In the days after the events of 11 September 2001, a colleague told me that the world had changed fundamentally. I responded that the world had not changed; certainly not fundamentally. Rather, the thinking and language of foreign policy in one part of the world had changed. This paper is, consequently, an attempt to rationalise the implications of the events of 11 September for development and foreign policy in the Caribbean, especially Grenada.
The events of 11 September immediately highlighted a number of implications for the region, including Grenada: offshore financial services, economic citizenship, and relations with 'rogue' states, including Libya and Cuba.
The end of the Cold War has left a void in US and NATO policy towards the Caribbean, especially Grenada. The old certainties are no more. The North is no longer willing to trade aid for proxies and votes in international organisations, especially the UN and OAS. Caribbean countries can no longer play the Soviet or Cuba card to attract development assistance, especially grants. There were cataclysmic events during the height of the Cold War that affected the Caribbean. The Jagan administration was effectively overthrown and the PNC under Forbes Burnham installed; a Cubana passenger plane was bombed shortly after take-off from Seawell airport in Barbados in retaliation against the refuelling of Cuban air force aircraft en route to Angola; and in 1983 the US invaded Grenada ostensibly to protect the lives of 1000 American medical students. In all three cases, either the US or one of its allies acted to further the Cold War ambitions of the US. Caribbean governments also facilitated all three events. Little was said in the region about the first two cases, while most governments supported the Reagan administration in 1983. This was the substance of the involvement of the Anglophone Caribbean in the Cold War.
By the late 1980s, Grenada and its Caribbean neighbours lost their value to the US. Budgetary support and aid for a number of programmes and projects were either terminated or wound down in 1987-88 when the Government of Grenada made clear that it was not going to sign up to an IMF Structural Adjustment Programme. Between 1986 and 1995, US aid to the Eastern Caribbean plummeted from US$ 226 million to US$ 25 million (UNIDCP 1997b). Aid to forestall Soviet adventurism and influence was replaced by pressure to stem the flow of narcotics to the US and its Western allies and contain the exodus of illegal aliens.
The scramble for aid has pressured OECS governments to make greater compromises in their foreign policies and development strategies. OECS governments support Japan's position in the International Whaling Commission in exchange for promises of aid. Since 1989, governments in Grenada have supported Taiwan's bid for membership of the UN in exchange for development assistance. There has been an important area of continuity: the promise of aid is almost invariably greater than the value of allocations and disbursements. The inherent compromises are not consistent with the requirements and determinants of foreign policy in the era of globalisation. Foreign policy and continued dependence on foreign aid have not enabled Caribbean countries, especially Grenada, to become more competitive in the international economic system.
The events of 11 September have merely exacerbated the implicit vulnerability of the small states of the Caribbean, especially Grenada.
11 September did not occur in isolation. The representation by the media and officialdom in the US of Osama bin Laden and the acts of 11 September as the work of an individual and organisation deeply bent on the destruction of Western civilisation and the Western secular state is simplistic.
Clearly there is much frustration in the Muslim world with US foreign policy, or failure thereof, in Israel/Palestine, the wider Middle East, Somalia, Bosnia, and Central Asia especially Chechnya (Parsons 1995). Contributing to sustainable world peace has always been secondary to the global ambitions of US foreign policy; the primary objective has long been to secure the informal empire. Compounding the failure of US foreign policy in the foregoing areas was the 'Gulf War' of 1991. Although the Bush insisted that the purpose of the Gulf War was to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait, the unstated objectives were: a) to secure oil lines of supply to the US; b) to regain territory lost in the late 1970s and early 1980s; and, c) to establish a launch pad for a future overthrow of Saddam Hussein.
Terrorism is not new. As Professor Sir Michael Howard puts it, whereas the state has the apparatus and military forces to fight wars and battles, the poor have only terrorist action, 'the weapon of the weak and highly motivated' (Howard 2001). The primary purpose of terrorism may be to attract public attention, rather than a component of a grand strategy. However, one of the objectives of terrorism is, through public opinon, to influence the state or overthrow the government. On the other hand, President Museveni contends that terrorism is self-defeating, 'As long as the army is intact or is viable, supported by the people, with a viable economy, the freedom fighter will never gain victory. By attacking civilians, therefore, the terrorist is attacking the wrong target' (Museveni 2001). The succes of trerrorist action is, therefore, dependent on the weakening of the security forces of the state. It might be worth noting that Mahatma Gandhi and Nelson Mandela were identified as terrorists during their times of imprisonment and struggle. In summer 1990, in identifying the ANC as a terroist organisation, and Mandela as a terrorist leader, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher declared that anyone who thought the ANC would form the next government in South Africa and Nelson Mandela would be President was living in "cloud cuckoo land". Fewer than five years later, Mrs Thatcher was leading a standing ovation for President Mandela at the Great Hall of Westminster.
The British experience with terrorism has been instructive. For decades London has faced the scourge of terrorism by the IRA. On occasion there has been suspicion that the IRA has been based, or has operated from, the Republic of Ireland. Nevertheless, successive British governments have defined IRA terrorism as a criminal act and have, thus, pursued and treated those who have engaged in terrorism as criminals. Terrorists have been held responsible under British law. The response of the British Government to the events of 11 September may not represent a fundamental shift in policy, but it certainly does reveal a major shift in the policy toward Terrorism, and bears a remarkable likeness to the US pattern. The US policy elucidated by President Bush as 'we'll sniff him out, smoke him out, and bring him to justice', is consistent with the invasion of Central American and Caribbean countries through most of the 19th and 20th centuries, and the unique interpretation of peacekeeping in Somalia in the early 1990s.
Although the US and UK Governments did say in the weeks after 11 September that they were committed to resolution of the Israel-Palestine conflict (Prime Minister Blair spoke of his Government's commitment to 'a viable Palestinian state'), such statements may really have been a means by which to persuade 'moderate' Muslim states to join the coalition. Pakistan, which had been accused of harbouring and training the Taliban, was a beneficiary of substantial US and World Bank aid in the anti-Taliban effort. It appears that the success of the Afghanistan operation has more recently muted the US and British Governments' positions regarding Israel-Palestine.
President Bush has made it clear that while the US prefers a coalition in its Afghanistan operation, it is prepared to revert to unilateralism. Although it is not clear who is leading the chorus, the US media's resort to jingoism — 'America Stands Alone', and 'America's New War' — may be an echoing of the President. In the more than three decades of experience with terrorism, no British Government has adopted such an approach. President Bush and his advisers have also made clear that the 'war against terrorism' is likely to be protracted, and may take up to 50 years. The version of 'us versus them' to which the US has resorted is far more extreme than that of the Cold War.
11 September has made the US far more aware of its vulnerability as a superpower. For decades US governments were proud that no enemy had been able to penetrate the mainland; Pearl Harbour having been the closest that any enemy had got, and Japan having lost the war. Developing creative solutions to the conflicts that lie at the root of the existence and quest of Al Qaida and Osama bin Laden is secondary, at best, to securing borders and reasserting hegemony. Washington has also become more cognisant of its Achilles heel: proliferation of the very weapons of mass destruction that it and its allies have developed since the Second World War. The genie having been allowed out of the bottle, Washington now intends to abrogate the ABM Treaty and proceed with development of a nuclear shield. The events of 11 September have shown, however, that the enemy does not need a nuclear, chemical, biological, or bacteriological weapon; a passenger aircraft is quite adequate.
One of the questions to have come out of the US response to 11 September is whether this is the beginning of the end of the US empire. President Museveni thinks not (2001). Paul Kennedy may not agree with President Museveni. Kennedy (1988) postulates that there are three phases to the lifespan of any empire. First, the country goes to war to acquire territory and peoples who are subjected. Second, it goes to war to procure resources and markets for its generation of wealth. Third, it goes to war to protect its affluence. In the first and second stages, there are clear economic and political objectives, so the costs of war are almost invariably written off many times over. In the third stage, however, the empire is determined to protect its affluence, and expends existing wealth to do so, so that there are no real gains to be made. In the third phase, the empire is in decline.
Another postulate is that this may be the beginning of the new world order - a war between and among civilisations (Huntington 1995). Many of the statements of officials of the Bush administration suggest that there is an inclination in Washington to the Huntington thesis. While identifying terrorism as 'a virus' that has to be fought, but cognisant that it is not possible to 'eradicate the problem', Ambassador Richard N. Haass declares 'Our campaign against international terrorism does not represent a some of sort of "clash of civilisations". Instead, it is a clash between civilisation and those who destroy it' (Haass 2001). By implication, the civilised world is under threat. James Rubin, former Press Secretary in the Department of State during the Clinton administration, has often argued in his commentaries on the BBC that Al Qaida, the Taliban, and other such fundamentalist Islamic organisations, are determined to destroy Western civilisation. So whatever language US policymakers and influential commentators choose to use, the subtext seems to be that Washington has entered the 'new war': the clash of civilisations.
The policy followed by the Bush administration, like Huntington's thesis, is flawed. There appears to be a difference in their view, between Christian fundamentalism in the US that attacks the secular libertarian state and many of its institutions (including the Supreme Court that protects libertarian values) and Islamic fundamentalism. There is also a diminution of the fact that the myriad Christian faiths are mirrored by the Muslim communities. There is probably as much homogeneity among Muslims worldwide as there is among Christians.
The threat posed by organisations like the Taliban and Al Qaida in Muslim countries is less a function of war against secularism and Western values than evidence of frustration with the many dictatorships that litter the Third World, from Egypt to Indonesia, and Iraq to Kenya. The overthrow of the Shah of Iran in 1979 was popular, not because of a desire to return to what Pol Pot called 'Year Zero', but a need to rid the country of a corrupt, autocratic, morally bankrupt, dictatorship and the system it designed to protect itself. Revolution, however, did not result in the introduction of libertarian values and democracy; few revolutions have opened themselves to scrutiny and fewer revolutionaries are willing to relinquish the power and authority they fought for. Rather, revolutionary leaders resort to totalitarianism to retain power.
Having won a military victory, the US and its allies now have to address a political settlement, and economic reconstruction in Afghanistan. The dilemma could not be more marked. Does the US hand Afghanistan over to indigenous communities and respect the sovereignty of the state; continue to influence events in the country; or hand the country over to the UN as happened with Somalia eventually. Continued US involvement in the political negotiations and selection of a government would represent a conflict of interest. Afghanistan has, if anything, widened the sphere of influence of the US. The US, having won a military victory, may just as easily lose interest as it did when the Cold War came to an end, and as the Caribbean has come to discover since 1990.
Grenada may have been affected by the events of 11 September; however, the global recession that began in the third quarter of 2000 has had a greater impact on the economy. As with the oil shocks of the 1970s, the small open economy is susceptible to external shocks (Commonwealth Advisory Group 1997; Commonwealth Consultative Group 1985).
While there was an initial expectation of a slowdown in tourism after 11 September, the industry actually picked up, especially cruise tourism. Poon and Poon note that international and regional crises have, historically, not significantly affected tourism (1994). Former President Clinton agrees with this postulate. Speaking in Trinidad on 23 October 2001, he told a meeting of insurance executives that he saw the events having 'little or no effect on the Caribbean'. However, 'If the US is slow to recover from the attacks, the region will be affected as American's purchasing power will be affected'. To President Clinton, the recession posed a greater threat to economic stability in the region than the events of 11 September (Musumba 2001).
In fact, tourism has not been as badly affected as was anticipated. While there was a decline in both stay-over and cruise visitors during the first half of 2001, consistent with the global recession, conditions had improved by November. Whereas stayover visitor arrivals fell by 14.42% in September 2001 in relation September 2000, and a further 18.37% in October 2001 (in relation to October 2000), there had been an improvement by November, with a decline of 7.7%. Cruise arrivals improved however. In August 2001, there was a decline of 38.89% in ship arrivals (in relation to August 2000), with a fall of 71.56% in visitor arrivals. In September 2001, there was no change (over 2000) in ship calls, with a decline in visitor arrivals of 43.79% (in relation to 2000). By October 2001, however, the decline in ship calls had improved and passenger arrivals had increased by 13.09%. In November, there was no change in ship calls, but passenger arrivals increased by 12.45% (Grenada Board of Tourism 2001: 6, 10).
The withdrawal of JMC in 2000 after the buyout by the Thomson chain resulted in much concern about the immediate future of tourism. However, since 11 September British Airways, which had also been considering a partial pull-out, has indicated an interest in consolidating its flights to Grenada. This is a significant development with implications for stay-over visitors.
Within a month of the events of 11 September, CARICOM Heads of Government agreed an $18 million tourism promotion and marketing campaign, primarily involving television advertisements to the US, UK, and Canada (Bahamas Information Services 2001). The Heads of Government also agreed a number of proposals to attract visitors and convince governments in industrial countries that the Caribbean is safe for visitors (Bahamas Information Services 2001).
The central challenge remains planning and marketing the OECS (if not the Anglophone Caribbean) as a single destination with unique points of interest (such as Dominica's tropical rain forest, Grenada's volcanic lakes, and so on). There is much to be learnt from Barbados and the Bahamas about the management and marketing of the tourism industry (Bahamas Information Services 2001). The marketing of the Caribbean and Grenada as a safe haven for visitors is an imperative for the sustainability of the industry and strengthening of the economy.
Environmental degradation is affecting the region. Despite protests from governments and environmental organisations, Japan continues to ply its cargoes of nuclear waste through the Caribbean Sea. Governments, especially in the aid-dependent OECS, are caught between making significant concessions in environmental (and marine) conservation and the need for foreign aid. This dilemma has been most clearly brought out by the support OECS governments give to Japan in the International Whaling Commission. Support for Japan's call for an end to the moratorium on the harvesting of minkhe whales can have a negative impact on the eco-tourism industry in the OECS. In 1999, the US Government successfully brought charges against Carnival Cruise Lines for polluting the Caribbean Sea and Gulf of Mexico. Governments in the region do not have the resources to either patrol or take legal action against violators of environmental protection laws. These are issues that pre-dated 11 September but need to be addressed.
11 September resulted in heightened concern in the industrial world about use the offshore financial services sector, especially offshore banking and economic citizenship, for the financing and concealment of identities of known and potential terrorists. The imposition of visa restrictions by Canada followed the blacklisting of a number of OECS member states by the OECD/FATF
To the US Internal Revenue Service, Caribbean offshore centres cost the US Government US$ 70 billion annually. 'Some Caribbean countries offer an alluring tax haven, however, because they impose no income tax and do not generally co-operate with IRS efforts to track down incomes' (Johnston 2000). The IRS has, consequently, required that US nationals file their credit card slips with their annual tax returns. One scholar, writing for the conservative Heritage Foundation, argues that the imposition of restrictions by the US and its OECD allies is a form of protectionism (Mitchell 2000; Mitchell 2001). While the OECD contention that Caribbean offshore centres are engaging in unfair tax competition is far from persuasive, visa restrictions and blacklisting are indicative of the power the G-7 wields over the economies of small vulnerable island states.
The offshore industry is, clearly, an important source of revenue to OECS member states. According to Bardouille, offshore centres in the Caribbean account for approximately one-third of the US$ 5 trillion to US$ 6 trillion that circulates through 70 offshore financial centres worldwide (Bardouille 2001: 11). Bardouille (2001: 12) points out that in Grenada, offshore banks expenditure increased from EC$ 70,000 in 1998 to EC$ 250,000 in 1999, and a further EC$ 3,000,000 targeted in December 2000. According to Finance Minister Boatswain, offshore financial services accounted for 200 jobs in 2000 (Boatswain 2000).
Removal of Grenada from the OECD blacklist is conditional on strengthening of the regulatory machinery, and greater access to information pertaining to the identities of account holders (the second of these conditions has implications for the secrecy that attracts investors/depositors). The scandals surrounding First International Bank have, however, severely damaged the reputation of Grenada, and repairing this damage may take some time (IMF 2001; DOS 2001a; DOS 2001b).
The imposition of visa restrictions on some OECS countries by Canada might be the consequence of the Christopher Skase scandal. It might also be a response to the ongoing concern in North America and Europe about the influx of illegal aliens, especially during times of economic recession.
Foreign policy and foreign relations are an extension of national interests. It is the route through which the state seeks alliances to further its strategic ambitions and enhance its domestic economic and social conditions. The world's superpowers and major powers do possess the economic and military instruments of power to exercise their will. Such was the lesson of the destabilisation and subsequent invasion of Grenada in 1979-1983. Henfrey (1984: 28) concludes 'no revolutionary leadership, however strong its popular base, could have been immune to the US pressures on so small a country as Grenada'.
The OECS, especially Grenada, has received far less in foreign aid from patron states that it has made in concessions, whether the US or the Soviet Union, and now Japan. Having received such little foreign aid from the Soviet Union in relation to the foreign policy concessions made, the PRG found itself with few allies against destabilisation by the Reagan administration by the end of 1982 (Jacobs 1983). The small state, therefore, is faced with the challenge of finding an acceptable balance between its national interests and the pressures that will or may result from its foreign policy decisions. The visit to Libya by heads of government of the OECS in the weeks preceding 11 September, despite concern expressed by the US administration to the Governments of the Eastern Caribbean, is such a case.
Security concerns now absorb US policy makers and the American public. Governments in the Eastern Caribbean, indeed the entire developing world, are now expected to improve markedly their security arrangements at air and sea ports. Implicit is significantly increased expenditure on security, and greater co-operation with the metropolitan centres to persuade their nationals that the Eastern Caribbean is a safe destination. At the same time, governments are faced with the challenge of ensuring that their countries do not become havens for terrorists, while respecting the rights of the citizenry.
One of the central issues accentuated by 11 September is the need for an OECS and CARICOM policy toward the US and rest of the North. Caribbean governments have been divided and have tended to respond to events, issues and policies in and of the industrial world, especially the US. OECS and CARICOM governments need to identify common areas of concern and assert their national (regional) interests. The termination of joint diplomatic representation on 1 July 1997 by the OECS Authority brought to an end the prospect of a single diplomatic service (and rationalisation of the cost of maintaining the service), and harmonisation of foreign policy and foreign relations. This step has weakened the capability of the region in understanding the outside world; and develop a coherent, rational short and long term strategy to exploit opportunities to achieve development objectives.
Reactive policy has to defer to a rational active policy that represents the interests of the Anglophone Caribbean and pursues the development objectives of the region. There has been little consistency and coherence in foreign policy decision making and the conduct of foreign relations since the 1970s. Disagreements over allowing Cuba to refuel aircraft en route to Angola were followed by divergences in relations with the PRG on one hand, and responses to attempts by the Carter and Reagan administrations to divide CARICOM and OECS Governments during the Grenada revolution. There was evidence of discord in support for Bernd Niehaus' bid for election to the post of Secretary General of the OAS (COHA 1994). The OECS, it appears, was responding to the influence of the Clinton administration, in spite of the US challenge to the region's banana trading arrangements with the European Union. Unlike the MDCs, OECS Governments offered little resistance to US terms in the imposition of the Shiprider Agreements. OECS Governments failed to adopt a multilateral approach toward the US and declined to call upon the greater strength of the MDCs in negotiating the Agreements. As Demas (1987) has pointed out, the success of the international relations of the OECS lies, in part, in the formation of a single grouping and, in the interim, harmonisation of foreign policy and foreign relations.
A united approach is essential to overcoming the vulnerability of the region.
Concern in the metropolitan centres about the recurrence of mass terrorism has implications for economic survival in the region, especially tourism, development assistance, and the prospect of embargoes and blacklistings.
The events of 11 September did not exacerbate economic conditions in Grenada. The recession that preceded 11 September, and poorly designed macro-economic and fiscal policies, have had a far deeper impact.
While mass terrorism has introduced a new dynamic to the vulnerability of the small island states of the Caribbean, it really is a continuation of the old concerns about the domino effect and ideological penetration in the industrial world. On one hand, the apparent misconstruction of the motives of Al Qaida conflicts with the objectives of US foreign policy in the Middle East and Central Asia.
The main challenge for the Caribbean, especially Grenada, lies in the balancing act between achieving objectives of a development strategy, securing borders against terrorists and the powerful states of the world. Governments are also faced with a need to ensure that policies are so designed that some insulation is offered to economies and societies, and that there is minimal exposure to the fallout of such trans-national disasters as the bombings of 11 September.
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