telegram to the State Department on February 23, 1951:

H.M.S. DEVONSHIRE landed Marines on Island Grenada early February 22 due general strike agricultural and unskilled workers. Local government has declared state of emergency and special public order ordinances have been passed. Labor leaders Eric Gairy and Gascoigne Blaize arrested, some violence reported. About 10 American citizens believed resident in Grenada. Department will be advised further developments.⁵

Acting Governor Green filed two reports on February 23-24, 1951 on the crisis in Grenada. The first message read:

Grenada Strike.

No report of fires last night. Water main leading into Richmond Hill reservoir broken (sabotage presumed) and has been repaired.

Deputation of business men interviewed me and take alarming view of the situation which they claim is class war. They have sent telegram to West Indian Committee urging troops be sent. In this connection see my telegram under reference.

Request made by some of Gairy's officials to see him and obtain mandate from him to call on people to cease violence. This is being arranged.

Have received following from Antigua Trade union. Begins.

People of Antigua deplore high-handed treatment to leaders of Grenada Union. Demand immediate release. Ends.

One Captain Musson (an Englishman) who arrived here some months ago and is believed to be a communist has been declared a prohibited immigrant and returned to Trinidad.⁶

His second message advised that the request of the local business men for the introduction of additional troops had been turned down by his local advisers:

There has been further consultation today with Executive Council, Captain of H.M.S. DEVONSHIRE and Superintendent of Police. Advice of Captain, which is accepted, is that it would be unwise to introduce further troops at present juncture.⁷

Green's next telegram on March 1, 1951, reported on the anger of the local planter-merchant elite at the rejection of their demand for the deployment of extra forces to crush the strike:

Grenada Strike.

Deputation of planters waited on me today and painted a livid picture. Their main points were:

that present situation is not merely a wage dispute but a communist uprising organized by Gairy.

that 80% of the labourers were willing to work but were being prevented by gangs who are held to be Gairy's "police";

that forces were not adequate to give their estates and themselves protection, and considerable extra forces should be brought into the Colony. They have undertaken to furnish me with a memorandum supported by evidence. In the meantime, I have arranged consultations between representatives of the planters and Superintendent of Police with a view to better use of available police.⁸

As if lending support to the plea of the local elite for greater security measures, Green reported that a watchman's house on an estate had been burnt "last night" by four masked men. He also reported on a strike-breaking tactic by the Government, namely allowing some "Representatives of Gairy's union" to broadcast appeals to the workers.⁹

The above-cited message of support for Gairy from the Antigua Trade Union reveals to us the externalizing of the Grenada crisis. There are two other indices of this externalization. On February 24, 1951, Acting Governor Green received a telegram from the General Secretary of the St. Kitts Trade Unions:

St. Kitts (Union(s) shocked news arrest of Gairy and Blaize although strike peaceful. You warned such action may be spark to ignite whole of British West Indies. Seriously urge immediate release of the arrested. Ends.¹⁰

Next, in a telegram of March 1, 1951, the Governor of Trinidad sent to the Colonial Office a resolution of support for Gairy from Trinidad's Federated Workers Trade Union:

Trade Union rights endangered Grenada. Object to use of the Navy and non Grenadian Police in local labour dispute. Your immediate intervention for peaceful settlement demanded. Protest Captain Musson English born Clarion correspondent and coloured West Indian wife Grenada expulsion and refusal Trinidad. Press freedom endangered. Trinidad and Grenada Governments action deemed unconstitutional. Demand immediate withdrawal Trinidad and Grenada Governments action against press correspondent. Trinidad workers perturbed over situation.¹¹

The Governor of Trinidad and Tobago went on to explain that the police detachment sent to Grenada was at the request of that Government. He also advised that, based "on local press reports,' the expulsion of Musson from Grenada was by order of its Government. The deportee arrived in Trinidad by air from Grenada "without notice on 27th February". He was at first refused leave to land. This order was rescinded and he was then allowed to land for three (3)days, pending a consideration of his case.¹²

The Return of Governor Arundell to Grenada

From the accounts of Smith and Singham, we know that the situation began to turn around, with the return of Governor Arundell from Britain on March 5, 1951. He was accompanied by a Labour Adviser, Barltrop, sent out by the Colonial Office. Both men had a mandate from London that they should deal directly with Gairy and, thereby, end the strike. In a last message of March 4, 1951, before Arundell's return, Green set the stage for what was to take place:

Grenada Strike.

General situation during the last 48 hours has been distinctly quieter though there has not been a return to work and there have been reports of two attempted cases of arson last night in country districts. Present situation probably due partly to appeal made by Union Representative to desist violence and partly to announcement of visit of your Labour Adviser, as request has been received to release Gairy in order that he may be available to represent the Union at any discussions that might take place with the Labour Adviser.

There was an abortive attempt on Thursday by some agricultural employers and the Trade Union Council to induce Gairy's Union to join the Trade Union Council. Gairy's Union Representative declined on the grounds that there was no mandate from Gairy.

In view of general improvement in the situation I issued announcement to-day to the effect that if the improvement continues it will be possible to declare the state of emergency at end within the next few days. (This, of course, would involve automatic release of the two persons detained).¹³

Governor Arundell returned to Grenada on March 5, 1951. His telegrams from March 6 to 17, 1951 provided the "end act" to the crisis, while filling in some details on what had transpired between February 19th and March 4th. He reported thus to London on March 6, 1951:

Grenada Strike.

Gairy was brought back from Carriacou last night and released. I saw him with Balthrop present early this morning and told him of my decision to end state of emergency. I impressed on him the grave effect lawlessness must have on him. He naturally took the line that had he not been arrested, there would have been no general disorder. I told him I should expect his cooperation in securing a return to work and a peaceful atmosphere in which the issues at stake can be frankly discussed. I think he will play. Blaize also released today.

2. I regret that a man was shot last night by a policeman and subsequently died. He was one of a mob raiding an estate and is said to have been shot in the act of attacking an estate watchman with a cutlass.

3. I signed a proclamation this morning taking off the state of emergency as from today.

4. SNIPE due this afternoon and DEVONSHIRE to leave tonight.¹⁴

On March 11, 1951, Arundell sent London his "appreciation of the situation" in Grenada:

Following appreciation of situation is based on meeting with representatives of labour and employers, conversations with population and personal tour of the Island Friday.

2. Gairy's line at meeting on Wednesday was that he called the strike because employers would not recognize him. He now demands recognition as sole bargaining authority for agricultural workers. He maintains that serious violence would not have occurred had he not been detained.

3. At meeting with delegation of businessmen and planters same day, feeling ran extremely high and several of those appeared on the verge of hysterically boasting incidentally that they went about armed and were in fact armed at the meeting with me. Their main contention was that strike is nothing short of a communist plot designed to overthrow society and that to treat directly with Gairy would mean end of industrial and social peace in Grenada. They maintain that the Government had failed to provide adequate protection for law-abiding citizens of a class who are in constant fear of attack on persons or property and were especially bitter because I lifted emergency powers and released detainees. They said that the Government seemed to have "abdicated" and they were prepared, if necessary, to take the law into their own hands. I have since learnt that planters are considering sending delegation to England.

4. My impression is that immense harm has been done to a kind people not only on economic but even more on social side, Some violence [is] expected in a general strike of this kind but planters appear to think nothing like it has happened anywhere. They have become hysterical and their jumpiness and constant rumours have not helped. On the other side, Gairy, an egoist, ambitious for power and with an inferiority complex apparently because of his dark colour, is determined to show the world that he can rise above birth and colour to political leadership of his people. He has in fact established in quick time remarkable ascendancy over the workers, both men and women. He says he is merely expressing their smouldering grievances but in fact he has aroused class jealousy and hatred and even racial feelings which were almost non-existent in Grenada where there is no colour discrimination.

5. Thus, depending on your information, Gairy is a heaven-sent leader or a representative of the forces of evil. He has, I am reliably informed, been hailed as reincarnation of Fedon (see handbook) and has been heard to say that Grenada needs a blood purge.

6. At meeting with me, Gairy undertook to cooperate in stopping violence and said that he would also try to get the people back to work, but was not sure if they would agree unless he could "tell them something".

7. At public meeting in St. George's on Thursday evening, he ordered those present not to resort to violence but spoilt the effect by several inflammatory remarks including, I have been informed, threat that, unless Green goes, St. Georges may be another Castries. He did not keep his word to try to effect resumption of work.

8. A meeting is to be held on Monday between Gairy's Union and Barltrop. I attach much importance to this meeting and will telegraph again when it is over.

9. My telegram No. 119 contains Barltrop's appreciation from from labour angle. In this connection, I hope that your telegram No. 91 does not imply any deviation from the position as hitherto understood and announced in the House of Commons by you under which Barltrop is here in advisory capacity to me. I consider this imperative in the present circumstances. This is not a straightforward labour dispute but there has been a social explosion from which repercussions are still unpredictable.

10. Your telegram No. 92. Without a larger and better trained police force than we possess, adequate (repeat adequate) steps to maintain order could not be taken with widespread minor disturbances like we have had. Grenada Force lacks training in dealing with civil commotions and indeed is a very mediocre force. Contingents from Trinidad and St. Lucia, each under an officer, have been of great assistance and I have today obtained from Barbados a retired army officer "Brigadier" prepared to act temporarily as second-in-command. It is essential that appointment should be made to vacant post of Deputy Superintendent in time to relieve this officer before the end of March and I should be grateful if you would arrange for this temporary secondment of an officer perhaps from the U.K. police who should be sent by air. Some progress has been made recently with arrests of wrongdoers, but there is a vast amount of police work to be done if we are to bring home to the people that crime and violence do not pay. Intimidation, real or fancy, has reached alarming proportions. I would also be grateful if you would intercede over question of police training school about which I have addressed you In Windwards despatch General No. 45 of 19th November, 1950. If anything was needed to emphasize need for this, Grenada's explosion supplies it. Fortunately, only one island has been affected but these things are contagious and another time outside help might not be so readily available.

11. I cannot yet say how long H.M.S. SNIPE ought to remain here nor can one discount the possibility of more serious disturbance which, if it came, would necessitate the despatch of troops from Jamaica at very short notice. I hope to be able to say something more definite in the next few days. Meanwhile, I am repeating this telegram to those concerned for information.

12. I am broadcasting through our amateur set on Tuesday and we shall continue to do all in our power to achieve peaceful solution. For what it is worth, there were no police reports last night.¹⁵

Governor Arundell's "appreciation' of the situation in Grenada was confirmed by Douglas Williams, special correspondent of the "Daily Telegraph" of London, in an article published in the newspaper on March 14, 1951. Entitled "Trouble Comes to Grenada: Campaign to Foment Workers' Discontent", the article was sent to the State Department by the US Embassy in London on March 15, 1951.

The article is reproduced in its entirety:

The Colonial Secretary is to be asked in the House of Commons to-day whether he can make any further statement on the situation in Grenada.

Grenada.
The troubles that have come to the peaceful island of Grenada, while symptomatic of the changing social conditions of the world since the end of the war, have been deliberately and artificially stimulated. The workers, the descendants of African slaves who for generations have been content to extract a bare subsistence from daily labour on the cocoa, banana, nutmeg and sugar plantations, have been awakened by agitation and propaganda to the fact that perhaps they are entitled to better conditions.
With their imaginations stimulated by this propaganda and by tales of good living and high wages brought back by neighbours who have worked in the oilfields of nearby Caribbean islands, they have slowly come to believe that the time has arrived for them to demand and receive basic amenities they have never enjoyed.
Emergence of a Leader
One of the things they have been told is that the wage concessions wrung from the planters are still far from adequate, and that existing high prices paid in foreign markets for the island's produce justify a considerable increase in their daily wage, now around 4s.

This fomenting of discontent has been sedulously carried on until the time was ripe for the emergence of a leader. In Gairy, native-born Grenadian, a man of some education and with some experience of foreign travel, they believe they have found their champion. Young, ambitious, unscrupulous, a fluent orator of the soap box variety, he has immense personal vanity and apart from the claim to be defender of the people's rights, he sees an opportunity in the present crisis to create for himself a position of political eminence in the island.

He has learnt from Bustamante in Jamaica and from Butler in Trinidad all the tricks of the trade. He knows just how far he can go in denunciation and abuse of the authorities and how far he can dare to incite his followers by windy oratory and slashing personal attacks on members of the Grenada Government.
Demagogic Technique
He knows all the demagogic techniques for conducting public meetings - the stage set in the village market place, the glaring bulb over the speaker's rostrum, the delayed arrival, walking through massed crowds amid thunderous applause, the opening prayer and singing of hymns, and finally the carefully modulated voice, through the loud-speaker, varied from gentle sarcasm to the screaming peroration that rouses the audience to a crescendo of wild excitement.

The appearance of such a personality was inevitable in the present conditions of Grenada, just as similar characters have appeared in other West Indian islands (omission due to faulty photocopying) ... . (his) methods may be unfair, but the problem he presents must be faced.

Opposing Gairy and his campaign for personal power camouflaged by the role of people's champion are the planters and the merchants of Grenada. Alarmed at the rapidity of his rise and startled by the increasing number of his adherents, they regard him as an upstart and adventurer whose sole aim is to destroy their livelihood and status in the community.

Strongly imbued with the principles and prejudices induced by generations of cheap and abundant labour, they resent what they consider his plan to turn the workers against them, and above all are indignant that demands for higher wages, which anyhow they are reluctant to grant, should be pressed on them by the leader of a union whose existence they refuse to recognize.

They claim that adequate unions already exist, but Gairy retaliates that these unions no longer represent the workers, that his followers are in an overwhelming majority, and that anyway his power to call a strike is in itself proof of his leadership.
Terrified Overseers
Many estates in Grenada are owned by absentee landlords and managed by overseers, themselves in some cases Negroes or Eurasians. Shocked by the unexpected interruption of their normal life and intimidated by threats against themselves and their plantations, they have shown a tendency to panic, and some of them are so fearful of attacks by their workers that they remain shut up in their houses, refusing to go out.

The actual violence done so far has not been great. Few strikes run their course without some incidents, and Grenada is no exception. Stones have been thrown, windows have even been broken by gunshot, workers have been beaten up and intimidated, crops stolen and damaged. But so far there has been only one death - a worker caught stealing nutmegs who was shot by an excited local constable - and the acts of arson committed have not been important.

Feeling among the planters is running very high. Some of them demand the immediate importation of large bodies of troops and parties of strike-breakers from Trinidad and Barbados, and hold that the proper method to end the strike is to drive the strikers by force into sullen submission.

Thus we have an impasse created by two apparently irreconcilable forces - Gairy versus the planters. Meanwhile crops perish, the island's revenue diminishes, workers get bitter and Grenada's slowly developing and badly needed tourist industry receives a setback from which it will take years to recover.

Between these two embittered parties the Government is seeking to mediate. Grenada is ruled by an Administrator, Mr. G.C. Green, who in turn is responsible to Sir Robert Arundell, Governor of the Windward Islands. Mr. Green, who has eight years service in Grenada, is a Civil Servant with a good record of achievement in his official duties, but he had never before been faced with a crisis such as suddenly developed while he was acting Governor in the absence of Sir Arundell in England. His chief adviser in matters of public order is Colonel Donald, recently retired from active police service in Burma.
Increase in Violence
It was on the heads of these two officials that the storm broke. They called in police reinforcements from St. Lucia and Trinidad and placed the island under emergency powers, suspending public liberties and detaining and expelling to a nearby island Gairy and his lieutenant Gascoigne Blaize.

The departure of Gairy was the signal for an immediate increase in acts of violence, which to that date had been few and far between. Unruly crowds invaded estates, attacking loyal workers and damaging crops. In at least one instance white women were attacked on the open road and beaten up on suspicion that they were "enemies of Gairy".

It was at this crucial point that the Governor, urgently recalled from leave, returned and in agreement with Mr. Green immediately rescinded the emergency order and caused Gairy to be returned to Grenada.

There is no doubt that the cancellation of the emergency powers decreased tension and momentarily at least restored a semblance of public order.
No Easy Solution
The situation is still ticklish and a solution difficult to find with both sides solidly entrenched in their respective positions. Much depends on Gairy's attitude and on him lies a heavy responsibility for the peace of the island. Some sentences in an inflammatory speech he made last Friday night are not encouraging.

"If Green," he is reported as saying, "does not go, St.George's [the chief town of Grenada] may be like Castries." (Castries is the town in St. Lucia where several disastrous fires occurred in recent years). [The rest of the document printed badly]¹⁶

The Finale to the Strike

By the date of publication of the article in the "Daily Telegram", the basis for an end to the strike had been laid in meetings between the Government, Gairy and the employers. "Ups and downs" there were. The "downs" included further acts of violence, reported by Governor Arundell on March 15th:

4. Bands of men and women are openly stealing crops where they will, and (security) party (touring the island that day) were lucky to escape manhandling in St. David's parish.

5. In the same parish, eight men out of a gang stealing cocoa were arrested this morning. Later, the police went to the place referred to in paragraph 4, and were forced to fire in order to save their own skins. Three persons were killed.¹⁷

This on-going situation forced the Governor to sack Colonel Donald and to replace him with Pickthall, whom London had sent out at his request. Pickthall was assisted by a Staff Officer and troops from the British Caribbean Army Base in Jamaica. Governor Arundell was scathing in his denunciation of Colonel Donald as "unfit to command the (Grenada) force", "prematurely senile"; and "rather uncouth and one of the stupidest men I have ever had to deal with".¹⁸

The critical "up" in the situation came in separate meetings which Barltrop, the Labour Adviser, had with Gairy's Union and the employers on Monday, March 12, 1951. A relieved Governor reported the outcome of the meeting to London on that day:

Barltrop had meeting today with Gairy's union and later with the the employers. Both parties indicated readiness to co-operate on Statutory Wage Fixing Council. Government has agreed to introduce necessary legislation. It has been made clear to Gairy that no such council can deliberate while the strike is in progress.¹⁹

The Wage Council was a new Government-Union-Employer body set up to deal with industrial disputes, such as the existing one, and to settle them, if possible. In the event of an impasse, settlement was reserved to an independent Arbitration Panel. These mechanisms existed then in Britain and were in the process of being transferred to the British Caribbean, for example, Trinidad and Tobago.²⁰

Not surprisingly, neither employers nor Gairy was comfortable about the new mechanisms. The former, long accustomed to having the upper hand over labour, wriggled at the last moment. Arundell reported thus on March 12, 1951:

3. Employers, still enraged at violence, thefts and arson, insist that protective measures be increased. Moreover, they demand introduction of laws like S.R.O. 1305 in the optimistic hope that it will ensure workers' acceptance of Wages Council decision. I understand that unless this is agreed they will proceed with their proposal to send a delegation of two to London.²¹

Arundell and his team called the bluff of the employers and they caved in to the new reality. Gairy also wriggled, fearing a trap. To appease and even to flatter him, Arundell allowed him to use the air to make his appeal to the workers to end the strike. The script was agreed. Gairy played the game. Arundell informed London thus on March 17, 1951:

7. After Gairy's broadcast, Barltrop and Pickthall took him on one side and tried to impress on him that he is now at the parting of the way. One the one hand, is possibly tempting way to chaos. On the other, is much more difficult way back to peaceful conditions. Gairy said the former would be more easy but towards the end he added "I am sure that the best thing for Grenada will be a return to work."²²

The rest is history. The strike was formally ended on March 19, 1951, when Gairy's Union and the Agricultural Employers' Society reached an agreement. Under it, agricultural wages were raised to $1.20 BWI for men, and $1.00 for women. This was a 50% increase, as Gairy had demanded. For the first time, also, workers got paid leave. Those who worked 200 days a year got seven days' paid leave.²³ Gairy was propelled to the commanding heights of political power on the back of this signal victory over the 'old slavocracy' in the general strike.

His party, the Grenada United Labour Party (GULP), swept the board in the first general election on October 10, 1951, under universal adult franchise.

The Regional Pattern of Strikes

The general strike of February-March 1951 in Grenada was not an isolated one. The environment from the end of World War II in the Caribbean was one of a return to the 'domino' strikes that had preceded the outbreak of that global war. The causes were the same. The mass of the working people in the Caribbean remained trapped in abysmal life conditions, after formal slavery had ended in the region between 1838 (British Caribbean) and 1886 (Cuba). Moreover, they were disenfranchised and, hence, could not use their votes to try and alter their life conditions.²⁴ During the war, construction of US base complexes under the Anglo-American Destroyers-Bases Agreement of 1940-1941 in Trinidad, for example, had generated some employment for locals and migrant workers from Grenada and other Eastern Caribbean territories.²⁵ Gairy was one migrant. At 19 or 20, he gained his first job in Trinidad with the Americans. From Trinidad, Gairy moved to new employment in the oil refineries in Aruba which, with those in Curaçao, then ranked among the largest in the world.²⁶

By 1943, however, war work was on the downturn in the Caribbean. In tandem, the graph of high unemployment returned in the base-territories in the American, British, Dutch and French areas. Of course, the pre-war graph remained high in non-base territories. In Grenada, the graph was heightened by the return of some of the migrants from Trinidad.

Between 1945 and 1951, British and US sources record strikes and protests in Surinam,²⁷ British Guiana,²⁸ British Honduras,²⁹ Trinidad and Tobago,³⁰ Antigua³¹ and Jamaica.³² A relative exception was Barbados.³³ At the time of the strike in Grenada in early 1951, the industrial relations environment was very disturbed in Jamaica and Antigua; while that in Trinidad was "fluid".³⁴. Figuring in the unrest were Bustamante and Norman Manley in Jamaica; Bird in Antigua; and Butler in Trinidad. To be more precise: from late 1950 into early 1951, Bustamante's Union was behind a series of strikes at Worthy Park Estate in St. Catherine.³⁵ In Antigua, Bird was locked with the Government and the Syndicate of Estates in a dispute over the question of land distribution to sugar workers. By May 1951, the stoppage had spread from the sugar belt to the docks in Antigua; while the dockworkers in St. Kitts had also gone on strike.³⁶

As contemporary British Governors noted, there was a political dimension to these strikes, namely the advent of new constitutional dispensations for the British territories under universal suffrage and, concomitantly, the emergence of competitive party-politics. Following what was to become a regional pattern, the parties led by Bustamante, Bird, Butler, Adams (Barbados) and Gairy had a trade-union base.

The International Context of Caribbean Strikes

This new phase in the political and social history of the Caribbean coincided with the advent of the Cold War between NATO and the USSR. A new age of warfare had also entered, namely Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs).The Caribbean, which had played a small, but important, role in the winning of War II by the Allies or United Nations, by virtue of the location of bases and the possession of strategic resources such as bauxite, oil and nickel, continued to maintain a similar post-war ranking in the evolving NATO system. Nothing showed this better than the US/NATO decision of use the archipelago of the Caribbean to test the first generation of ICBMs, from a start-up in Florida.³⁷ A second index was British-US talks from 1950 "for defence arrangements in the greater Caribbean area in time of war",³⁸ on the model of arrangements in World War II. These had given overall command of the region to the United States Navy, with the exception of Bermuda.³⁹ By 1950, also, there were parallel US-Dutch conversations relating to the defence of Aruba and Curaçao.

Map entitled "Air and Sea Defense of North America" (click on image above to see larger version). Source, RG 273, Papers of the US National Security Council (NSC), Mill 191, "3 of #3, Report of United States Overseas Military Bases, April 1960, prepared by William E. Lang, Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) et al., Part II, pp. 14-18. There are maps, with data, for bases in Europe in support of NATO; in the Far East; and in the Middle East, South Asia and Southeast Asia.

As the US sources indicate, the objective of the US-Dutch talks was to achieve "an agreement for the use of U.S. military aid in the protection of the oil refineries of Aruba and Curaçao".⁴⁰ The model was World War II, when US Forces occupied these islands as well as continental Surinam, to defend oil and bauxite.⁴¹ The Caribbean oil resources embraced Venezuela and Trinidad. Hence, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) addressed the "Vulnerability To Sabotage of Petroleum Installations in Venezuela, Aruba and Curaçao" in May, 1948.⁴² The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) examined "Emergency Plans for Defense of the Venezuelan Oil Fields" and "Security of Venezuelan Oil Production Area" from May to December, 1948.⁴³ Both the National Security Council (NSC) and the State Department broadened the Venezuelan evaluation into "Security of Strategically Important Industrial Operations in Foreign Countries"⁴⁴ and "Political Factors Affecting the Oil Supplies of the United States and Friendly Powers".⁴⁵

The "friendly powers" in the report of the State Department included Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, the Netherlands West Indies and Trinidad in the circum-Caribbean region. The scenario was a disruption or closure of oil supplies from the Middle East and a greater dependence on supplies in the Western Hemisphere, including the Caribbean. The fear then was that Caribbean oil would be subject to sabotage. The CIA document was very specific for Venezuela, Aruba and Curaçao:

Oil wells in Venezuela and the refineries on the adjacent Netherlands West Indies islands of Aruba and Curaçao offer one of the most remunerative targets for industrial sabotage of the Western Hemisphere. Venezuela in 1947 produced 80 percent of all Western Hemisphere oil excluding the US, and 60 percent of Venezuelan production was refined at Aruba and Curaçao. Political conditions are generally favorable in both areas, but both areas have particular points of vulnerability to sabotage, especially by trained agents. By crippling either production or refining in these areas, or by impairing the utility of the specialist tanker fleet which transports the oil from the wells to the refineries, such agents could seriously affect US capacity either to prepare for or to wage war. Protection against such sabotage would require precautions (cooperatively taken by the companies concerned, the local governments, and the US government) at least as comprehensive as those taken under the emergency of 1941-1945.⁴⁶

Given such strategic stakes in the Caribbean, the "official mind", as well as business, tended to label as "communist" anybody or any activity which was held to be a threat to vital interests. Hence, the nationalists, fighting for the independence of Puerto Rico from the US, were condemned as "communists"; and were harassed by the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) and other agencies, especially when a group of them tried, unsuccessfully, to assassinate President Truman in Blair House, Washington, D.C. on November 2, 1950.⁴⁷

In Jamaica, Norman Manley and his People's National Party were early smeared as "communist". He, his wife, Edna Manley, O.T. Fairclough, Richard A. Hart, Frank A. and Kenneth G. Hill, Roger Mais, and N. N. Nethersole were eight of nine Jamaicans rated in 1947 concerning their "attitude toward and service in the United States" by the State Department.. The ninth person was Owen Karl Henriques, a nominated member of the Legislative Council in 1942-1944 and a prominent businessman. Each of the PNP eight was scored "Outwardly - favorable Inwardly - in doubt" Only Henriques was judged as "favorable". A factor was that he had reported to the US Consulate in Kingston on "the political beliefs of Norman Washington MANLEY".⁴⁸ Bustamante, cousin of Norman Manley and his chief political rival in Jamaican politics, was judged as "totally devoid of racial hatred and colour prejudice...no desire to see the immediate end of British administration in the colony nor the ousting of British, Canadian, or American businesses".⁴⁹ This 1948 evaluation was reached, even though it was Bustamante and his Union that were spearheading the spate of working-class strikes in sugar and other sectors in the Jamaica economy. Bustamante, although a 'SOB', was a 'Western SOB'.

In Trinidad and Tobago by 1951-2, the "official mind" had a very jaundiced view of John Rojas, President of the Oilfield Workers' Trade Union (OWTU) and of the Trinidad and Tobago Trade Unions' Council (TTTUC). In particular, they noted, with disapproval, Rojas' attendance in early 1952 at the meeting of the 'communist' World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) in Vienna and his distancing and that of other trade union leaders from the 'Western' International Conference of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU).⁵⁰ The State Department was pleased however, when, in May, 1952, the Government of Trinidad and Tobago, clamped "certain restrictive measures" on the movements and activities of "communists".⁵¹

What of Gairy and Blaize? As we have seen, the local planters and merchants were convinced that they were "communists".⁵² Acting Governor Green and Donald, the chief Security Adviser, apparently felt the same. They acted to deport Captain Musson, a British citizen, from Grenada, on the ground that he was a "communist" and aiding and abetting Gairy's Union in the strike.⁵³ There is no evidence, however, that Governor Arundell, Barltrop, Pickthall and the Colonial Office regarded Gairy as a "communist". The same was true of the special correspondent of the "Daily Telegraph". To them, Gairy was one of a generation of British West Indian leaders in the post-1945 period who were exploiting long-standing grievances of the working class, by organizing trade unions as the bases of political parties.⁵⁴ The author agrees with this view of Gairy, Bustamante, Butler, Bird and Adams.

Gascoigne Blaize, however, was an ideological animal. He was cleared by the Dutch Authorities in February, 1939, to work with the Lago Oil Transport Co. in Aruba. In 1945, the Dutch Authorities, on a request from the Aruba branch of Marcus Garvey's United Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), agreed to Blaize's "release from the Lago" to "become an employee of the Association, under their guarantee". Blaize was "to teach shorthand and tying to the children of members of the abovementioned Association". The Authorities later discovered that Blaize had tricked them and the UNIA in Aruba. He had not resigned from Lago, as he had claimed, but had been dismissed "for inefficiency and insubordination".⁵⁵ This was the code for trade-union activities within Lago. Thereupon, Blaize was deported from Aruba to Grenada. There, he teamed up with Gairy in trade unionism and in organizing the general strike of 1951. The men apparently knew each other in Aruba. Gairy, in oral interviews with Singham, boasted about his trade union activism in Aruba, which led the Dutch Authorities. to deport him.⁵⁶ There may, however, be a different version of the history, namely Gairy as agent of Lago to hinder the development of trade unionism among the British West Indian employees of Lago and other oil companies in Aruba. The author received this view from members of the British West Indian community in Curaçao, during a visit there for an annual conference of the Association of Caribbean Historians in 1979. This is clearly an area for further research.⁵⁷

Conclusion

The preceding does not detract from our thesis in this paper that the general strike in February-March, called by Gairy and Blaize, was not just a historic event in Grenada. There was a regional and international dimension to it, related to the wind of decolonization, the Cold War and the missile age of warfare. To bring out these related aspects, the author has delved into primary records in Britain and the United States not tapped by historians of the Caribbean to date, as far as he is aware. A lot of the records have been released only in recent times. Some are still classified for reasons of "National Security". The US records are particularly rich for the post-1945 period and before. They are still under-used by historians of the UWI School of History. British socialization, including training in British Universities, predisposes our UWI historians to make the pilgrimage to Britain and to Kew Gardens, particularly, in order to do research on the history of the Commonwealth Caribbean. But the route to the US Archives in Washington, D.C. and in Maryland is not only shorter. It is more cost-efficient for travel and accommodation; and the records in the Archives are veritable lodes of gold.