The dialogue called Euthyphron, over and above its contribution to the ethical enquiries of Plato, has a certain bearing on the character and exculpation of Sokrates. It will therefore come conveniently in immediate sequel to the Apology and the Kriton.
Situation supposed in the dialogue — interlocutors.
The indictment by Melętus against Sokrates is assumed to have been formally entered in the office of the King Archon. Sokrates has come to plead to it. In the portico before that office, he meets Euthyphron: a man of ultra-pious pretensions, possessing special religious knowledge (either from revelation directly to himself, or from having been initiated in the various mysteries consecrated throughout Greece), delivering authoritative opinions on doubtful theological points, and prophesying future events.1
1 Plato, Euthyphr. c. 2, p. 3 D; compare Herodot. ii. 51.
What brings you here, Sokrates (asks Euthyphron), away from your usual haunts? Is it possible that any one can have preferred an indictment against you?
Indictment by Melętus against Sokrates — Antipathy of the Athenians towards those who spread heretical opinions.
Yes (replies Sokrates), a young man named Melętus. He takes commendable interest in the training of youth, and has indicted me as a corruptor of youth. He says that I corrupt them by teaching belief in new gods, and unbelief in the true and ancient Gods.
Euthyph. — I understand: it is because you talk about the Dćmon or Genius often communicating with you, that Melętus calls you an innovator in religion. He knows that such calumnies find ready 438 admission with most minds.2 So also, people laugh at me, when I talk about religion, and when I predict future events in the assembly. It must be from jealousy; because all that I have predicted has come true.
2 Plato, Euthyph. c. 2, p. 3 B: φησὶ γάρ με ποιητὴν εἶναι θεῶν καὶ ὡς καινοὺς ποιοῦντα θεούς, τοὺς δ’ ἀρχαίους οὐ νομίζοντα, ἐγράψατο τούτων αὐτῶν ἕνεκα, ὥς φησιν. c. 5, p. 5 A: αὐτοσχεδιάζοντα καὶ καινοτομοῦντα περὶ τῶν θείων ἐξαμαρτάνειν.
Sokr. — To be laughed at is no great matter. The Athenians do not care much when they regard a man as overwise, but as not given to teach his wisdom to others: but when they regard him besides, as likely to make others such as he is himself, they become seriously angry with him — be it from jealousy, as you say, or from any other cause. You keep yourself apart, and teach no one; for my part, I delight in nothing so much as in teaching all that I know. If they take the matter thus seriously, the result may be very doubtful.3
3 Plato, Euthyphr. c. 3, p. 3 C.-D. Ἀθηναίοις γὰρ οὐ σφόδρα μέλει, ἄν τινα δεινὸν οἴωνται εἶναι, μὴ μέντοι διδασκαλικὸν τῆς αὐτοῦ σοφίας· ὃν δ’ ἂν καὶ ἄλλους οἴωνται ποιεῖν τοιούτους, θυμοῦνται, εἶτ’ οὖν φθόνῳ, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, εἴτε δι’ ἄλλο τι.
Euthyphron recounts that he is prosecuting an indictment for murder against his own father — Displeasure of his friends at the proceeding.
Sokrates now learns what is Euthyphron’s business at the archontic office. Euthyphron is prosecuting an indictment before the King Archon, against his own father; as having caused the death of a dependent workman, who in a fit of intoxication had quarrelled with and killed a fellow-servant. The father of Euthyphron, upon this occurrence, bound the homicide hand and foot, and threw him into a ditch: at the same time sending to the Exęgętęs (the canonical adviser, supposed to be conversant with the divine sanctions, whom it was customary to consult when doubts arose about sacred things) to ask what was to be done with him. The incident occurred at Naxos, and the messenger was sent to the Exęgętęs at Athens: before he could return, the prisoner had perished, from hunger, cold, and bonds. Euthyphron has indicted his father for homicide, as having caused the death of the prisoner: who (it would appear) had remained in the ditch, tied hand and foot, without food, and with no more than his ordinary clothing, during the time occupied in the voyage from Naxos to Athens, in obtaining the answer of the Exęgętęs, and in returning to Naxos.
My friends and relatives (says Euthyphron) cry out against me for this proceeding, as if I were mad. They say that my father did not kill the man:4 that even if he had, the man had committed murder: lastly, that however the case may have been, to indict my own father is monstrous and inexcusable. Such reasoning is silly. The only point to be considered is, whether my father killed the deceased justly or unjustly. If justly there is nothing to be said; if unjustly, then my father becomes a man tainted with impiety and accursed. I and every one else, who, knowing the facts, live under the same roof and at the same table with him, come under the like curse; unless I purify myself by bringing him to justice. The course which I am now taking is prescribed by piety or holiness. My friends indeed tell me that it is unholy for a son to indict his father. But I know better than they, what holiness is and I should be ashamed of myself if I did not.5
4 According to the Attic law every citizen was bound, in case any one of his relatives (μέχρις ἀνεψιαδῶν) or any member of his household (οἰκέτης) had been put to death, to come forward as prosecutor and indict the murderer. This was binding upon the citizen alike in law and in religion.
Demosthen. cont. Euerg. et Mnesibul. p. 1161. Jul. Pollux, viii. 118.
Euthyphron would thus have been considered as acting with propriety, if the person indicted had been a stranger.
5 Plato, Euthyphron, c. 4, p. 4. Respecting the μίασμα, which a person who had committed criminal homicide was supposed to carry about with him wherever he went, communicating it both to places and to companions, see Antiphon. Tetralog. i. 2, 5, 10; iii. s. 7, p. 116; and De Herodis Cćde s. 81, p. 139. The argument here employed by Euthyphron is used also by the Platonic Sokrates in the Gorgias, 480 C-D. If a man has committed injustice, punishment is the only way of curing him. That he should escape unpunished is the worst thing that can happen to him. If you yourself, or your father, or your friend, have committed injustice, do not seek to avert the punishment either from yourself or them, but rather invoke it. This is exactly what Euthyphron is doing, and what the Platonic Sokrates (in dialogue Euthyphron) calls in question.
Euthyphron expresses full confidence that this step of his is both required and warranted by piety or holiness. Sokrates asks him — What is Holiness?
I confess myself (says Sokrates) ignorant respecting the question,6 and I shall be grateful if you will teach me: the rather as I shall be able to defend myself better against Melętus. Tell me what is the general constituent feature of Holiness? What is that common essence, or same character, which belongs to and distinguishes all holy or pious acts?7
6 Plato, Euthyphron, c. 6, p. 6 B. τί γὰρ καὶ φήσομεν, οἵ γε καὶ αὐτοὶ ὁμολογοῦμεν περὶ αὐτῶν μηδὲν εἰδέναι;
7 Plato, Euthyphron, c. 6, p. 5 D. Among the various reasons (none of them valid in my judgment) given by Ueberweg (Untersuch. p. 251) for suspecting the authenticity of the Euthyphron, one is that τὸ ἀνόσιον is reckoned as an εἶδος as well as τὸ ὅσιον. Ueberweg seems to think this absurd, since he annexes to the word a note of admiration. But Plato expressly gives τὸ ἄδικον as an εἶδος, along with τὸ δίκαιον (Repub. v. 476 A); and one of the objections taken against his theory by Aristotle was, that it would assume substantive Ideas corresponding to negative terms — τῶν ἀποφάσεων ἰδέας. See Aristot. Metaphys. A. 990, b. 13, with the Scholion of Alexander, p. 565, a. 81, r.
Euthyphron alludes to the punishment of Uranus by his son Kronus and of Kronus by his son Zeus.
It is holy (replies Euthyphron) to do what I am now doing: to bring to justice the man who commits impiety, either by homicide or sacrilege or any other such crime, whoever he be — even though it be your own father. The examples of the Gods teach us this. Kronus punished his father Uranus for wrong-doing: Zeus, whom every one holds to be the best and justest of the Gods, did the like by his father Kronus. I only follow their example. Those who blame my conduct contradict themselves when they talk about the Gods and about me.8
8 Plato, Euthyphron, p. 5-6.
We see here that Euthyphron is made to follow out the precept delivered by the Platonic Sokrates in the Thećtętus and elsewhere — to make himself as like to the Gods as possible — (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν. Thećtęt. p. 176 B; compare Phćdrus, 252 C) — only that he conceives the attributes and proceedings of the Gods differently from Sokrates.
Sokrates intimates his own hesitation in believing these stories of discord among the Gods. Euthyphron declares his full belief in them, as well as in many similar narratives, not in so much circulation.
Do you really confidently believe these stories (asks Sokrates), as well as many others about the discord and conflicts among the Gods, which are circulated among the public by poets and painters? For my part, I have some repugnance in believing them;9 it is for reason probably, I am now to be indicted, and proclaimed as doing wrong. If you tell me that you are persuaded of their truth, I must bow to your superior knowledge. I cannot help doing so, since for my part I pretend to no knowledge whatever about them.
9 Plato, Euthyphron, c. 6, p. 6 A. Ἀρά γε τοῦτ’ ἔστιν, οὖ ἕνεκα τὴν γραφὴν φεύγω, ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπειδάν τις περὶ τῶν θεῶν λέγῃ, δυσχερῶς πως ἀποδέχομαι; δι’ ἃ δὴ, ὡς ἔοικε, φήσει τίς με ἐξαμαρτάνειν.
I am persuaded that these narratives are true (says Euthyphron): and not only they, but many other narratives yet more surprising, of which most persons are ignorant. I can tell you some of them, if you like to hear. You shall tell me another time (replies Sokrates): now let me repeat my question to you respecting holiness.10
10 Plato, Euthyphron, c. 6, p. 6 C.
Bearing of this dialogue on the relative position of Sokrates and the Athenian public.
Before we pursue this enquiry respecting holiness, which is the portion of the dialogue bearing on the Platonic ethics, I will say one word on the portion which has preceded, and which appears to bear on the position and character of Sokrates. He (Sokrates) has incurred odium from the Dikastery and the public, because he is heretical and incredulous. “He does not believe in those Gods in whom the city believes, but introduces religious novelties” — to use the words of the indictment preferred against him by Melętus. The Athenian public felt the same displeasure and offence in hearing their divine legends, such as those of Zeus and Kronus,11 called in question or criticised in an ethical spirit different from their own — as is felt by Jews or Christians when various narratives of the Old Testament are criticised in an adverse spirit, and when the proceedings ascribed to Jehovah are represented as unworthy of a just and beneficent god. We read in Herodotus what was the sentiment of pious contemporaries respecting narratives of divine matters. Herodotus keeps back many of them by design, and announces that he will never recite them except in case of necessity: while in one instance, where he has been betrayed into criticism upon a few of them, as inconsiderate and incredible, he is seized with misgivings, and prays that Gods and heroes will not be offended with him.12 The freethinkers, among whom Sokrates was numbered, were the persons from whom adverse criticism came. It is these men who are depicted by orthodox opponents as committing lawless acts, and justifying themselves by precedents 442drawn from the proceedings or Zeus.13 They are, besides, especially accused of teaching children to despise or even to ill-use their parents.14
11 I shall say more about Plato’s views on the theological legends generally believed by his countrymen, when I come to the language which he puts into the mouth of Sokrates in the second and third books of the Republic. Eusebius considers it matter of praise when he says “that Plato rejected all the opinions of his country-men concerning the Gods and exposed their absurdity” — ὅπως τε πάσας τὰς πατρίους περὶ τῶν θεῶν ὑπολήψεις ἠθέτει, καὶ τὴν ἀτοπίαν αὐτῶν διήλεγχεν (Prćp. Evan. xiii. 1) — the very same thing which is averred in the indictment laid by Melętus against Sokrates.
12 Herodot. ii. 65: τῶν δὲ εἵνεκεν ἀνεῖται τὰ ἱρὰ, εἰ λέγοιμι, καταβαίην ἂν τῷ λόγῳ ἐς τὰ θεῖα πρήγματα, τὰ ἐγὼ φεύγω μάλιστα ἀπηγεέσθαι. τὰ δὲ καὶ εἴρηκα αὐτῶν ἐπιψαύσας, ἀναγκαίη καταλαμβανόμενος εἶπον.… 45. Λέγουσι δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ἄλλα ἀνεπισκέπτως οἱ Ἕλληνες· εὐήθης δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ ὅδε ὁ μῦθος ἐστι, τὸν περὶ τοῦ Ἡρακλέος λέγουσι.… ἔτι δὲ ἕνα ἐόντα τὸν Ἡρακλέα, καὶ ἔτι ἄνθρωπον, ὡς δή φασι, κῶς φύσιν ἔχει πολλὰς μυριάδας φονεῦσαι; καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων τοσαῦτα ἡμῖν εἰποῦσι, καὶ παρὰ τῶν θεῶν καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἡρώων εὐμένεια εἴη.
About the ἱροὶ λόγοι which he keeps back, see cap. 51, 61, 62, 81, 170, &c.
13 Aristoph. Nubes, 905-1080.
14 Aristoph. Nubes, 994-1333-1444. Xenophon, Mem. i. 2, 49. Σωκράτης — τοὺς πατέρας προπηλακίζειν ἐδίδασκε (accusation by Melętus).
Dramatic moral set forth by Aristophanes against Sokrates and the freethinkers, is here retorted by Plato against the orthodox champion.
Now in the dialogue here before us, Plato retorts this attack. Euthyphron possesses in the fullest measure the virtues of a believer. He believes not only all that orthodox Athenians usually believed respecting the Gods, but more besides.15 His faith is so implicit, that he proclaims it as accurate knowledge, and carries it into practice with full confidence; reproaching other orthodox persons with inconsistency and short-coming, and disregarding the judgment of the multitude, as Sokrates does in the Kriton.16 Euthyphron stands forward as the champion of the Gods, determined not to leave unpunished the man who has committed impiety, let him be who he may.17 These lofty religious pretensions impel him, with full persuasion of right, to indict his own father for homicide, under the circumstances above described. Now in the eyes of the Athenian public, there could hardly be any act more abhorrent, than that of a man thus invoking upon his father the severest penalties of law. It would probably be not less abhorrent than that of a son beating his own father. When therefore we read, in the Nubes of Aristophanes, the dramatic moral set forth against Sokrates, “See the consequences to which free-thinking and the new system of education lead18 — the son Pheidippides beating his own father, and justifying the action as right, by citing the violence of Zeus towards his father Kronus” — we may take the Platonic Euthyphron as an antithesis to this moral, propounded by a defender of Sokrates, “See the consequences to which consistent orthodoxy and implicit faith conduct. The son Euthyphron indicts his own 443father for homicide; he vindicates the step as conformable to the proceedings of the gods; he even prides himself on it as championship on their behalf, such as all religious men ought to approve.”19
15 Plato, Euthyphron, c. 6, p. 6 B. καὶ ἔτι γε τούτων θαυμασιώτερα, ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ οὐκ ἴσασιν.
Euthyphron belonged to the class described in Euripides, Hippol. 45:—
Ὅσοι μεν οὖν γραφάς τε τῶν παλαιτέρων Ἔχοισιν, αὐτοί τ’ εἰσὶν ἐν μούσαις ἀεί, Ἴσασιν, &c. |
Compare also Euripid. Herakleidć, 404.
16 Plato, Euthyphron, c. 4, p. 5 A; c. 6, p. 6 A.
17 Plato, Euthyphron, c. 6, p. 5 E. μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν τῷ ἀσεβοῦντι μηδ’ ἂν ὁστισοῦν τυγχάνῃ ὦν.
18 Aristoph. Nubes, 937. τὴν καινὴν παίδευσιν, &c.
19 Schleiermacher (Einleitung zum Euthyphron, vol. ii. pp. 51-54) has many remarks on the Euthyphron in which I do not concur; but his conception of its “unverkennbare apologetische Absicht” is very much the same as mine. He describes Euthyphron as a man “der sich besonders auf das Göttliche zu verstehen vorgab, und die rechtglaubigen aus den alten theologischen Dichtern gezogenen Begriffe tapfer vertheidigte. Diesen nun gerade bei der Anklage des Sokrates mit ihm in Berührung, und durch den unsittlichen Streich, den sein Eifer für die Frömmigkeit veranlasste, in Gegensatz zu bringen — war ein des Platon nicht unwürdiger Gedanke” (p. 54). But when Schleiermacher affirms that the dialogue was indisputably composed (unstreitig) between the indictment and the trial of Sokrates, — and when he explains what he considers the defects of the dialogue, by the necessity of finishing it in a hurry (p. 53), I dissent from him altogether, though Steinhart adopts the same opinion. Nor can I perceive in what way the Euthyphron is (as he affirms) either “a natural out-growth of the Protagoras,” or “an approximation and preparation for the Parmenidęs” (p. 52). Still less do I feel the force of his reasons for hesitating in admitting it to be a genuine work of Plato.
I have given my reasons, in a preceding chapter, for believing that Plato composed no dialogues at all during the lifetime of Sokrates. But that he should publish such a dialogue while the trial of Sokrates was impending, is a supposition altogether inadmissible, in my judgment. The effect of it would be to make the position of Sokrates much worse on his trial. Herein I agree with Ueberweg (Untersuch. p. 250), though I do not share his doubts of the authenticity of the dialogue.
The confident assertion of Stallbaum surprises me. “Constat enim Platonem eo tempore, quo Socrati tantum erat odium conflatum, ut ei judicii immineret periculum, complures dialogos composuisse; in quibus id egit, ut viri sanctissimi adversarios in eo ipso genere, in quo sibi plurimum sapere videbantur, inscitić et ignorantić coargueret. Nam Euthyphronem novimus, ad vates ignorantić rerum gravissimarum convincendos, esse compositum; ut in quo eos ne pietatis quidem notionem tenere ostenditur. In Menone autem id agitur, ut sophistas et viros civiles non scientiâ atque arte, sed cœco quodam impetu mentis et sorte divinâ duci demonstretur: quod quidem ita fit, ut colloquium ex parte cum Anyto, Socratis accusatore, habeatur.… Nam Menonem quidem et Euthyphronem Plato eo confecit tempore, quo Socratis causa haud ita pridem in judicio versabatur, nec tamen jam tanta ei videbatur imminere calamitas, quanta postea consecuta est. Ex quo sané verisimiliter colligere licet Ionem, cujus simile argumentum et consilium est, circa idem tempus literis consignatum esse.” Stallbaum, Prolegom. ad Platonis Ionem, pp. 288-289, vol. iv. [Comp. Stallb. ibid., 2nd ed. pp. 339-341].
“Imo uno exemplo Euthyphronis, boni quidem hominis ideoque ne Socrati quidem inimici, sed ejusdem superstitiosi, vel ut hodie loquuntur, orthodoxi, qualis Athenis vulgň esset religionis conditio, declarare instituit. Ex quo nobis quidem clarissimé videtur apparere Platonem hoc unum spectavisse, ut judices admonerentur, ne populari superstitioni in sententiis ferendis plus justo tribuerent.” Stallbaum, Proleg. ad Euthyphron. T. vi. p. 146.
Steinhart also (in his Einleitung, p. 190) calls Euthyphron “ein rechtgläubiger von reinsten Wasser — ein ueberfrommer, fanatischer, Mann,” &c.
In the two preceding pages Stallbaum defends himself against objections made to his view, on the ground that Plato, by composing such dialogues at this critical moment, would increase the unpopularity and danger of Sokrates, instead of diminishing it. Stallbaum contends (p. 145) that neither Sokrates nor Plato nor any of the other Sokratic men, believed that the trial would end in a verdict of guilty: which is probably true about Plato, and would have been borne out by the event if Sokrates had made a different defence. But this does not assist the conclusion which Stallbaum wishes to bring out; for it is not the less true that the dialogues of Plato, if published at that moment, would increase the exasperation against Sokrates, and the chance, whatever it was, that he would be found guilty. Stallbaum refers by mistake to a passage in the Platonic Apology (p. 36 A), as if Sokrates there expressed his surprise at the verdict of guilty, anticipating a verdict of acquittal. The passage declares the contrary: Sokrates expresses his surprise that the verdict of guilty had passed by so small a majority as five; he had expected that it would pass by a larger majority.
Sequel of the dialogue — Euthyphron gives a particular example as the reply to a general question.
I proceed now with that which may be called the Platonic purpose in the dialogue — the enquiry into the general idea of Holiness. When the question was first put to Euthyphron, What is the Holy? — he replied, “That which I am now doing.” Sokr. That may be: but many other things besides are also holy. — Euthyph. Certainly. — Sokr. Then your answer does not meet the question. You have indicated one particular holy act, among many. But the question asked was — What is Holiness generally? What is that specific property, by the common possession of which all holy things are entitled to be called holy? I want to know this general Idea, in order that I may keep it in view as a type wherewith to compare each particular case, thus determining whether the case deserves to be called holy or not.20
20 Plato, Euthyphron, c. 7, p. 6 E.
Here we have a genuine specimen of the dialectic interrogatory in which Xenophon affirms21 Sokrates to have passed his life, and which Plato prosecutes under his master’s name. The question is generalised much more than in the Kriton.
21 Xenoph. Memor. i. 1, 16.
Such mistake frequent in dialectic discussion.
It is assumed that there is one specific Idea or essence — one objective characteristic or fact — common to all things called Holy. The purpose of the questioner is: to determine what this Idea is: to provide a good definition of the word. The first mistake made by the respondent is, that he names simply one particular case, coming under the general Idea. This is a mistake often recurring, and often corrected in the Platonic dialogues. Even now, such a mistake is not unfrequent: and in the time of Plato, when general ideas, and the definition of general terms, had been made so little the subject of direct attention, it was doubtless perpetually made. When the question was first put, its bearing 445would not be properly conceived. And even if the bearing were properly conceived, men would find it easier then, and do find it easier now, to make answer by giving one particular example than to go over many examples, and elicit what is common to all.
First general answer given by Euthyphron — that which is pleasing to the Gods is holy. Comments of Sokrates thereon.
Euthyphron next replies — That which is pleasing to the Gods is holy: that which is not pleasing, or which is displeasing to the Gods, is unholy. — Sokr. That is the sort of answer which I desired to have: now let us examine it. We learn from the received theology, which you implicitly believe, that there has been much discord and quarrel among the Gods. If the Gods quarrel, they quarrel about the same matters as men. Now men do not quarrel about questions of quantity — for such questions can be determined by calculation and measurement: nor about questions of weight — for there the balance may be appealed to. The questions about which you and I and other men quarrel are, What is just or unjust, honourable or base, good or evil? Upon these there is no accessible standard. Some men feel in one way, some in another; and each of us fights for his own opinions.22 We all indeed agree that the wrong-doer ought to be punished: but we do not agree who the wrong-doer is, nor what is wrong-doing. The same action which some of us pronounce to be just, others stigmatise as unjust.23
22 Plato, Euthyphron, c. 8, p. 7 C-D. Περὶ τίνος δὲ δὴ διενεχθέντες καὶ ἐπὶ τίνα κρίσιν οὐ δυνάμενοι ἀφικέσθαι ἐχθροί γε ἂν ἀλλήλοις εἶμεν καὶ ὀργιζοίμεθα; ἴσως οὐ πρόχειρόν σοί ἐστιν, ἀλλ’ ἐμοῦ λέγοντος σκόπει, εἰ τάδ’ ἐστὶ τό τε δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον, καὶ καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν, καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν. Ἆρ’ οὐ ταῦτα ἐστι περὶ ὧν διενεχθέντες καὶ οὐ δυνάμενοι ἐπὶ ἰκανὴν κρίσιν αὐτῶν ἐλθεῖν ἐχθροὶ ἀλλήλοις γιγνόμεθα, ὅταν γιγνώμεθα, καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ σὺ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι πάντες;
23 Plato, Euthyphron, c. 9, p. 8 D. Οὐκ ἄρα ἐκεῖνό γε ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, ὡς οὐ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα δεῖ διδόναι δίκην· ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνο ἴσως ἀμφισβητοῦσι, τὸ τίς ἐστιν ὁ ἀδικων καὶ τί δρῶν, καὶ πότε; Πράξεώς τινος περὶ διαφερόμενοι, οἱ μὲν δικαίως φασὶν αὐτὴν πεπρᾶχθαι, οἱ δὲ ἀδίκως.
So likewise the quarrels of the Gods must turn upon these same matters — just and unjust, right and wrong, good and evil. What one God thinks right, another God thinks wrong. What is pleasing to one God, is displeasing to another. The same action will be both pleasing and displeasing to the Gods.
According to your definition of holy and unholy, therefore, the same action may be both holy and unholy. Your definition will not hold, for it does not enable me to distinguish the one from the other.24
24 In regard to Plato’s ethical enquiries generally, and to what we shall find in future dialogues, we must take note of what is here laid down, that mankind are in perpetual dispute, and have not yet any determinate standard for just and unjust, right and wrong, honourable and base, good and evil. Plato had told us, somewhat differently, in the Kriton, that on these matters, though the judgment of the many was not to be trusted, yet there was another trustworthy judgment, that of the one wise man. This point will recur for future comment.
Euthyph. — I am convinced that there are some things which all the Gods love, and some things which all the Gods hate. That which I am doing, for example — indicting my father for homicide — belongs to the former category. Now that which all the Gods love is the holy: that which they all hate, is the unholy.25
25 Plato, Euthyphron, c. 11, p. 9.
To be loved by the Gods is not the essence of the Holy — they love it because it is holy. In what then does its essence consist? Perplexity of Euthyphron.
Sokr. — Do the Gods love the holy, because it is holy? Or is it holy for this reason, because they do love it? Euthyph. — They love it because it is holy.26 Sokr. — Then the holiness is one thing; the fact of being loved by the Gods is another. The latter fact is not of the essence of holiness: it is true, but only as an accident and an accessory. You have yet to tell me what that essential character is, by virtue of which the holy comes to be loved by all the Gods, or to be the subject of various other attributes.27
26 Plato, Euthyphron, c. 12, p. 10 A-D. The manner in which Sokrates conducts this argument is over-subtle. Οὐκ ἄρα διότι ὁρώμενον γέ ἐστι διὰ τοῦτο ὁρᾶται, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον διότι ὁρᾶται, διὰ τοῦτο ὁρώμενον· οὐδὲ διότι ἀγόμενόν ἐστι, διὰ τοῦτο ἄγεται, ἀλλὰ διότι ἄγεται, διὰ τοῦτο ἀγόμενον· οὐδὲ διότι φερόμενον, φέρεται, ἀλλὰ διότι φέρεται, φερόμενον.
The difference between the meaning of φέρεται and φερόμενόν ἐστι is not easy to see. The former may mean to affirm the beginning of an action, the latter the continuance: but in this case the inference would not necessarily follow.
Compare Aristotel. Physica, p. 185, b. 25, with the Scholion of Simplikius, p. 330, a. 2nd ed. Bekk. where βαδίζων ἔστι is recognised as equivalent to βαδίζει.
27 Plato, Euthyphron, c. 13, p. 11 A. κινδυνεύεις, ἐρωτώμενος τὸ ὅσιον, ὅ, τί ποτ’ ἔστιν, τὴν μὲν οὐσίαν μοι αὐτοῦ οὐ βούλεσθαι δηλῶσαι, πάθος δέ τι περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν, ὅ, τι πέπονθε τοῦτο τὸ ὅσιον, φιλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ πάντων τῶν θεῶν· ὅ, τι δὲ ὂν, οὔπω εἶπες.… πάλιν εἰπὲ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, τί ποτε ὂν τὸ ὅσιον εἴτε φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν, εἴτε ὅτι δὴ πάσχει.
Euthyph. — I hardly know how to tell you what I think. None of my explanations will stand. Your ingenuity turns and twists them in every way. Sokr. — If I am 447ingenious, it is against my own will;28 for I am most anxious that some one of the answers should stand unshaken. But I will now put you in the way of making a different answer. You will admit that all which is holy is necessarily just. But is all that is just necessarily holy?
28 Plato, Euthyphron, c. 13, p. 11 D. ἄκων εἰμὶ σοφός, &c.
Sokrates suggests a new answer. The Holy is one branch or variety of the Just. It is that branch which concerns ministration by men to the Gods.
Euthyphron does not at first understand the question. He does not comprehend the relation between two words, generic and specific with reference to each other: the former embracing all that the latter embraces, and more besides (denoting more objects, connoting fewer attributes). This is explained by analogies and particular examples, illustrating a logical distinction highly important to be brought out, at a time when there were no treatises on Logic.29 So much therefore is made out — That the Holy is a part, or branch, of the Just. But what part? or how is it to be distinguished from other parts or branches of the just? Euthyphron answers. The holy is that portion or branch of the Just which concerns ministration to the Gods: the remaining branch of the Just is, what concerns ministration to men.30
29 Plato, Euthyphron, c. 13-14, p. 12.
30 Plato, Euthyphron, c. 14, p. 12 E. τὸ μέρος τοῦ δικαίου εἶναι εὐσεβές τε καὶ ὅσιον, τὸ περὶ τὴν τῶν θεῶν θεραπείαν· τὸ δὲ περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, τὸ λοιπὸν εἶναι τοῦ δικαίου μέρος.
Ministration to the Gods? How? To what purpose?
Sokr. — What sort of ministration? Other ministrations, to horses, dogs, working cattle, &c., are intended for the improvement or benefit of those to whom they are rendered:—besides, they can only be rendered by a few trained persons. In what manner does ministration, called holiness, benefit or improve the Gods? Euthyph. — In no way: it is of the same nature as that which slaves render to their masters. Sokr. — You mean, that it is work done by us for the Gods. Tell me — to what end does the work conduce? What is that end which the Gods accomplish, through our agency as workmen? Physicians employ their slaves for the purpose of restoring the sick to health: shipbuilders put their slaves to the completion of ships. But what are those great works which the Gods bring about by our agency? Euthyph. — Their works are numerous and great. Sokr. — The like may be 448said of generals: but the summary and main purpose of all that generals do is — to assure victory in war. So too we may say about the husbandman: but the summary of his many proceedings is, to raise corn from the earth. State to me, in like manner, the summary of that which the Gods perform through our agency.31
31 Plato, Euthyphron, c. 16, pp. 13, 14.
Holiness — rectitude in sacrifice and prayer — right traffic between men and the Gods.
Euthyph. — It would cost me some labour to go through the case fully. But so much I tell you in plain terms. If a man, when sacrificing and praying, knows what deeds and what words will be agreeable to the Gods, that is holiness: this it is which upholds the security both of private houses and public communities. The contrary is unholiness, which subverts and ruins them.32 Sokr. — Holiness, then, is the knowledge of rightly sacrificing and praying to the Gods; that is, of giving to them, and asking from them. To ask rightly, is to ask what we want from them: to give rightly, is to give to them what they want from us. Holiness will thus be an art of right traffic between Gods and men. Still, you must tell me how the Gods are gainers by that which we give to them. That we are gainers by what they give, is clear enough; but what do they gain on their side?
32 Plato, Euthyphron, c. 16, p. 14 B. Compare this third unsuccessful answer of Euthyphron with the third answer assigned to Hippias (Hipp. Maj. 291 C-E). Both of them appear lengthened, emphatic, as if intended to settle a question which had become vexatious.
This will not stand — the Gods gain nothing — they receive from men marks of honour and gratitude — they are pleased therewith — the Holy, therefore, must be that which is pleasing to the Gods.
Euthyph. — The Gods gain nothing. The gifts which we present to them consist in honour, marks of respect, gratitude. Sokr. — The holy, then, is that which obtains favour from the Gods; not that which gainful to them, nor that which they love. Euthyph. — Nay: I think they love it especially. Sokr. — Then it appears that the holy is what the Gods love? Euthyph. — Unquestionably.
This is the same explanation which was before declared insufficient. A fresh explanation is required from Euthyphron. He breaks off the dialogue.
Sokr. — But this is the very same explanation which we rejected a short time ago as untenable.33 It was agreed between us, that to be loved by the Gods was 449not of the essence of holiness, and could not serve as an explanation of holiness: though it might be truly affirmed thereof as an accompanying predicate. Let us therefore try again to discover what holiness is. I rely upon you to help me, and I am sure that you must know, since under a confident persuasion that you know, you are indicting your own father for homicide.
33 Plato, Euthyphron, c. 19, p. 15 C. μέμνησαι γάρ που, ὅτι ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν τό τε ὅσιον καὶ τὸ θεοφιλὲς οὐ ταὐτὸν ἡμῖν ἐφάνη, ἀλλ’ ἕτερα ἀλλήλων.
Euthyph. — “The investigation must stand over to another time, I have engagements now which call me elsewhere.”
Sokratic spirit of the dialogue — confessed ignorance applying the Elenchus to false persuasion of knowledge.
So Plato breaks off the dialogue. It is conceived in the truly Sokratic spirit:—an Elenchus applied to implicit and unexamined faith, even though that faith be accredited among the public as orthodoxy: warfare against the confident persuasion of knowledge, upon topics familiar to every one, and on which deep sentiments and confused notions have grown up by association in every one’s mind, without deliberate study, systematic teaching, or testing cross-examination. Euthyphron is a man who feels unshaken confidence in his own knowledge, and still more in his own correct religious belief. Sokrates appears in his received character as confessing ignorance, soliciting instruction, and exposing inconsistencies and contradiction in that which is given to him for instruction.
The questions always difficult, often impossible to answer. Sokrates is unable to answer them, though he exposes the bad answers of others.
We must (as I have before remarked) take this ignorance on the part of the Platonic Sokrates not as assumed, but as very real. In no part of the Platonic writings do we find any tenable definition of the Holy and the Unholy, such as is here demanded from Euthyphron. The talent of Sokrates consists in exposing bad definitions, not in providing good ones. This negative function is all that he claims for himself — with deep regret that he can do no more. “Sokrates” (says Aristotle34) “put questions, but gave no answers: for he professed not to know.” In those dialogues where Plato makes him attempt more (there also, against his own will 450and protest, as in the Philębus and Republic), the affirmative Sokrates will be found only to stand his ground because no negative Sokrates is allowed to attack him. I insist upon this the rather, because the Platonic commentators usually present the dialogues in a different light, as if such modesty on the part of Sokrates was altogether simulated: as if he was himself,35 from the beginning, aware of the proper answer to his own questions, but refrained designedly from announcing it: nay, sometimes, as if the answers were in themselves easy, and as if the respondents who failed must be below par in respect of intelligence. This is an erroneous conception. The questions put by Sokrates, though relating to familiar topics, are always difficult: they are often even impossible to answer, because they postulate and require to be assigned a common objective concept which is not to be found. They only appear easy to one who has never attempted the task of answering under the pressure of cross-examination. Most persons indeed never make any such trial, but go on affirming confidently as if they knew, without trial. It is exactly against such illusory confidence of knowledge that Sokrates directs his questions: the fact belongs to our days no less than to his.36
34 Aristotel. Sophist. Elench. p. 183, b. 7. ἐπεὶ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο Σωκράτης ἠρώτα καὶ οὐκ ἀπεκρίνετο· ὡμολόγει γὰρ οὐκ εἰδέναι.
35 See Stallbaum, Prolegg. ad Euthyphron. p. 140.
36 Adam Smith observes, in his Essay on the Formation of Languages (p. 20 of the fifth volume of his collected Works), “Ask a man what relation is expressed by the preposition of: and if he has not beforehand employed his thoughts a good deal upon these subjects, you may safely allow him a week to consider of his answer.”
The Platonic problem assumes, not only that he shall give an answer, but that it shall be an answer which he can maintain against the Elenchus of Sokrates.
Objections of Theopompus to the Platonic procedure.
The assumptions of some Platonic commentators — that Sokrates and Plato of course knew the answers to their own questions — that an honest and pious man, of ordinary intelligence, has the answer to the question in his heart, though he cannot put it in words — these assumptions were also made by many of Plato’s contemporaries, who depreciated his questions as frivolous and unprofitable. The rhetor and historian Theopompus (one of the most eminent among the numerous pupils of Isokrates, and at the same time unfriendly to Plato, though younger in age), thus criticised Plato’s requirement, that these familiar terms should be defined: “What! (said he) have none of us before your time talked about 451the Good and the Just? Or do you suppose that we cannot follow out what each of them is, and that we pronounce the words as empty and unmeaning sounds?”37 Theopompus was the scholar of Isokrates, and both of them probably took the same view, as to the uselessness of that colloquial analysis which aims at determining the definition of familiar ethical or political words.38 They considered that Plato and Sokrates, instead of clearing up what was confused, wasted their ingenuity in perplexing what was already clear. They preferred the rhetorical handling (such as we noticed in the Kriton) which works upon ready-made pre-established sentiments, and impresses a strong emotional conviction, but presumes that all the intellectual problems have already been solved.
37 Epiktętus, ii. 17, 5-10. Τὸ δ’ ἐξαπατῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς τοῦτ’ ἔστιν, ὅπερ καὶ Θεόπομπον τὸν ῥήτορα ὅς που καὶ Πλάτωνι ἐγκαλεῖ ἐπὶ τῷ βούλεσθαι ἕκαστα ὁρίζεσθαι. Τί γὰρ λέγει; Οὐδεὶς ἡμῶν πρὸ σοῦ ἔλεγεν ἀγαθὸν ἢ δίκαιον; ἢ μὴ παρακολουθοῦντες τί ἐστι τούτων ἕκαστον, ἀσήμως καὶ κενῶς ἐφθεγγόμεθα τὰς φωνάς;
Respecting Theopompus, compare Dionys. Hal. Epistol. ad Cn. Pompeium de Platone, p. 757; also De Prćcip. Historicis, p. 782.
38 Isokrates, Helen. Encom. Or. x. init. De Permut. Or. xv. sect. 90.
These passages do not name Sokrates and Plato, but have every appearance of being intended to allude to them.
Objective view of Ethics, distinguished by Sokrates from the subjective.
All this shows the novelty of the Sokratic point of view: the distinction between the essential constituent and the objective accidental accompaniment,39 and the search for a definition corresponding to the former: which search was first prosecuted by Sokrates (as Aristotle40 points out) and was taken up from him by Plato. It was Sokrates who first brought conspicuously into notice the objective intellectual, scientific view of ethics — as distinguished from the subjective, emotional, incoherent, and uninquiring. I mean that he was the first who proclaimed himself as feeling the want of such an objective view, and who worked upon other minds so as to create the like want in them: I do not mean that he provided satisfaction for this requirement.
39 This distinction is pointedly noticed in the Euthyphron, p. 11 A.
40 Aristotel. Metaphys. A. 987, b. 2, M. 1078, b. 28.
Subjective unanimity coincident with objective dissent.
Undoubtedly (as Theopompus remarked) men had used these ethical terms long before the time of Sokrates, and had used them, not as empty and unmeaning, but with a full body of meaning (i.e. emotional meaning). Strong and marked emotion had become associated with each term; and the same emotion, similar in 452 character, though not equal in force — was felt by the greater number of different minds. Subjectively and emotionally, there was no difference between one man and another, except as to degree. But it was Sokrates who first called attention to the fact as a matter for philosophical recognition and criticism, — that such subjective and emotional unanimity does not exclude the widest objective and intellectual dissension.41
41 It is this distinction between the subjective and the objective which is implied in the language of Epiktętus, when he proceeds to answer the objection cited from Theopompus (note 1 p. 451): Τίς γὰρ σοι λέγει, Θεόπομπε, ὅτι ἐννοίας οὐκ εἶχομεν ἑκάστου τούτων φυσικάς καὶ προλήψεις; Ἀλλ’ οὐχ οἷον τε ἐφαρμόζειν τὰς προλήψεις ταῖς καταλλήλοις οὐσίαις, μὴ διαρθρώσαντα αὐτάς, καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο σκεψάμενον, ποίαν τινὰ ἑκάστῃ αὐτῶν οὐσίαν ὑποτακτέον.
To the same purpose Epiktętus, in another passage, i. 22, 4-9: Αὐτὴ ἐστιν ἡ τῶν Ἰουδαίων, καὶ Σύρων, καὶ Αἰγυπτίων, καὶ Ῥωμαίων μάχη· οὐ περὶ τοῦ, ὅτι τὸ ὅσιον πάντων προτιμητέον, καὶ ἐν παντὶ μεταδιωκτέον — ἀλλὰ πότερόν ἐστιν ὅσιον τοῦτο, τὸ χοιρείου φαγεῖν, ἢ ἀνόσιον.
Again, Origen also, in a striking passage of his reply to Celsus (v. p. 263, ed. Spencer; i. p. 614 ed. Delarue), observes that the name Justice is the same among all Greeks (he means, the name with the emotional associations inseparable from it), but that the thing designated was very different, according to those who pronounced it:—λεκτέον, ὅτι τὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης ὄνομα ταὐτον μὲν ἔστιν παρὰ πᾶσιν Ἕλλησιν· ἤδη δὲ ἀποδείκνυται ἄλλη μὲν ἡ κατ’ Ἐπίκουρον δικαιοσύνη, ἄλλη δὲ ἡ κατὰ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς, ἀρνουμένων τὸ τριμερὲς τῆς ψυχῆς, ἄλλη δὲ κατὰ τοὺς ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος, ἰδιοπραγίαν τῶν μερῶν τῆς ψυχῆς φάσκοντας εἶναι τὴν δικαιοσύνην. Οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἄλλη μὲν ἡ Ἐπικούρου ἀνδρία, &c.
“Je n’aime point les mots nouveaux” (said Saint Just, in his Institutions, composed during the sitting of the French Convention, 1793), “je ne connais que le juste et l’injuste: ces mots sont entendus par toutes les consciences. Il faut ramener toutes les définitions ŕ la conscience: l’esprit est un sophiste qui conduit les vertus ŕ l’échafaud.” (Histoire Parlementaire de la Révolution Française, t. xxxv. p. 277.) This is very much the language which honest and vehement ἰδιῶται of Athens would hold towards Sokrates and Plato.
Cross-examination brought to bear upon this mental condition by Sokrates — position of Sokrates and Plato in regard to it.
As the Platonic Sokrates here puts it in the Euthyphron — all men agree that the person who acts unjustly must be punished; but they dispute very much who it is that acts unjustly — which of his actions are unjust — or under what circumstances they are so. The emotion in each man’s mind, as well as the word by which it is expressed, is the same:42 but the person, or the acts, to which it is applied by each, although partly the same, are often so different, and sometimes so opposite, as to occasion violent dispute. There is subjective agreement, with objective disagreement. It is upon 453this disconformity that the Sokratic cross-examination is brought to bear, making his hearers feel its existence, for the first time, and dispelling their fancy of supposed knowledge as well as of supposed unanimity. Sokrates required them to define the general word — to assign some common objective characteristic, corresponding in all cases to the common subjective feeling represented by the word. But no man could comply with his requirement, nor could he himself comply with it, any more than his respondents. So far Sokrates proceeded, and no farther, according to Aristotle. He never altogether lost his hold on particulars: he assumed that there must be something common to them all, if you could but find out what it was, constituting the objective meaning of the general term. Plato made a step beyond him, though under the name of Sokrates as spokesman. Not being able (any more than Sokrates) to discover or specify any real objective characteristic, common to all the particulars — he objectivised43 the word itself: that is, he assumed or imagined a new objective Ens of his own, the Platonic Idea, corresponding to the general word: an idea not common to the particulars, but existing apart from them in a sphere of its own — yet nevertheless lending itself in some inexplicable way to be participated by all the particulars. It was only in this way that Plato could explain to himself how knowledge was possible: this universal Ens being the only object of knowledge: particulars being an indefinite variety of fleeting appearances, and as such in themselves unknowable. The imagination of Plato created a new world of Forms, Ideas, Concepts, or objects corresponding to general terms: which he represents as the only objects of knowledge, and as the only realities.
42 Plato, Euthyphron, p. 8, C-D, Euripides, Phœnissć, 499 —
εἰ πᾶσι ταὐτὸ καλὸν ἔφυ, σοφόν θ’ ἄμα, οὐκ ἦν ἂν ἀμφιλεκτὸς ἀνθρώποις ἔρις· νῦν δ’ οὐθ’ ὅμοιον οὐδὲν οὔτ’ ἴσον βρότοις, πλὴν ὀνομάσαι· τὸ δ’ ἔργον οὐκ ἔστιν τόδε. |
Hobbes expresses, in the following terms, this fact of subjective similarity co-existent with great objective dissimilarity among mankind.
“For the similitude of the thoughts and passions of one man, to the thoughts and passions of another, whoever looketh into himself and considereth what he does when he does think, opine, reason, hope, fear, &c., and upon what grounds, he shall thereby read and know what are the thoughts and passions of all other men upon the like occasions. I say the similitude of passions, which are the same in all men, desire, fear, hope, &c., not the similitude of the objects of the passions, which are the things desired, feared, hoped, &c., for these the constitution individual, and particular education do so vary, and they are so easy to be kept from our knowledge, that the characters of man’s heart, blotted and confounded as they are with lying, dissembling, counterfeiting, and erroneous doctrines, are legible only to him that searcheth hearts.” Introduction to Leviathan.
43 Aristot. Metaphys. M. 1078, b. 30, 1086, b. 4.
The Holy — it has an essential characteristic — what is this? — not the fact that it is loved by the Gods — this is true, but is not its constituent essence.
In the Euthyphron, however, we have not yet passed into this Platonic world, of self-existent Forms — objects of conception — concepts detached from sensible particulars. We are still with Sokrates and with ordinary men among the world of particulars, only that Sokrates introduced a new mode of looking at all the particulars, and searched among them for some common feature which he did not find. The Holy (and the Unholy) is a word freely pronounced by every speaker, and familiarly understood by every hearer, as if it denoted something one and the same in all these particulars.44 What is that something — the common essence or idea? Euthyphron cannot tell; though he agrees with Sokrates that there must be such essence. His attempts to explain it prove failures.
44 Plato, Euthyphron, p. 5 D, 6 E.
The definition of the Holy — that it is what the Gods love — is suggested in this dialogue, but rejected. The Holy is not Holy because the Gods love it: on the contrary, its holiness is an independent fact, and the Gods love it because it is Holy. The Holy is thus an essence, per se, common to, or partaken by, all holy persons and things.
Views of the Xenophontic Sokrates respecting the Holy — different from those of the Platonic Sokrates — he disallows any common absolute general type of the Holy — he recognises an indefinite variety of types, discordant and relative.
So at least the Platonic Sokrates here regards it. But the Xenophontic Sokrates, if we can trust the Memorabilia, would not have concurred in this view: for we read that upon all points connected with piety or religious observance, he followed the precept which the Pythian priestess delivered as an answer to all who consulted the Delphian oracle on similar questions — You will act piously by conforming to the law of the city. Sokrates (we are told) not only acted upon this precept himself, but advised his friends to do the like, and regarded those who acted otherwise as foolish and over-subtle triflers.45 It is plain that this doctrine disallows all supposition of any general essence, called the Holy, to be discovered and appealed to, as type in cases of doubt; and recognises the equal title of many separate local, dis455cordant, and variable types, each under the sanction of King Nomos. The procedure of Sokrates in the Euthyphron would not have been approved by the Xenophontic Sokrates. It is in the spirit of Plato, and is an instance of that disposition which he manifests yet more strongly in the Republic and elsewhere, to look for his supreme authority in philosophical theory and not in the constituted societies around him: thus to innovate in matters religious as well as political — a reproach to him among his own contemporaries, an honour to him among various subsequent Christian writers. Plato, not conforming to any one of the modes of religious belief actually prevalent in his contemporary world, postulates a canon, suitable to the exigencies of his own mind, of that which the Gods ought to love and must love. In this respect, as in others, he is in marked contrast with Herodotus — a large observer of mankind, very pious in his own way, curious in comparing the actual practices consecrated among different nations, but not pretending to supersede them by any canon of his own.
45 Compare Xen. Mem. i. 3, 1. ἥ τε γὰρ Πυθία νόμῳ πόλεως ἀναιρεῖ ποιοῦντας εὐσεβῶς ἂν ποιεῖν· Σωκράτης τε οὕτως καὶ αὐτὸς ἐποίει καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις παρῄνει, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλως πως ποιοῦντας περιέργους καὶ ματαίους ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι.
The Holy a branch of the Just — not tenable as a definition, but useful as bringing to view the subordination of logical terms.
Though the Holy, and the Unholy, are pronounced to be each an essence, partaken of by all the particulars so-called; yet what that essence is, the dialogue Euthyphron noway determines. Even the suggestion of Sokrates — that the Holy is a branch of the Just, only requiring to be distinguished by some assignable mark from the other branches of the Just — is of no avail, since the Just itself had been previously declared to be one of the matters in perpetual dispute. It procures for Sokrates however the opportunity of illustrating the logical subordination of terms; the less general comprehended in the more general, and requiring to be parted off by some differentia from the rest of what this latter comprehends. Plato illustrates the matter at some length;46 and apparently with a marked purpose of drawing attention to it. We must keep in mind, that logical distinctions had at that time received neither special attention nor special names — however they may have been unconsciously followed in practice.
46 Plato, Euthyphron, p. 12.
The Euthyphron represents Plato’s way of replying to the charge of impiety, preferred by Melętus against Sokrates — comparison with Xenophon’s way of replying.
What I remarked about the Kriton, appears to me also true 456about the Euthyphron. It represents Plato’s manner of replying to the charge of impiety advanced by Melętus and his friends against Sokrates, just as the four first chapters of the Memorabilia represent Xenophon’s manner of repelling the same charge. Xenophon joins issue with the accusers, — describes the language and proceedings of Sokrates, so as to show that he was orthodox and pious, above the measure of ordinary men, in conduct, in ritual, and in language; and expresses his surprise that against such a man the verdict of guilty could have been returned by the Dikasts.47 Plato handles the charge in the way in which Sokrates himself would have handled it, if he had been commenting on the same accusation against another person and as he does in fact deal with Melętus, in the Platonic Apology. Plato introduces Euthyphron, a very religious man, who prides himself upon being forward to prosecute impiety in whomsoever it is found, and who in this case, under the special promptings of piety, has entered a capital prosecution against his own father.48 The occasion is here favourable to the Sokratic interrogatories, applicable to Melętus no less than to Euthyphron. “Of course, before you took this grave step, you have assured yourself that you are right, and that you know what piety and impiety are. Pray tell me, for I am ignorant on the subject: that I may know better and do better for the future.49 Tell me, what is the characteristic essence of piety as well as impiety?” It turns out that the accuser can make no satisfactory answer: that he involves himself in confusion and contradiction:—that he has brought capital indictments against citizens, without having ever studied or appreciated the offence with which he charges them. Such is the manner in which the Platonic Sokrates is made to deal with Euthyphron, and in which the real Sokrates deals with Melętus:50 rendering the questions instrumental to two larger purposes — first, to his habitual crusade against the false per457suasion of knowledge — next, to the administering of a logical or dialectical lesson. When we come to the Treatise De Legibus (where Sokrates does not appear) we shall find Plato adopting the dogmatic and sermonising manner of the first chapters of the Xenophontic Memorabilia. Here, in the Euthyphron and in the Dialogues of Search generally, the Platonic Sokrates is something entirely different.51
47 Xenoph. Memor. i. 1, 4; also iv. 8, 11.
48 Plato, Euthyphron, p. 5 E.
49 Compare, even in Xenophon, the conversation of Sokrates with Kritias and Chariklęs — Memorab. i. 2, 32-38: and his cross-examination of the presumptuous youth Glaukon, Plato’s brother (Mem. iii. 7).
50 Plato, Apol. c. 11, p. 24 C. ἀδικεῖν φημὶ Μέλητον, ὅτι σπουδῇ χαριεντίζεται, ῥᾳδίως εἰς ἀγῶνας καθιστὰς ἀνθρώπους, &c.
51 Steinhart (Einleitung, p. 199) agrees with the opinion of Schleiermacher and Stallbaum, that the Euthyphron was composed and published during the interval between the lodging of the indictment and the trial of Sokrates. K. F. Hermann considers it as posterior to the death of Sokrates.
I concur on this point with Hermann. Indeed I have already given my opinion, that not one of the Platonic dialogues was composed before the death of Sokrates.
[END OF CHAPTER XI]
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