The Myopic Hand at Work: Colonial Development Policy in Montserrat

Gracelyn Cassell

Introduction

Montserrat is a tiny British Overseas Territory in the Leeward chain of Caribbean islands. Antigua lies to the north-west, while Guadeloupe is located south-east of Montserrat. Before the Soufriere Hills volcano, the youngest of several volcanoes on the island, roared to life in 1995, Montserrat was described as being 39.6 square miles (102 km²), its population was approximately 12,000 and its capital, Plymouth was the centre of government and commercial activity. Today, Montserrat has a population of approximately 5000, Plymouth has been destroyed and a growing volcano dome presents a constant threat to areas on the periphery of the designated safe zone.

Settled in the 1630s, Montserrat is among Britain's oldest West Indian colonies. British rule has only been broken by brief periods of French occupation in 1667 and 1782 which ended with the Treaties of Breda (1667) and Versailles (1783) respectively. Fergus describes the island's political status:

Montserrat entered the twentieth century as a British Crown colony, and although there have been name changes such as 'dependent territory', and 'overseas territory' and a liberal rhetoric of a 'partner' relationship, the essential status has not changed significantly. Indeed the island is likely to enter the twenty-first century (2001) in its present abject dependency position as a grant-aided territory - a status from which it had graduated in 1984 and into which it relapsed due to volcanic devastation. Budgetary aid comes with the heavy hand of Whitehall in the territory's administration. (Montserrat 14)

This paper will briefly trace the evolution of British development policy from the 1920s to the 1950s. It will describe the administrative machinery that was introduced to implement this policy and it will attempt to analyse the effectiveness or weakness of the policy in operation with illustrations taken from infrastructural development activities in Montserrat during the period under consideration. In this context the term 'infrastructure' will be limited to what is referred to as the structural elements of a society such as communications and transport, housing, power systems and water supplies (Pearce, 211). This exercise may provide guidelines for the development process currently in crisis-ridden Montserrat. As the debate continues as to what constitutes an appropriate development paradigm in small states saddled with a colonial history, there may be instructive lessons to be gleaned from past activities.

Background

Prior to the late 1920s, the British Government adhered firmly to the doctrine of "laissez-faire" where development activity in the colonies was concerned. Colonial administrations were responsible for maintaining law and order and "the colonies were expected to be 'self-supporting', meeting all the expenses of administration and social services (if any) from what revenue they could raise by local taxation. Where they failed to do this entirely, the conditions of 'grant-aid' from the United Kingdom were extremely severe" (G.B. Treasury, 1).

Abbott has a similar view of British policy towards its colonies and remarks that:

Throughout the nineteenth century colonial development was a matter primarily for the colonies themselves. They were required to finance their economic development from the proceeds of sales of their export crops and whatever private international capital they could attract. They were not encouraged to look to the imperial government for financial or economic assistance, nor did the imperial government in turn actively formulate any programmes for colonial development. Colonial assistance was only given in cases of national emergency, and was purely of a temporary nature (1971: 68).

During the colonial era, eradicating world poverty and working for sustainable development were not factors which impacted on Whitehall's policy-making. Any improvement in the colonial subjects' standard of living were incidental to the process of accumulating and extracting as much wealth from the colony as possible.

CDA 1929

J.H. Thomas, Lord Privy Seal, had argued convincingly that the policy would help reduce unemployment in the United Kingdom by promoting industry. Thus it was that the Colonial Development Fund (CDF) which was not to exceed £1,000,000 in any one year was established under the Act to aid and develop agriculture and industry in the colonies and in so doing promote "commerce with or industry in the United Kingdom" (CO 152 419/7).

Abbott explains that the Act represented a change in the approach to development.

The 1929 Colonial Development Act was the first real attempt to formalize the Chamberlain ad hoc approach to colonial development. Colonial assistance was now given only after a systematic examination of all schemes and projects put forward by colonial governments. The act introduced a greater degree of self-consciousness and systematization. It also created the machinery for the examination of all projects (70).

The Secretary of State first sent out a circular telegram, followed by a circular despatch, to each colonial government to benefit from the fund. They were all invited to submit applications for assistance from the Fund for schemes requiring improved machinery and equipment for cultivation and for marketing agricultural produce, equipment for improved transportation and communication and schemes leading to the development of water supplies, electricity and mineral resources among other projects. A Colonial Development Advisory Committee (CDAC) had already been appointed under the Act to consider and report on applications for assistance from the CDF.

One of the first requests to be submitted from Montserrat for funding was for a loan of £5,000 for the immediate construction of 100 concrete houses for the peasantry (CO 152 415/9a). This request is particularly significant as it was made just after the 1928 hurricane had left thousands homeless.

The year 1928 will always be remembered on account of the devastating hurricane which struck this island on the 12th September causing heavy loss of life and property. Many Government buildings, Churches, Schools, Estate and other buildings, and peasant's houses were destroyed (G.B. Colonial Office Leewards..., 1930, 34).

When the Governor of the Leeward Islands was informed about the request, he declared that he was not in favour of the suggestion. The Colonial Office subsequently merely requested information on the disbursement of the Charitable Funds and there is no further evidence on the file to indicate that any amount would be taken from Montserrat's reserve to respond to the need for housing. At the time the reserve fund stood at just over £10,000 but Hinds in looking at the sterling balance crisis from 1943-1956 hints at the control that was exercised over Colonial Funds.

The new CDF was therefore regarded as being fortuitous. Indeed, the 1929-30 Annual Report for the Leeward Islands records that:

Great interest was taken in the possibilities arising out of loans under the Colonial Development Act and application was immediately made for a loan of £5000 (since approved) to provide small concrete hurricane-proof houses for the peasantry (33).

The proposal was circulated in the Colonial Office for comments before submission to the CDAC. One Mr. Blood minuted "I notice there is no provision for a kitchen for cooking, or for latrines. There is also no verandah, and the design appears to afford ample facilities for producing hermetically sealed black holes of Calcutta which will tend neither to the improvement of public health nor to the elevation of public morals" (CO 152 415/9b). Blood felt Dr. Stanton, Chief Medical Adviser appointed in 1926 to deal with medical and sanitary matters, should be consulted. Stanton in reply minuted, "In these circumstances, it is not possible to make any useful comment from the medical aspect on the sketch plan which is obviously incomplete. As the proposal is put forward by Governor St. Johnston we may assume that he has considered the medical aspect in so far as it is relevant in the circumstances" (CO 152 415/9c).

That assumption has not however been born out by subsequent reports. In the 1957 Report of a Survey on Housing, it is recorded that none of the houses erected by Government had electricity, water supply, drainage or sanitary facilities (Horn, Table 20). Reporting around the same period Sir Stephen Luke describes the housing situation as follows:

Housing in Montserrat has been confined to an aided self-help scheme in which 16 houses have been completed during the period at a completed cost of £237 per unit, consisting of two rooms, concrete built, with wood floors and galvanized iron roofs (1957, 110).

Once the Governor got wind of this, he hurriedly sent off a telegram saying that U.K. expenditure would be increased by purchasing galvanized iron for the roofs and a stone breaker from England. The CDAC recommended a loan. The Secretary of State informed the Governor of the favourable recommendation and assumed "that no part of the sum would be expended on material imported from foreign countries" (CO 152 419/8).

To some extent the foregoing reflects some of the regulations which the Secretary of State after consultation with the CDAC and with the concurrence of the Treasury, had drawn up for "prescribing the manner in which applications for assistance ... were to be made." Applications were to be submitted in multiple copies by the Officer administering the Colonial Government to the Secretary of State, who, if he had no objection would refer them to the CDAC with any comments he felt necessary to include. The CDAC on considering the applications was to submit its recommendations simultaneously to the Treasury and the Colonial Office. The latter would then communicate with the Treasury on the CDAC's recommendations. All correspondence between the CDAC and the Colonial Governments was to be conducted through the Colonial Office (G.B. Colonial Office, 5).

There were further requirements for administering the Colonial Development Act. The method of presentation of the schemes and the kind of information that should be included to facilitate the work of the CDAC were specified by the Secretary of State in further despatches to the Colonial Governments. All imported goods were to be British made "save in exceptional circumstances" and orders were to be made through the Crown Agents for the Colonies. Those Governments receiving assistance from the fund were expected to submit half-yearly (eventually quarterly) reports on the progress of works. Statutory requirements relating to conditions of and remuneration for work and to the prohibition of forced or child labour were to be observed by the colonial administrations and the Colonial Office requested periodic reports on labour conditions in the colonies (G.B. Colonial Office, 11).

The Progress Report for the half-year ending December 31, 1932 indicates that the housing scheme was started on November 19, 1932 with a scheduled completion date of March 31, 1935. £1,000 had been paid by the U.K. Treasury to the Crown Agents and while two houses had already been completed there were six in the process of construction. The Report was prepared by the Inspector of Works and Roads in Montserrat and certified correct by the Commissioner. It would seem that the Commissioner's concern for labour conditions in Montserrat resulted in a further request for readjusting U.K. expenditure. He explained there was no need for the stonebreaker as its use would simply augment the unemployment problem in Montserrat (CO 152 440/2 a).

While the Colonial Office had its requirements for the administration of the Act, the Government in Montserrat had drawn up regulations for its own operation in the Presidency. The Housing Rules 1932 were made by the Governor in Council on November 2, 1932 under Section 3 of The Housing Ordinance 1931. Under these Statutory Rules and Orders, the houses on completion were to be advertised in the Gazette with their prices stated. Applications were to be made to the Commissioner accompanied by recommendations from persons of good standing and a receipt showing that a deposit of £1 had been paid into the Montserrat Treasury. If the applicant wanted the house erected on land allotted to him by the Crown, he needed to furnish a certificate of occupancy and receipts of payments made. In the case of houses to be erected on land other than Crown lands, then a Title deed was necessary (CO 152 440/2a).

According to Commissioner T.E. Baynes, who succeeded Hutchings, public meetings had been held around the island to explain the scheme to the people but little interest was shown. He then brought the matter before the Executive Council and it was decided that some houses should be erected on government land at Webb's, in the suburbs of Plymouth, to encourage the labouring classes to purchase them and to induce others to apply for other houses. The ploy worked for four out of eight houses built had been taken. A Housing Board was appointed to consider all applications for houses and to deal with matters connected with the scheme. After receiving numerous applications for erecting houses on other than Crown lands, without the necessary title deeds, the scheme was brought to a halt and this was queried by the Colonial Office. The Housing Board finally decided, and this was explained to the Colonial Office, that the Government would undertake the preparation of Certificates of Title and carry out other necessary legal formalities which individuals could not afford, and then add the cost to the price of the houses (CO 152 440/2b).

By 1936, on receiving news of the impending visit of Sir John Maffey, Permanent Under Secretary of State in the Colonial Office, some twenty-one 'tax-payers' drew up proposals for scrapping the CDF housing scheme in favour of a concrete and wood housing scheme with improved specifications. This was done on behalf of the 'peasants', 'labourers' and poorer classes (CO 152 465/10). But Sir John Maffey never got to Montserrat. Although the proposal was sent to him in Trinidad, and in 1938, T.A. Twyman, Director of the Birmingham-based headquarters of the Montserrat Company, later forwarded a copy to the Colonial Office requesting that the proposals be considered, nothing ever came of it (CO 152 481). However, it serves to indicate that the people of Montserrat had ideas as to what kind of housing they wanted. The response of the taxpayers is an indication that consultation with the people instead of the obvious top-down approach that was used might have resulted in a more effective housing project. The participatory approach as suggested by Jennings means involvement by a local population in the creation, content and conduct of a program or policy designed to change their lives.

The project also pointed to the difficulty of addressing the dual mandate of the Act. The Governor was forced to explain to the Colonial Office that although it had been agreed that material would be purchased from the U.K. for the roof of the houses, shingles had been used instead of galvanised iron. Consequently, there would have been a reduction in the U.K. expenditure so a revised scheme was put forward at the same time for ten bigger and better houses that would require asbestos roofing rather than galvanize which was considered to be a source of danger during hurricanes. This revised scheme would maintain U.K. expenditure in the agreed amount (CO 152 440/2c).

The experience with the housing project would have been valuable for the management of the volcanic crisis in Montserrat. Skinner assessing the volcano crisis management suggests that colonial governmentality with its rational administration assumes control over the development of the native population, frequently employing the classic mechanisms of bureaucratisation, documentation, rationalisation and registration to dispossess the indigenous. He goes on to say that:

Montserrat's colonial history exemplified these mechanisms even in the present day with, for example, new calls for land registration in the north of the island by a certain date after which land will become crown land, though few can afford the surveyor's fees to substantiate local land knowledge for foreign planners. Development activities on the island are the result of 'white' colonial control by expatriates - 'professional expatriates such as ... the Governor... and his army of elite Technical Co-operation Officers (TCOs) - who talk of Britain as 'home' and go on to think and shape the colony Anti-social).

Achieving development objectives with aid strapped in conditionalities has always been problematic. It militates against long-term planning and encourages ad-hoc development activities.

After 11 years of the CDF, Montserrat received grants totalling £3,428 for two schemes and £11,295 in loans for four other schemes. The titles of the schemes are listed in Appendix 1. U.K. expenditure amounted to £6,804. A scheme proposed in 1932 for constructing a tubercolosis ward at the Glendon Hospital was not regarded as warranting CDF assistance as it would not contribute to agricultural or industrial development in Montserrat (CO 152 435/5).

The scheme for reconstructing 68.5 miles of roads in Montserrat was also rejected when the CDAC learnt that no immediate demands for motor vehicles would result from the scheme. No consideration was given to the Commissioners' explanations that the scheme would ameliorate the unemployment situation as well as facilitate efficient transportation of agricultural produce (CO 152 434/3).

An electric light scheme for Plymouth was first rejected because the CDAC regarded it as an amenity and not a scheme contributing to agricultural or industrial development. Electricity was considered desirable as it would replace the gasoline and kerosene lamps which were fire hazards in an island subject to frequent earthquakes (CO 152 419/5). The proposal was revised but the Colonial Office, without forwarding it to the CDAC, replied that the scheme could not be entertained during the Depression. That was in 1931 and once again in 1934 it was submitted with recommendations from the Crown Agents' electrical engineers who regarded the project as sound (CO 152 450/6). The Colonial Office replied that they saw no justification for submitting the proposals to the CDAC.

In 1935, the scheme was again submitted, this time with an alternative proposal presented by C. Lorenzo Smith whose American firm was seeking a contract to implement the electric light scheme. In his covering letter to the Secretary of State, Governor St. Johnston declared, "for the last six years I have constantly supported the proposal that Plymouth should be placed upon the same footing as St. John's [Antigua], Basseterre [St. Kitts], and Roseau [Dominica] with regard to electric lighting, but difficulties have always arisen.... But I am quite opposed to any contracts being made with American or other foreign firms, and I consider that some British Company could tender just as cheaply, and far more satisfactorily, in this sphere of enterprise" (CO 152 456/10). Nothing came of this proposal either.

No arguments highlighting the importance of electricity for developing an agro-processing sector in Montserrat. Getting the island to add value to its primary produce and so improve the revenue earning potential would have been a better approach to development. However, this was not the intention of the Act. There was no such vision for the colony of Montserrat.

Havinden and Meredith discuss the difficulties of the development strategy envisaged under the CDA 1929. They maintain that the structure of colonial economies, the role of expatriate private enterprise and the philosophy of the local British administrators were counterproductive. Colonies were caught in a relationship of dependence with industrialised countries, there was an overemphasis on export of primary produce almost always in an unprocessed state (152). The conclusion can only be made that nothing had changed essentially. The new policy had done little to change the pervasive intent of metropolitan interest at the expense of the colonies.

The restrictive stipulations of the Colonial Development Act 1929 along with other factors gave rise to the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940.

Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940

When Malcolm MacDonald became Secretary of State for the Colonies in May 1938, he was already aware that Britain was increasingly being subjected to the unfavourable scrutiny of other countries that felt Britain had done very little to develop its colonies. Indeed, comparisons were being made between British administration and that of other colonial powers. Johnson tells us that strikes and disturbances occurred in the British West Indies with disquieting regularity. Colonial Office officials were convinced that the rapid succession of disturbances in Trinidad, Barbados, and Jamaica were due to common problems and feared the development of disturbances in other colonies. There was general recognition that social conditions in the region were at the root of the riots. Wages were low, unemployment serious, and housing and sanitary conditions left much to be desired (The West Indies, 55, 67, 68).

In addition it came out in Colonial Office discussions that the CDA 1929 was not wholly satisfactory. Under the stipulations of the Act, the CDAC felt unwilling to provide assistance for social services, for recurrent expenditure or for projects that would not result in any gains for the U.K. There was also "a widespread feeling that all was not well with the Colonial Empire" (Morgan, xvi). Between 1935 and 1938 a wave of social unrest rippled across the Colonies. MacDonald who recognized the need for a more vigorous colonial development policy was hoping that the report of the West India Royal Commission appointed in June 1938 to investigate the reasons behind disturbances in the West Indian colonies would provide the stimulus for an improved policy.

The final draft of the report of the Commission was ready by December 1939 but it was decided that its publication would have to wait until the end of the war for its revelations were regarded volatile propaganda material not in the interest of Britain. However, the recommendations of the Commission were published in February 1940 as Cmd Paper 6174 while a Statement of Policy on Colonial Development and Welfare followed as Cmnd Paper 6175. The Colonial Development and Welfare Act was finally passed in July 1940.

Under the new Act, £5.5 million, including £500,000 for research, was to be voted annually "for promoting the development of resources of Colonies and the welfare of their peoples" (Wicker, 181). Provision would also be made for relieving Colonial and other Governments from liability in relation to some loans including those incurred under the CDA 1929. Under this clause Montserrat was relieved of loans totalling £37,750 for administrative expenses and the cost of repairing earthquake damage. As Wicker explains, "the 1940 Act widened the scope of development projects to include operating charges as well as capital expenditures and expenditures on education" (181). All this was in an attempt to remove the restrictions of the CDA 1929. Colonial Administrations were encouraged to embark on long-range plans for necessary development since assistance would be provided for a maximum of ten years. Schemes were to be approved by the Secretary of State with the concurrence of the Treasury and all unspent monies would have to be returned to the Treasury at the end of each financial year.

As a result of the recommendations of the West India Royal Commission, a Comptroller for Development and Welfare in the West Indies, Sir Frank Stockdale, was appointed in September 1940. The Comptroller with the assistance of advisors was to guide colonial administrations in the West Indies, assist with the drawing up of long-term programmes of social reform and schemes for which assistance could be sought under the CDWA 1940. The Comptroller, who was based in Barbados, was also responsible for reporting on progress being made in the West Indies. An effort was made from the very start to visit all the colonies to observe conditions needing change and to discuss proposals and the applications for assistance which resulted from these proposals were to be sent to the Comptroller who would recommend them to the Secretary of State.

On 8 November 1940, the Governor of the Leeward Islands forwarded an application to the Comptroller for assistance to improve the water supply in Montserrat. The water supply had deteriorated considerably in some areas after two years of low rainfall and a number of earth tremors. The Comptroller replied that he had already discussed the issue with the members of the Legislative Council when he had visited Montserrat. Stockdale stated, "I feel that you will agree with me that it is hardly possible during the period of the war to contemplate the installation of a pumping plant and to undertake the re-organisation of the water supply system. The requirements of the situation are not so urgent as to warrant immediate action of so far reaching a character" (CO 318/451/6).

This response reflected the Circular Dispatch of 10 September 1940 from the Secretary of State informing Colonial Governments that apart from proposals having direct relations to the war effort, he was only prepared to consider applications for assistance for purposes of real urgency. He would not feel justified in asking the Treasury to make financial provisions for schemes that could not be carried out solely with local resources of men and materials and without detriment to the war effort, or for schemes that involved expenditure outside the sterling area. The only schemes that would be considered were those of such urgency and importance as to justify the expenditure of United Kingdom funds in the present circumstances (Morgan, v 1, 90).

The Governor was therefore left with the promise that "if it were necessary to arrange for a visiting water engineer to report upon water problems in the Leeward Islands generally and in Anguilla in particular, the requirements of Montserrat would not be overlooked" (CO 152 501/62426). Stockdale concluded by recommending that local arrangements be made for weekly or even fortnightly readings of water supplies in the Island and that cisterns be erected in Harris' Village as an intermediate measure of relief in the water supply position.

In March 1941, the Superintendent of Public Works in Antigua was sent to Montserrat to discuss with the Acting Commissioner and the Inspector of Works and Roads, the shortage of water in Harris' and Plymouth. Harris' Village was reduced to 3/5 of a gallon of water per head daily and this was transported each day by lorry at a cost of £10 per week. The Superintendent's report was discussed at a meeting of the Finance Committee and the Board of Health where he explained that he tried to make suggestions that would not conflict with any future developments consequent on an examination by the Comptroller's water expert. His plan for installing a ram to pipe water from Killiecrankie and for the construction of tanks to conserve rainwater in Harris' totalled £2,600. The Acting Commissioner, in drawing up the proposal for assistance for this scheme, ventured to add £50 for acquiring "proper mathematical instruments for the use of the Public Works Department as at present the Inspector of Works has to borrow privately in order to perform his duties" (CO 152 501/62426).

The dispatch was sent to the Comptroller on 4 April 1941 and he wrote to the Secretary of State on 5 May recommending a grant of £2,650 for the scheme to improve the water supply to Harris' Village and to neighbouring villages. He stipulated that the requirements of the act regarding the activities of trade unions, the rates of wages and the non-employment of children under 14 had been observed. A memorandum was sent from the Colonial Office to the Treasury on 27 August 1941. It noted that Lord Moyne was satisfied that the proposals were of such importance and urgency as to justify the provision of assistance from the United Kingdom funds in the present circumstances and that they could be carried into effect from local resources of labour without detriment to the war effort, and that no expenditure outside the sterling area was involved. On 4 September 1941, the Treasury informed the Colonial Office of their approval.

An understanding of the contradictions that seemed inherent in the implementation of the CDWA 1940 is provided by Johnson.

The most significant limitation on proposals for colonial development and welfare were wartime mobilization and the central importance of Britain's economic needs during post-war reconstruction. In a gesture of self-conscious magnanimity intended to impress the United States, Britain had initiated the programme of development and welfare during wartime, yet the war would serve to emphasize her economic dependency on the colonies. In 1941, for example, Lord Moyne as Secretary of State for the Colonies sent a circular dispatch detailing methods of economizing on resources and urging colonial governments to accumulate surplus balances for future use. He suggested that such balances could become interest-free loans to the metropolitan governments...
The sterling balances between 1943 and 1956 illustrate British dependence on the colonies at the same time that the British government claimed to fund overseas development projects. By 1943, the colonies had accumulated sterling balances in Britain to which they did not have unrestricted access because of British wartime demands on those financial reserves. In the post-war years, colonial access to these assets continued to be strictly regulated in the interests of the British economy (The British Caribbean, 613).

Morgan explains the procedure adopted by the Committee as follows:

Applications were first to be examined by the geographical departments and advisers. Every application ... was to be submitted to the Committee with a covering memorandum. Straightforward applications were to be grouped at the beginning of the agenda for speedy disposal. Urgent applications could be approved by the chairman, after circulation to the members if no adverse criticism was received within 36 hours (v1, 95).

It is hardly surprising then, that a correspondent felt the need to declare in the Wednesday 6 October Issue of the St. Kitts-Nevis Daily Bulletin that "using the Leeward Islands as an illustration what can be pointed to here to prove that the Stockdale Organization has helped Antigua, St. Kitts, Nevis, Montserrat and the Virgin Islands to get out of the economic rut into which they have fallen? Absolutely nothing! The lot of the peasant is not one whit better from the advent of the Comptroller and staff" (CO 318 455/21).

Even in the papers of the Fabian Colonial Bureau that had been monitoring colonial development activities since 1940, concern for what the Comptroller was doing in the West Indies is reflected. "He has been in the West Indies well over a year, but little has so far emerged" (FCB MSS). There was concern that the remarks made by Lord Moyne about development in the Colonies not being allowed to interfere with importing interests were affecting industrial development in the West Indies. "From what we have heard of Stockdale's schemes the whole bias is on agriculture and the possibilities of valuable industries based on local raw materials appear to be receiving scant consideration" (FCB MSS). Perhaps this explains why Montserrat received a grant of £19,829 for the improvement of agricultural methods and conditions while no discussions took place as to the role of agro-processing that would require the provision of electricity.

Colonial Development and Welfare Acts 1945, 1949 and 1950

J.M. Lee and Martin Petter explain that post-war planning for social and economic development began in the Colonial Office in 1943. Major restructuring of the Office gave rise to two new Under-Secretary posts, the Economic Division was further expanded, a Production Department was established and Caine "as Financial Advisor, was given responsibility for the supervision of Colonial Development and Welfare Policy" (169). Caine recognized that both the Colonial Office as well as colonial governments lacked experience in economic planning and that the war was only partly responsible for the relatively limited progress achieved under the CDWA 1940. There was little satisfaction with how development had been administered. Long-term planning was hampered by the fixed annual maximum of expenditure that prevented money being carried forward from one year to the next. The need was felt for a new Act.

A Bill to amend the CDWA 1940 was introduced in the House of Commons on 31 January 1945 before the war ended and by 25 April, the CDWA 1945 was passed. It provided that assistance for schemes would not exceed £17.5 million in any one year, while sums for promoting research or inquiry were not to exceed £1 million. The Act increased and extended the provision for colonial development and welfare by providing a total of £120 million over ten years ending in March 1956. Again Colonial Governments were informed by circular dispatch which was later published as Cmd 6713. They were given general lines on which development should be planned under the Act and the Secretary of State asked that ten year development plans be drawn up.

While the Colonial Governments were left to get on with planning, an Adviser on Development at the Colonial Office was appointed to co-ordinate planning activities. In the following year, 1946, a Colonial Economic and Development Council was appointed to advise on, as well as examine, the ten year development plans submitted by colonial governments. It was not until 1949 that a development plan for Montserrat was submitted (see Appendix 2) but assistance was still being provided for individual projects. The 1950 Report of the Comptroller for Development and Welfare in the West Indies indicates that the development plans of most colonies, drawn up as a result of the 1945 Act, had been settled. Those of some of the Leeward Islands Presidencies were still under consideration. Apparently the delay was due to the fact that originally a development plan covering all the Presidencies of the Leeward Islands as well as Leeward Islands Federal Services had been submitted in February 1949. The Colonial Office informed the Governor that the Plan was unsatisfactory and Mr. Gallagher, Colonial Office Economic Liaison Officer, was sent to assist with its revision. The Plan for Montserrat was then prepared by Commissioner Charlesworth Ross after consultation with Gallagher and the Colonial Secretary based in Antigua. The approval of the unofficial members of the Legislative Council for the plan was recorded in the minutes of the Finance Committee.

Eventually it was proposed that each Presidency should have a separate plan. Montserrat's Plan was the first to be submitted and it was circulated in the Colonial Office for comments by those concerned with various sections of the plan in December 1949. This was before it was circulated to the Colonial Economic and Development Council (CO 152 534/62442).

The Montserrat plan was discussed at a preliminary meeting in the Colonial Office on 15 February 1950. It consisted of a Practical Plan costing £90,500 which would utilize the CDWA allocation but would not make the territory independent of grant-in-aid and a Larger Plan (Plan L) costing a further £165,000 which by developing sugar, lime and tomato production was to make the island financially independent. Appendix 3 provides a breakdown of each Plan and its cost. There was general agreement that port and harbour facilities were essential prerequisites for economic development and that the estimate for them and for roads should be approved. It was felt that no further expenditure should be made on water supplies until the appointment of an Anti-Waste Inspector (to be paid from local revenue) to measure whether water was being wasted. Housing in Montserrat was considered to be lower than elsewhere in the British Caribbean and it was felt that the proposed expenditure would suffice for the erection of 150 houses using material from the United States base. The electric light and power scheme was one that it was felt the Colonial Development Corporation might be interested in (CO 152 544/62442).

The Ten Year Plan however, makes a more determined case for getting electrification:

There is one essential service which Montserrat lacks, and which is a severe handicap to any advancement in this Presidency. This is electric light and power. Not only does Plymouth and its environs present a very dismal picture at night, but crime, vice and smuggling are encouraged under cover of darkness. In addition, petrol pressure lamps which illuminate a few patches of a few streets and most of the better-class homes constitute an unwarrantable fire hazard in a built-up area where the water supply has often to be locked off at night. Further, it is practically impossible to entice capital for new ventures or to expand existing ones (e.g. cotton ginneries, manufacture of edible oil) without electric light and power. The provision of electric light and power must be considered a sine qua non to the development of the Presidency (CO 152 544/62442 Plan p. 7).

The Plan also highlights developments in US and British relations that had implications for the colonies. As Clive Thomas explains:

As the war between Britain and Germany advanced, the British government entered into lend-lease arrangements with the US in which military bases in some of its Caribbean territories were given to the US in exchange for war materials (Thomas, 49).

While the Montserrat Development Plan was being discussed, the CDWA 1945 was twice amended. In 1949, it was amended to raise the upper limit on expenditure to £20 million a year of which £2.5 million might be spent annually on research. Then in 1950, it was again amended to increase the total provision for the period 1946-1956 to £140 million by providing a further sum of £20 million. This last amendment also raised the annual upper limit on total expenditure to £25 million (G.B. Central Office of Information, 10). The Colonial Office publication The Colonial Territories 1950-1951 explains the reason for the amendments as follows:

It was reported last year that 1949-1950 had been a year of considerable economic development in the colonial territories. Greater supplies of capital and consumer goods had become available, there had been some improvement in recruitment of technical staff, and it was noted that the time had almost come when finance might be regarded as the limiting factor in development (96).

The Colonial Economic and Development Council met to discuss the Montserrat Development Plan and, in a confidential memorandum dated 10 March 1950, agreed to recommend to the Secretary of State that action on the plan should proceed along the lines proposed by the Colonial Office. They even conceded that expenditure on port and harbour facilities had been underestimated and should be increased as necessary (CO 152 544/62442).

The role of the Development and Welfare Organisation in the West Indies in the preparation of this plan does not seem to have been as significant as would have been expected. But Morgan explains that the work performed by the Organisation had become increasingly disconnected from the CD & W Act and progressively non-advisory. The Comptroller was caught up not only with his duties as Co-Chairman of the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission but also with activities to foster regional integration that would lead to the future Federation of the West Indies (Morgan Vol 2, 163).

In looking at the evolution of the development policy for the Colonies we are reminded of Conway's warning that the rhetoric of participation, and espousal of the cause of the poor can serve to delude well meaning development management practitioners and theorists, into supporting interventions which do not actually challenge 'established priorities and values', which date back to the colonial era.

In determining an appropriate development framework for the tiny dependency of Montserrat, an effort has to be made to move away from rhetoric. We have heard of trusteeship and partnerships but with nothing essentially changing, a lack of trust on the part of Montserratians is understandable. Indeed, Skinner is not without support when he argues that:

the volcano natural disaster has been so mis-managed by the British Government that many Montserratians believe that they would be better off independent and free to appeal to the international community rather than be tied to bilateral aid strategies from Britain. In August 1997, Clare Short, Secretary of State for International Development, made a political gaffe by publicly describing Montserratian appeals for additional financial support as 'wanting golden elephants next'... This untimely comment followed the deaths of 19 Montserratians due to pyroclastic flow two months earlier. Furthermore, though Short went on to promise US$125 million in aid in June 1998, it has been difficult for the Montserratian public to see the concrete nature of this support because the British have been waiting for the volcano to stabilize before re-investing in the island's infrastructure (Skinner, 315).

Conclusion

If development efforts are to work in small, resource-limited dependencies, there is a need for commitment to and vision for the process on the part of all stakeholders. Development strategists need to be able to think "outside the box" to identify untried paths possibly pregnant with development potential. History has demonstrated that the vision for residential tourism in Montserrat has brought untold gains to the island. Although the gains would have been more had links been made with developing the agricultural sector, the fact remains however, that the idea of an industry other than that limited to primary production was supported by investors. People bought into the idea and gave it their commitment. This commitment to achieving the goal goes a long way to ensure the success of development activities. Presently, the vision and commitment to development in crisis-ridden Montserrat seems lacking on the part of change agents and has contributed to the demoralizing frustration experienced by Montserratians with a vision of a future for their island home.

Another essential requirement for the development process is that development agents make every effort to truly understanding the cultural environment rather than resort to interpretations based on inappropriate yardsticks. Notions of cultural superiority have to be left behind. Every effort should be made to incorporate cultural practices in the development process. To date, none of the recent housing projects on Montserrat have encompassed the Montserrat 'maroon' tradition where family, friends and neighbours provide their labour without charge for certain construction tasks. British technocrats clutching purse strings may need to find room for an administrative flexibility to allow for this type of involvement, even while maintaining accountability. If in the end development dollars are better spent, the approach should not be ignored. The lessons of the past should be taken into consideration and there must be true adherence to the insights provided rather than to the rhetoric that continues to be touted .

REFERENCES

Primary Sources

Public Record Office, Kew, UK.

CO 152 413/8 1928-1929 Hurricane Relief and Rebuilding, Montserrat.

CO 152 415/9 a 1929-1939 Colonial Development Fund: Houses, Montserrat.

CO 152 415/9 b 1929-1939 Minute Sheet. Colonial Development Fund: Houses, Montserrat.

CO 152 415/9 c 1929-1939 Minute dated 11/11/29. Colonial Development Fund: Houses, Montserrat.

CO 152 419/5 1930-1931 Colonial Development Fund" Electric Lighting and Cold Storage, Montserrat (with Plan of Refrigeration Plant).

CO 152 419/7 1930-1931 Colonial Development Fund: Botanical and Experimental Station, Montserrat.

CO 152 419/8 1929-1932 Colonial Development Fund: Houses, Montserrat.

CO 152 434/3 1931-1932 Colonial Development Fund: Reconstruction of Roads.

CO 152 435/5 1932-1933 Colonial Development Fund Construction of Tuberculosis Ward at Hospital, Montserrat.

CO 152 440/2 a 1933 Colonial Development Fund: Housing, Montserrat.

CO 152 440/2 b 1933 Folio 9 Correspondence dated 4/7/33 Colonial Development Fund: Housing, Montserrat.

CO 152 440/2 c 1933 Folio 1 Correspondence dated 4/3/33 Colonial Development Fund: Housing, Montserrat.

CO 152 450/6 1934-1936 Electric Light Scheme for Montserrat.

CO 152 456/10 1935 Proposed Electric Light Scheme for Plymouth, Montserrat.

CO 152 465/10 1936-1937 Earthquake Damage in Montserrat: Reconstruction and Expenditure.

CO 152 481 1938-1939 Montserrat and the British Virgin Islands: Original Correspondence.

CO 152 501/62426 1941-1943

CO 152 534/62442 1947-1951 Montserrat: Original Correspondence.

CO 152 544/62442 1950-1953 Montserrat and the Virgin Islands: Original Correspondence.

CO 318/451/6 1940 Comptroller's Despatches to Governor: Montserrat.

CO 318 455/21 1943 West Indian Press Cuttings.

CO 152 501/62426 1941-1943 Office of the Comptroller for Development and Welfare (West Indies): Proposal for Improving the Water Supplies in Montserrat.

University of Oxford. Rhodes House Library. South Parks Road, Oxford OX1 3RG, England

FCB MSS Brit Emp S.365 Box 67 FF1-116 1940-1944 Colonial Development and Welfare.

Secondary Sources

Abbott, George C. "A Re-examination of the 1929 Colonial Development Act." The Economic History Review, 23, 1971.

Conway, Dennis. "Pursuing an Appropriate Development Model for Caribbean Small Islands: Can Past Experience Help Subvert the Neo-Liberal Agenda?" Paper presented at the Latin American Studies Association XX International Congress, held in Guadalajara, Mexico, April 17-19, 1997. 10 Oct 2002. < http://136.142.158.105/LASA97/conway.pdf>

Fergus, Howard A. Montserrat in the Twentieth Century: Trials and Triumphs. Manjack, Montserrat: U.W.I. School of Continuing Studies, 2001.

Great Britain. Central Office of Information. The United Kingdom Colonial and Development and Welfare Acts. Rev. London: HMSO, 1960.

Great Britain. Colonial Office. The Colonial Territories 1950-1951. Cmd. 8243. London: HMSO, 1951.

Great Britain. Colonial Office. First Interim Report of the Colonial Development Advisory Committee Covering the Period 1st August 1929 to 28th February, 1930. Cmd 3540. London: HMSO, 1930.

Great Britain. Colonial Office. Leeward Islands: Report for 1928-29. London: HMSO, 1930.

Great Britain. Colonial Office. Leeward Islands: Report for 1929-30. London: HMSO, 1931.

Great Britain. Treasury. Colonial Development: Memorandum Explaining Financial Resolution. London: HMSO, 1929.

Havinden, Michael and David Meredith. Colonialism and Development: Britain and its Tropical Colonies 1850-1960. London: Routledge, 1993.

Horn, Edwin. The West Indies: Report of a Survey on Housing. Barbados: Development & Welfare Organization, 1957.

Hinds, Allister. "Imperial Policy and Colonial Sterling Balances, 1943-1956." Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 19.1 (1991): 24-44.

Jennings, Ray. "Participatory Development as New Paradigm: The Transition of Development Professionalism." 13 Oct. 2002. <http://www.usaid.gov/hum_response/oti/pubs/ptdv1000.pdf>

Johnson, Howard. "The British Caribbean from Demobilization to Constitutional Decolonization." The Twentieth Century. Ed. Judith M. Brown and Wm. Roger Louis, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. Vol. IV of The Oxford History of the British Empire. 597-622.

--- "The West Indies and the Conversion of the British Official Classes to the Development Idea." Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 15.1 (1977): 55-83.

Lee, J.M. and Martin Petter. The Colonial Office, War and Development Policy: Organisation and the Planning of a Metropolitan Initiative, 1939-1940. London: Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 1982.

Luke, Stephen. Development and Welfare in the West Indies 1955-1956: Report [of the] Comptroller for Development and Welfare in the West Indies. London: HMSO, 1957.

Morgan, D.J. The Origins of British Aid Policy 1924-1945: The Official History of Colonial Development. 2 vols. London: Macmillan, 1980.

Pearce, David W. The Dictionary of Modern Economics. Rev ed. London: Macmillan, 1983.

Skinner, Jonathan. "Anti-social 'Social Development'? Governmentality, Indigenousness and the DFID Approach on Montserrat. (Unpublished Paper), 2002.

--- "British Constructions with Constitutions: The Formal and Informal Nature of 'Island' Relations on Montserrat and Gibraltar." Social Identities, 8.2 (2002): 301-320.

Stolberg, Claus. "British Colonial Policy and the Great Depression: The Case of Jamaica." Journal of Caribbean History, 23.1 (1989): 142-163.

Thomas, Clive Y. The Poor and the Powerless: Economic Policy and Change in the Caribbean. London: Latin America Bureau, 1988.

Whitingham Paul. "New Labour, New Hope? The Development Policy of the New British Government." FGD Occasional Paper No. 12. Braamfontein, South Africa: The Foundation for Global Dialogue, March 1998. 13 Oct 2002. < http://www.igd.org.za/IgdDocs/newlabour.doc>

Wicker, E.R.. "Colonial Development and Welfare 1929-1957: The Evolution of a Policy. " Social and Economic Studies, 7.4 (1978): 171-191.

APPENDIX 1

APPENDIX 2

APPENDIX 3

© Gracelyn Cassell, 2003.

HTML last revised 11 February, 2003.

Return to Conference Papers.