PLATO,

AND THE

OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES.

BY GEORGE GROTE

A NEW EDITION.

IN FOUR VOLUMES.

Vol. III.

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER XXVI.
PHÆDRUS — SYMPOSION.
These two are the two erotic dialogues of Plato. Phædrus is the originator of both	1
Eros as conceived by Plato. Different sentiment prevalent in Hellenic antiquity and in modern times. Position of women in Greece	ib.
Eros, considered as the great stimulus to improving philosophical communion. Personal Beauty, the great point of approximation between the world of sense and the world of Ideas. Gradual generalisation of the sentiment	4
All men love Good, as the means of Happiness, but they pursue it by various means. The name Eros is confined to one special case of this large variety	5
Desire of mental copulation and procreation, as the only attainable likeness of immortality, requires the sight of personal beauty as an originating stimulus	6
Highest exaltation of the erotic impulse in a few privileged minds, when it ascends gradually to the love of Beauty in general. This is the most absorbing sentiment of all	7
Purpose of the Symposion, to contrast this Platonic view of Eros with several different views of it previously enunciated by the other speakers; closing with a panegyric on Sokrates, by the drunken Alkibiades	8
Views of Eros presented by Phædrus, Pausanias, Eryximachus, Aristophanes, Agathon	9
Discourse of Sokrates from revelation of Diotima. He describes Eros as not a God, but an intermediate Dæmon between Gods and men, constantly aspiring to divinity, but not attaining it	9
Analogy of the erotic aspiration with that of the philosopher, who knows his own ignorance and thirsts for knowledge	10
Eros as presented in the Phædrus — Discourse of Lysias, and counter-discourse of Sokrates, adverse to Eros — Sokrates is seized with remorse, and recants in a high-flown panegyric on Eros	11
Panegyric — Sokrates admits that the influence of Eros is a variety of madness, but distinguishes good and bad varieties of madness, both coming from the Gods. Good madness is far better than sobriety	ib.
Poetical mythe delivered by Sokrates, describing the immortality and pre-existence of the soul, and its pre-natal condition of partial companionship with Gods and eternal Ideas	12
Operation of such pre-natal experience upon the Intellectual faculties of man — Comparison and combination of particular sensations indispensable — Reminiscence	13
Reminiscence is kindled up in the soul of the philosopher by the aspect of visible Beauty, which is the great link between the world of sense and the world of Ideas	14
Elevating influence ascribed, both in Phædrus and Symposion, to Eros Philosophus. Mixture in the mind of Plato, of poetical fancy and religious mysticism, with dialectic theory	15
Differences between Symposion and Phædrus. In-dwelling conceptions assumed by the former, pre-natal experiences by the latter	17
Nothing but metaphorical immortality recognised in Symposion	ib.
Form or Idea of Beauty presented singly and exclusively in Symposion	18
Eros recognised, both in Phædrus and Symposion, as affording the initiatory stimulus to philosophy — Not so recognised in Phædon, Theætêtus, and elsewhere	ib.
Concluding scene and speech of Alkibiades in the Symposion — Behaviour of Sokrates to Alkibiades and other handsome youths	19
Perfect self-command of Sokrates — proof against every sort of trial	20
Drunkenness of others at the close of the Symposion — Sokrates is not affected by it, but continues his dialectic process	21
Symposion and Phædon — each is the antithesis and complement of the other	22
Symposion of Plato compared with that of Xenophon	ib.
Small proportion of the serious, in the Xenophontic Symposion	24
Platonic Symposion more ideal and transcendental than the Xenophontic	25
Second half of the Phædrus — passes into a debate on Rhetoric. Eros is considered as a subject for rhetorical exercise	26
Lysias is called a logographer by active politicians. Contempt conveyed by the word. Sokrates declares that the only question is, Whether a man writes well or ill	27
Question about teaching the art of writing well or speaking well. Can it be taught upon system or principle? Or does the successful Rhetor succeed only by unsystematic knack?	28
Theory of Sokrates — that all art of persuasion must be founded upon a knowledge of the truth, and of gradations of resemblance to the truth	ib.
Comparison made by Sokrates between the discourse of Lysias and his own. Eros is differently understood: Sokrates defined what he meant by it: Lysias did not define	29
Logical processes — Definition and Division — both of them exemplified in the two discourses of Sokrates	ib.
View of Sokrates — that there is no real Art of Rhetoric, except what is already comprised in Dialectic — The rhetorical teaching is empty and useless	30
What the Art of Rhetoric ought to be — Analogy of Hippokrates and the medical Art	31
Art of Rhetoric ought to include a systematic classification of minds with all their varieties, and of discourses with all their varieties. The Rhetor must know how to apply the one to the other, suitably to each particular case	32
The Rhetorical Artist must farther become possessed of real truth, as well as that which his auditors believe to be truth. He is not sufficiently rewarded for this labour	33
Question about Writing — As an Art, for the purpose of instruction, it can do little — Reasons why. Writing may remind the reader of what he already knows	ib.
Neither written words, nor continuous speech, will produce any serious effect in teaching. Dialectic and cross-examination are necessary	34
The Dialectician and Cross-Examiner is the only man who can really teach. If the writer can do this, he is more than a writer	37
Lysias is only a logographer: Isokrates promises to become a philosopher	38
Date of the Phædrus — not an early dialogue	ib.
Criticism given by Plato on the three discourses — His theory of Rhetoric is more Platonic than Sokratic	ib.
His theory postulates, in the Rhetor, knowledge already assured — it assumes that all the doubts have been already removed	39
The Expositor, with knowledge and logical process, teaches minds unoccupied and willing to learn	ib.
The Rhetor does not teach, but persuades persons with minds pre-occupied — guiding them methodically from error to truth	40
He must then classify the minds to be persuaded, and the means of persuasion or varieties of discourse. He must know how to fit on the one to the other in each particular case	41
Plato’s Idéal of the Rhetorical Art — involves in part incompatible conditions — the Wise man or philosopher will never be listened to by the public	ib.
The other part of the Platonic Idéal is grand but unattainable — breadth of psychological data and classified modes of discourse	42
Plato’s ideal grandeur compared with the rhetorical teachers — Usefulness of these teachers for the wants of an accomplished man	44
The Rhetorical teachers conceived the Art too narrowly: Plato conceived it too widely. The principles of an Art are not required to be explained to all learners	45
Plato includes in his conception of Art, the application thereof to new particular cases. This can never be taught by rule	46
Plato’s charge against the Rhetorical teachers is not made out	47
Plato has not treated Lysias fairly, in neglecting his greater works, and selecting for criticism an erotic exercise for a private circle	47
No fair comparison can be taken between this exercise of Lysias and the discourses delivered by Sokrates in the Phædrus	48
Continuous discourse, either written or spoken, inefficacious as a means of instruction to the ignorant	49
Written matter is useful as a memorandum for persons who know — or as an elegant pastime	50
Plato’s didactic theories are pitched too high to be realised	51
No one has ever been found competent to solve the difficulties raised by Sokrates, Arkesilaus, Karneades, and the negative vein of philosophy	ib.
Plato’s idéal philosopher can only be realised under the hypothesis of a pre-existent and omniscient soul, stimulated into full reminiscence here	52
Different proceeding of Plato in the Timæus	53
Opposite tendencies co-existent in Plato’s mind — Extreme of the Transcendental or Absolute — Extreme of specialising adaptation to individuals and occasions	54



CHAPTER XXVII.
PARMENIDES.
Character of dialogues immediately preceding — much transcendental assertion. Opposite character of the Parmenides	56
Sokrates is the juvenile defendant — Parmenides the veteran censor and cross-examiner. Parmenides gives a specimen of exercises to be performed by the philosophical aspirant	ib.
Circumstances and persons of the Parmenides	57
Manner in which the doctrine of Parmenides was impugned. Manner in which his partisan Zeno defended him	58
Sokrates here impugns the doctrine of Zeno. He affirms the Platonic theory of ideas separate from sensible objects, yet participable by them	60
Parmenides and Zeno admire the philosophical ardour of Sokrates. Parmenides advances objections against the Platonic theory of Ideas	60
What Ideas does Sokrates recognise? Of the Just and Good? Yes. Of Man, Horse, &c.? Doubtful. Of Hair, Mud, &c.? No	ib.
Parmenides declares that no object in nature is mean to the philosopher	61
Remarks upon this — Contrast between emotional and scientific classification	ib.
Objections of Parmenides — How can objects participate in the Ideas. Each cannot have the whole Idea, nor a part thereof	62
Comparing the Idea with the sensible objects partaking in the Idea, there is a likeness between them which must be represented by a higher Idea — and so on ad infinitum	63
Are the Ideas conceptions of the mind, and nothing more? Impossible	64
The Ideas are types or exemplars, and objects partake of them by being likened to them. Impossible	65
If Ideas exist, they cannot be knowable by us. We can know only what is relative to ourselves. Individuals are relative to individuals: Ideas relative to Ideas	ib.
Forms can be known only through the Form of Cognition, which we do not possess	66
Form of cognition, superior to our Cognition, belongs to the Gods. We cannot know them, nor can they know us	ib.
Sum total of objections against the Ideas is grave. But if we do not admit that Ideas exist, and that they are knowable, there can be no dialectic discussion	67
Dilemma put by Parmenides — Acuteness of his objections	68
The doctrine which Parmenides attacks is the genuine Platonic theory of Ideas. His objections are never answered in any part of the Platonic dialogues	ib.
Views of Stallbaum and Socher. The latter maintains that Plato would never make such objections against his own theory, and denies the authenticity of the Parmenidês	69
Philosophers are usually advocates, each of a positive system of his own	70
Different spirit of Plato in his Dialogues of Search	ib.
The Parmenidês is the extreme manifestation of the negative element. That Plato should employ one dialogue in setting forth the negative case against the Theory of Ideas is not unnatural	71
Force of the negative case in the Parmenidês. Difficulties about participation of sensible objects in the world of Ideas	ib.
Difficulties about the Cognizability of Ideas. If Ideas are absolute, they cannot be cognizable: if they are cognizable, they must be relative. Doctrine of Homo Mensura	72
Answer of Sokrates — That Ideas are mere conceptions of the mind. Objection of Parmenides correct, though undeveloped	73
Meaning of Abstract and General Terms, debated from ancient times to the present day — Different views of Plato and Aristotle upon it	76
Plato never expected to make his Ideas fit on to the facts of sense: Aristotle tried to do it and partly succeeded	78
Continuation of the Dialogue — Parmenides admonishes Sokrates that he has been premature in delivering a doctrine, without sufficient preliminary exercise	79
What sort of exercise? Parmenides describes: To assume provisionally both the affirmative and the negative of many hypotheses about the most general terms, and to trace the consequences of each	ib.
Impossible to do this before a numerous audience — Parmenides is entreated to give a specimen — After much solicitation he agrees	80
Parmenides elects his own theory of the Unum, as the topic for exhibition — Aristoteles becomes respondent	ib.
Exhibition of Parmenides — Nine distinct deductions or Demonstrations, first from Unum Est — next from Unum non Est	81
The Demonstrations in antagonising pairs, or Antinomies. Perplexing entanglement of conclusions given without any explanation	ib.
Different judgments of Platonic critics respecting the Antinomies and the dialogue generally	82
No dogmatical solution or purpose is wrapped up in the dialogue. The purpose is negative, to make a theorist keenly feel all the difficulties of theorising	85
This negative purpose is expressly announced by Plato himself. All dogmatical purpose, extending farther, is purely hypothetical, and even inconsistent with what is declared	87
The Demonstrations or Antinomies considered. They include much unwarranted assumption and subtlety. Collection of unexplained perplexities or ἀπορίαι	88
Even if Plato himself saw through these subtleties, he might still choose to impose and to heap up difficulties in the way of a forward affirmative aspirant	89
The exercises exhibited by Parmenides are exhibited only as illustrative specimens of a method enjoined to be applied to many other Antinomies	91
These Platonic Antinomies are more formidable than any of the sophisms or subtleties broached by the Megaric philosophers	ib.
In order to understand fully the Platonic Antinomies, we ought to have before us the problems of the Megarics and others. Uselessness of searching for a positive result	93
Assumptions of Parmenides in his Demonstrations convey the minimum of determinate meaning. Views of Aristotle upon these indeterminate predicates, Ens, Unum, &c.	94
In the Platonic Demonstrations the same proposition in words is made to bear very different meanings	95
First demonstration ends in an assemblage of negative conclusions. Reductio ad Absurdum, of the assumption — Unum non Multa	96
Second Demonstration	97
It ends in demonstrating Both, of that which the first Demonstration had demonstrated Neither	98
Startling paradox — Open offence against logical canon — No logical canon had then been laid down	99
Demonstration third — Attempt to reconcile the contradiction of Demonstrations I. and II.	100
Plato’s imagination of the Sudden or Instantaneous — Breaches or momentary stoppages in the course of time	ib.
Review of the successive pairs of Demonstrations or Antinomies in each, the first proves the Neither, the second proves the Both	101
The third Demonstration is mediatorial but not satisfactory — The hypothesis of the Sudden or Instantaneous found no favour	102
Review of the two last Antinomies. Demonstrations VI. and VII.	103
Demonstration VII. is founded upon the genuine doctrine of Parmenides	104
Demonstrations VI. and VII. considered — Unwarrantable steps in the reasoning — The fundamental premiss differently interpreted, though the same in words	105
Demonstrations VIII. and IX. — Analysis of Demonstration VIII.	106
Demonstration VIII. is very subtle and Zenonian	107
Demonstration IX. Neither following Both	ib.
Concluding words of the Parmenides — Declaration that he has demonstrated the Both and the Neither of many different propositions	108
Comparison of the conclusion of the Parmenides to an enigma of the Republic. Difference. The constructor of the enigma adapted its conditions to a foreknown solution. Plato did not	ib.



CHAPTER XXVIII.
THEÆTETUS.
Subjects and personages in the Theætêtus	110
Question raised by Sokrates — What is knowledge or Cognition? First answer of Theætêtus, enumerating many different cognitions. Corrected by Sokrates	111
Preliminary conversation before the second answer is given. Sokrates describes his own peculiar efficacy — mental obstetric — He cannot teach, but he can evolve knowledge out of pregnant minds	112
Ethical basis of the cross-examination of Sokrates — He is forbidden to pass by falsehood without challenge	113
Answer of Theætêtus — Cognition is sensible perception: Sokrates says that this is the same doctrine as the Homo Mensura laid down by Protagoras, and that both are in close affinity with the doctrines of Homer, Herakleitus, Empedoklês, &c., all except Parmenides	ib.
Plato here blends together three distinct theories for the purpose of confuting them; yet he also professes to urge what can be said in favour of them. Difficulty of following his exposition	114
The doctrine of Protagoras is completely distinct from the other doctrines. The identification of them as one and the same is only constructive — the interpretation of Plato himself	115
Explanation of the doctrine of Protagoras — Homo Mensura	116
Perpetual implication of Subject with Object — Relate and Correlate	118
Such relativity is no less true in regard to the ratiocinative combinations of each individual, than in regard to his percipient capacities	ib.
Evidence from Plato proving implication of Subject and Object, in regard to the intelligible world	121
The Protagorean measure is even more easily shown in reference to the intelligible world than in reference to sense	122
Object always relative to Subject — Either without the other, impossible. Plato admits this in Sophistes	126
Plato’s representation of the Protagorean doctrine in intimate conjunction with the Herakleitean	126
Relativity of sensible facts, as described by him	ib.
Relations are nothing in the object purely and simply without a comparing subject	127
Relativity twofold — to the comparing Subject — to another object, besides the one directly described	ib.
Statement of the doctrine of Herakleitus — yet so as to implicate it with that of Protagoras	128
Agent and Patient — No absolute Ens	129
Arguments derived from dreams, fevers, &c., may be answered	130
Exposition of the Protagorean doctrine, as given here by Sokrates is to a great degree just. You cannot explain the facts of consciousness by independent Subject and Object	131
Plato’s attempt to get behind the phenomena. Reference to a double potentiality — Subjective and Objective	133
Arguments advanced by the Platonic Sokrates against the Protagorean doctrine. He says that it puts the wise and foolish on a par — that it contradicts the common consciousness. Not every one, but the wise man only, is a measure	135
In matters of present sentiment every man can judge for himself. Where future consequences are involved special knowledge is required	136
Plato, when he impugns the doctrine of Protagoras, states that doctrine without the qualification properly belonging to it. All belief relative to the condition of the believing mind	137
All exposition and discussion is an assemblage of individual judgments and affirmations. This fact is disguised by elliptical forms of language	139
Argument — That the Protagorean doctrine equalises all men and animals. How far true. Not true in the sense requisite to sustain Plato’s objection	141
Belief on authority is true to the believer himself — The efficacy of authority resides in the believer’s own mind	142
Protagorean formula — is false, to those who dissent from it	143
Plato’s argument that the wise man alone is a measure — Reply to it	ib.
Plato’s argument as to the distinction between present sensation and anticipation of the future	145
The formula of Relativity does not imply that every man believes himself to be infallible	ib.
Plato’s argument is untenable — That if the Protagorean formula be admitted, dialectic discussion would be annulled — The reverse is true — Dialectic recognises the autonomy of the Individual mind	146
Contrast with the Treatise De Legibus — Plato assumes infallible authority — sets aside Dialectic	148
Plato in denying the Protagorean formula, constitutes himself the measure for all. Counter-proposition to the formula	ib.
Import of the Protagorean formula is best seen when we state explicitly the counter-proposition	150
Unpopularity of the Protagorean formula — Most believers insist upon making themselves a measure for others, as well as for themselves. Appeal to Abstractions	150
Aristotle failed in his attempts to refute the Protagorean formula — Every reader of Aristotle will claim the right of examining for himself Aristotle’s canons of truth	152
Plato’s examination of the other doctrine — That knowledge is Sensible Perception. He adverts to sensible facts which are different with different Percipients	153
Such is not the case with all the facts of sense. The conditions of unanimity are best found among select facts of sense — weighing, measuring, &c.	154
Arguments of Sokrates in examining this question. Divergence between one man and another arises, not merely from different sensual impressibility, but from mental and associative difference	155
Argument — That sensible Perception does not include memory — Probability that those who held the doctrine meant to include memory	157
Argument from the analogy of seeing and not seeing at the same time	ib.
Sokrates maintains that we do not see with our eyes, but that the mind sees through the eyes: that the mind often conceives and judges by itself without the aid of any bodily organ	159
Indication of several judgments which the mind makes by itself — It perceives Existence, Difference, &c.	160
Sokrates maintains that knowledge is to be found, not in the Sensible Perceptions themselves, but in the comparisons add computations of the mind respecting them	161
Examination of this view — Distinction from the views of modern philosophers	162
Different views given by Plato in other dialogues	163
Plato’s discussion of this question here exhibits a remarkable advance in analytical psychology. The mind rises from Sensation, first to Opinion, then to Cognition	164
Plato did not recognise Verification from experience, or from facts of sense, as either necessary or possible	168
Second definition given by Theætêtus — That Cognition consists in right or true opinion	ib.
Objection by Sokrates — This definition assumes that there are false opinions. But how can false opinions be possible? How can we conceive Non-Ens: or confound together two distinct realities?	ib.
Waxen memorial tablet in the mind, on which past impressions are engraved. False opinion consists in wrongly identifying present sensations with past impressions	169
Sokrates refutes this assumption. Dilemma. Either false opinion is impossible, or else a man may know what he does not know	170
He draws distinction between possessing knowledge, and having it actually in hand. Simile of the pigeon-cage with caught pigeons turned into it and flying about	ib.
Sokrates refutes this. Suggestion of Theætêtus — That there may be non-cognitions in the mind as well as cognitions, and that false opinion may consist in confounding one with the other. Sokrates rejects this	171
He brings another argument to prove that Cognition is not the same as true opinion. Rhetors persuade or communicate true opinion; but they do not teach or communicate knowledge	172
New answer of Theætêtus — Cognition is true opinion, coupled with rational explanation	173
Criticism on the answer by Sokrates. Analogy of letters and words, primordial elements and compounds. Elements cannot be explained: compounds alone can be explained	ib.
Sokrates refutes this criticism. If the elements are unknowable, the compound must be unknowable also	174
Rational explanation may have one of three different meanings. 1. Description in appropriate language. 2. Enumeration of all the component elements in the compound. In neither of these meanings will the definition of Cognition hold	ib.
Third meaning. To assign some mark, whereby the thing to be explained differs from everything else. The definition will not hold. For rational explanation, in this sense, is already included in true opinion	175
Conclusion of the dialogue — Summing up by Sokrates — Value of the result, although purely negative	176
Remarks on the dialogue. View of Plato. False persuasion of knowledge removed. Importance of such removal	ib.
Formation of the testing or verifying power in men’s minds, value of the Theætêtus, as it exhibits Sokrates demolishing his own suggestions	177
Comparison of the Philosopher with the Rhetor. The Rhetor is enslaved to the opinions of auditors	178
The Philosopher is master of his own debates	179
Purpose of dialogue to qualify for a life of philosophical Search	ib.
Difficulties of the Theætêtus are not solved in any other Dialogue	180
Plato considered that the search for Truth was the noblest occupation of life	182
Contrast between the philosopher and the practical statesman — between Knowledge and Opinion	183



CHAPTER XXIX.
SOPHISTES — POLITIKUS.
Persons and circumstances of the two dialogues	185
Relation of the two dialogues to the Theætêtus	187
Plato declares that his first purpose is to administer a lesson in logical method: the special question chosen, being subordinate to that purpose	188
Method of logical Definition and Division	ib.
Sokrates tries the application of this method, first, upon a vulgar subject. To find the logical place and deduction of the Angler. Superior classes above him. Bisecting division	189
Such a lesson in logical classification was at that time both novel and instructive. No logical manuals then existed	190
Plato describes the Sophist as analogous to an angler. He traces the Sophist by descending subdivision from the acquisitive genus of art	191
The Sophist traced down from the same, by a second and different descending subdivision	192
Also, by a third	193
The Sophist is traced down, from the genus of separating or discriminating art	194
In a logical classification, low and vulgar items deserve as much attention as grand ones. Conflict between emotional and scientific classification	195
The purifier — a species under the genus discriminator — separates good from evil. Evil is of two sorts; the worst sort is, Ignorance, mistaking itself for knowledge	197
Exhortation is useless against this worst mode of evil. Cross-examination, the shock of the Elenchus, must be brought to bear upon it. This is the sovereign purifier	ib.
The application of this Elenchus is the work of the Sophist, looked at on its best side. But looked at as he really is, he is a juggler who teaches pupils to dispute about every thing — who palms off falsehood for truth	198
Doubt started by the Eleate. How can it be possible either to think or to speak falsely?	199
He pursues the investigation of this problem by a series of questions	ib.
The Sophist will reject our definition and escape, by affirming that to speak falsely is impossible. He will require us to make out a rational theory, explaining Non-Ens	200
The Eleate turns from Non-Ens to Ens. Theories of various philosophers about Ens	ib.
Difficulties about Ens are as great as those about Non-Ens	201
Whether Ens is Many or One? If Many, how Many? Difficulties about One and the Whole. Theorists about Ens cannot solve them	201
Theories of those who do not recognise a definite number of Entia or elements. Two classes thereof	202
1. The Materialist Philosophers. 2. The Friends of Forms or Idealists, who recognise such Forms as the only real Entia	ib.
Argument against the Materialists — Justice must be something, since it may be either present or absent, making sensible difference — But Justice is not a body	203
At least many of them will concede this point, though not all Ens is common to the corporeal and the incorporeal. Ens is equivalent to potentiality	204
Argument against the Idealists — who distinguish Ens from the generated, and say that we hold communion with the former through our minds, with the latter through our bodies and senses	ib.
Holding communion — What? Implies Relativity. Ens is known by the mind. It therefore suffers or undergoes change. Ens includes both the unchangeable and the changeable	205
Motion and rest are both of them Entia or realities. Both agree in Ens. Ens is a tertium quid — distinct from both. But how can anything be distinct from both?	206
Here the Eleate breaks off without solution. He declares his purpose to show, That Ens is as full of puzzle as Non-Ens	ib.
Argument against those who admit no predication to be legitimate, except identical. How far Forms admit of intercommunion with each other	ib.
No intercommunion between any distinct forms. Refuted. Common speech is inconsistent with this hypothesis	207
Reciprocal intercommunion of all Forms — inadmissible	ib.
Some Forms admit of intercommunion, others not. This is the only admissible doctrine. Analogy of letters and syllables	ib.
Art and skill are required to distinguish what Forms admit of intercommunion, and what Forms do not. This is the special intelligence of the Philosopher, who lives in the bright region of Ens: the Sophist lives in the darkness of Non-Ens	208
He comes to enquire what Non-Ens is. He takes for examination five principal Forms — Motion — Rest — Ens — Same — Different	ib.
Form of Diversum pervades all the others	209
Motion is different from Diversum, or is not Diversum. Motion is different from Ens — in other words, it is Non-Ens. Each of these Forms is both Ens and Non-Ens	210
By Non-Ens, we do not mean anything contrary to Ens — we mean only something different from Ens. Non-Ens is a real Form, as well as Ens	ib.
The Eleate claims to have refuted Parmenides, and to have shown both that Non-Ens is a real Form, and also what it is	211
The theory now stated is the only one, yet given, which justifies predication as a legitimate process, with a predicate different from the subject	212
Enquiry, whether the Form of Non-Ens can come into intercommunion with the Forms of Proposition, Opinion, Judgment	213
Analysis of a Proposition. Every Proposition must have a noun and a verb — it must be proposition of Something. False propositions, involve the Form of Non-Ens, in relation to the particular subject	ib.
Opinion, Judgment, Fancy, &c., are akin to Proposition, and may be also false, by coming into partnership with the Form Non-Ens	214
It thus appears that Falsehood, imitating Truth, is theoretically possible, and that there may be a profession, like that of the Sophist, engaged in producing it	ib.
Logical distribution of Imitators — those who imitate what they know, or what they do not know — of these last, some sincerely believe themselves to know, others are conscious that they do not know, and designedly impose upon others	215
Last class divided — Those who impose on numerous auditors by long discourse, the Rhetor — Those who impose on select auditors, by short question and answer, making the respondent contradict himself — the Sophist	215
Dialogue closed. Remarks upon it. Characteristics ascribed to a Sophist	216
These characteristics may have belonged to other persons, but they belonged in an especial manner to Sokrates himself	ib.
The conditions enumerated in the dialogue (except the taking of a fee) fit Sokrates better than any other known person	217
The art which Plato calls “the thoroughbred and noble Sophistical Art” belongs to Sokrates and to no one else. The Elenchus was peculiar to him. Protagoras and Prodikus were not Sophists in this sense	218
Universal knowledge — was professed at that time by all Philosophers — Plato, Aristotle, &c.	219
Inconsistency of Plato’s argument in the Sophistês. He says that the Sophist is a disputatious man who challenges every one for speaking falsehood. He says also that the Sophist is one who maintains false propositions to be impossible	220
Reasoning of Plato about Non-Ens — No predications except identical	221
Misconception of the function of the copula in predication	ib.
No formal Grammar or Logic existed at that time. No analysis or classification of propositions before the works of Aristotle	222
Plato’s declared purpose in the Sophistês — To confute the various schools of thinkers — Antisthenes, Parmenides, the Materialists, &c.	223
Plato’s refutation throws light upon the doctrine of Antisthenes	ib.
Plato’s argument against the Materialists	224
Reply open to the Materialists	ib.
Plato’s argument against the Idealists or Friends of Forms. Their point of view against him	225
Plato argues — That to know, and be known, is action and passion, a mode of relativity	226
Plato’s reasoning — compared with the points of view of both	ib.
The argument of Plato goes to an entire denial of the Absolute, and a full establishment of the Relative	227
Coincidence of his argument with the doctrine of Protagoras in the Theætêtus	ib.
The Idealists maintained that Ideas or Forms were entirely unchangeable and eternal. Plato here denies this, and maintains that ideas were partly changeable, partly unchangeable	228
Plato’s reasoning against the Materialists	ib.
Difference between Concrete and Abstract, not then made conspicuous. Large meaning here given by Plato to Ens — comprehending not only objects of Perception, but objects of Conception besides	229
Narrower meaning given by Materialists to Ens — they included only Objects of Perception. Their reasoning as opposed to Plato	ib.
Different definitions of Ens — by Plato — the Materialists, the Idealists	231
Plato’s views about Non-Ens examined	ib.
His review of the select Five Forms	233
Plato’s doctrine — That Non-Ens is nothing more than different from Ens	ib.
Communion of Non-Ens with proposition — possible and explicable	235
Imperfect analysis of a proposition — Plato does not recognise the predicate	ib.
Plato’s explanation of Non-Ens is not satisfactory — Objections to it	236
Plato’s view of the negative is erroneous. Logical maxim of contradiction	239
Examination of the illustrative propositions chosen by Plato — How do we know that one is true, the other false?	ib.
Necessity of accepting the evidence of sense	240
Errors of Antisthenes — depended partly on the imperfect formal logic of that day	241
Doctrine of the Sophistês — contradicts that of other Platonic dialogues	242
The persons whom Plato here attacks as Friends of Forms are those who held the same doctrine as Plato himself espouses in Phædon, Republic, &c.	246
The Sophistês recedes from the Platonic point of view, and approaches the Aristotelian	247
Aristotle assumes without proof, that there are some propositions true, others false	249
Plato in the Sophistês has undertaken an impossible task — He could not have proved, against his supposed adversary, that there are false propositions	ib.
What must be assumed in all dialectic discussion	251
Discussion and theorising presuppose belief and disbelief, expressed in set forms of words. They imply predication, which Antisthenes discarded	252
Precepts and examples of logical partition, illustrated in the Sophistês	253
Recommendation of logical bipartition	254
Precepts illustrated by the Philêbus	ib.
Importance of founding logical Partition on resemblances perceived by sense	255
Province of sensible perception — is not so much narrowed by Plato here as it is in the Theætêtus	256
Comparison of the Sophistês with the Phædrus	257
Comparison of the Politikus with the Parmenidês	258
Variety of method in dialectic research — Diversity of Plato	259



CHAPTER XXX.
POLITIKUS.
The Politikus by itself, apart from the Sophistês	260
Views of Plato on mensuration. Objects measured against each other. Objects compared with a common standard. In each Art, the purpose to be attained is the standard	ib.
Purpose in the Sophistês and Politikus is — To attain dialectic aptitude. This is the standard of comparison whereby to judge whether the means employed are suitable	261
Plato’s defence of the Politikus against critics. Necessity that the critic shall declare explicitly what his standard of comparison is	262
Comparison of Politikus with Protagoras, Phædon, Philêbus, &c.	ib.
Definition of the statesman, or Governor. Scientific competence. Sokratic point of departure. Procedure of Plato in subdividing	263
King during the Saturnian period, was of a breed superior to the people — not so any longer	264
Distinction of causes Principal and Causes Auxiliary. The King is the only Principal Cause, but his auxiliaries pretend to be principal also	266
Plato does not admit the received classification of government. It does not touch the point upon which all true distinction ought to be founded — Scientific or Unscientific	267
Unscientific governments are counterfeits. Government by any numerous body must be counterfeit. Government by the one scientific man is the true government	268
Fixed laws, limiting the scientific Governor, are mischievous, as they would be for the physician and the steersman. Absurdity of determining medical practice by laws, and presuming every one to know it	269
Government by fixed laws is better than lawless government by unscientific men, but worse than lawless government by scientific men. It is a second-best	ib.
Comparison of unscientific governments. The one despot is the worse. Democracy is the least bad, because it is least of a government	270
The true governor distinguished from the General, the Rhetor, &c. They are all properly his subordinates and auxiliaries	271
What the scientific Governor will do. He will aim at the formation of virtuous citizens. He will weave together the energetic virtues with the gentle virtues. Natural dissidence between them	272
If a man sins by excess of the energetic element, he is to be killed or banished: if of the gentle, he is to be made a slave. The Governor must keep up in the minds of the citizens an unanimous standard of ethical orthodoxy	272
Remarks — Sokratic Ideal — Title to govern mankind derived exclusively from scientific superiority in an individual person	273
Different ways in which this ideal is worked out by Plato and Xenophon. The man of speculation and the man of action	ib.
The theory in the Politikus is the contradiction to that theory which is assigned to Protagoras in the Protagoras	274
Points of the Protagorean theory — rests upon common sentiment	275
Counter-Theory in the Politikus. The exigencies of the Eleate in the Politikus go much farther than those of Protagoras	276
The Eleate complains that under the Protagorean theory no adverse criticism is allowed. The dissenter is either condemned to silence or punished	ib.
Intolerance at Athens, not so great as elsewhere. Plato complains of the assumption of infallibility in existing societies, but exacts it severely in that which he himself constructs	277
Theory of the Politikus — distinguished three gradations of polity. Gigantic individual force the worst	278
Comparison of the Politikus with the Republic. Points of analogy and difference	279
Comparison of the Politikus with the Kratylus. Dictatorial, constructive, science or art, common to both: applied in the former to social administration — in the latter to the formation and modification of names	281
Courage and Temperance are assumed in the Politikus. No notice taken of the doubts and difficulties raised in Lachês and Charmidês	282
Purpose of the difficulties in Plato’s Dialogues of Search — To stimulate the intellect of the hearer. His exposition does not give solutions	284



CHAPTER XXXI.
KRATYLUS.
Persons and subjects of the dialogue Kratylus — Sokrates has no formed opinion, but is only a Searcher with the others	285
Argument of Sokrates against Hermogenes — all proceedings of nature are conducted according to fixed laws — speaking and naming among the rest	286
The name is a didactic instrument; fabricated by the law-giver upon the type of the Name-Form, and employed as well as appreciated, by the philosopher	287
Names have an intrinsic aptitude for signifying one thing and not another	289
Forms of Names, as well as Forms of things nameable — essence of the Nomen, to signify the Essence of its Nominatum	ib.
Exclusive competence of a privileged lawgiver, to discern these essences, and to apportion names rightly	290
Counter-Theory, which Sokrates here sets forth and impugns — the Protagorean doctrine — Homo Mensura	291
Objection by Sokrates — That Protagoras puts all men on a level as to wisdom and folly, knowledge and ignorance	292
Objection unfounded — What the Protagorean theory really affirms — Belief always relative to the believer’s mind	ib.
Each man believes others to be wiser on various points than himself — Belief on authority — not inconsistent with the affirmation of Protagoras	293
Analogy of physical processes (cutting and burning) appealed to by Sokrates — does not sustain his inference against Protagoras	294
Reply of Protagoras to the Platonic objections	295
Sentiments of Belief and Disbelief, common to all men — Grounds of belief and disbelief, different with different men and different ages	295
Protagoras did not affirm, that Belief depended upon the will or inclination of each individual but that it was relative to the circumstances of each individual mind	297
Facts of sense — some are the same to all sentient subjects, others are different to different subjects. Grounds of unanimity	298
Sokrates exemplifies his theory of the Absolute Name or the Name-Form. He attempts to show the inherent rectitude of many existing names. His etymological transitions	299
These transitions appear violent to a modern reader. They did not appear so to readers of Plato until this century. Modern discovery, that they are intended as caricatures to deride the Sophists	302
Dissent from this theory — No proof that the Sophists ever proposed etymologies	304
Plato did not intend to propose mock-etymologies, or to deride any one. Protagoras could not be ridiculed here. Neither Hermogenes nor Kratylus understand the etymologies as caricature	306
Plato intended his theory as serious, but his exemplifications as admissible guesses. He does not cite particular cases as proofs of a theory, but only as illustrating what he means	308
Sokrates announces himself as Searcher. Other etymologists of ancient times admitted etymologies as rash as those of Plato	310
Continuance of the dialogue — Sokrates endeavours to explain how it is that the Names originally right have become so disguised and spoiled	312
Letters, as well as things, must be distinguished with their essential properties, each must be adapted to each	313
Essential significant aptitude consists in resemblance	ib.
Sokrates assumes that the Name-giving Lawgiver was a believer in the Herakleitean theory	314
But the Name-Giver may be mistaken or incompetent — the rectitude of the name depends upon his knowledge	315
Changes and transpositions introduced in the name — hard to follow	315
Sokrates qualifies and attenuates his original thesis	316
Conversation of Sokrates with Kratylus; who upholds that original thesis without any qualification	ib.
Sokrates goes still farther towards retracting it	317
There are names better and worse — more like, or less like to the things named: Natural Names are the best, but they cannot always be had. Names may be significant by habit, though in an inferior way	318
All names are not consistent with the theory of Herakleitus: some are opposed to it	319
It is not true to say, That Things can only be known through their names	320
Unchangeable Platonic Forms — opposed to the Herakleitean flux, which is true only respecting sensible particulars	ib.
Herakleitean theory must not be assumed as certain. We must not put implicit faith in names	321
Remarks upon the dialogue. Dissent from the opinion of Stallbaum and others, that it is intended to deride Protagoras and other Sophists	ib.
Theory laid down by Sokrates à priori, in the first part — Great difficulty, and ingenuity necessary, to bring it into harmony with facts	322
Opposite tendencies of Sokrates in the last half of the dialogue — he disconnects his theory of Naming from the Herakleitean doctrine	324
Ideal of the best system of naming — the Name-Giver ought to be familiar with the Platonic Ideas or Essences, and apportion his names according to resemblances among them	325
Comparison of Plato’s views about naming with those upon social institutions. Artistic, systematic construction — contrasted with unpremeditated unsystematic growth	327
Politikus compared with Kratylus	328
Ideal of Plato — Postulate of the One Wise Man — Badness of all reality	329
Comparison of Kratylus, Theætêtus, and Sophistês, in treatment of the question respecting Non-Ens, and the possibility of false propositions	331
Discrepancies and inconsistencies of Plato, in his manner of handling the same subject	332
No common didactic purpose pervading the Dialogues — each is a distinct composition, working out its own peculiar argument	ib.



CHAPTER XXXII.
PHILEBUS.
Character, Personages, and Subject of the Philêbus	334
Protest against the Sokratic Elenchus, and the purely negative procedure	335
Enquiry — What mental condition will ensure to all men a happy life? Good and Happiness — correlative and co-extensive. Philêbus declares for Pleasure, Sokrates for Intelligence	ib.
Good — object of universal choice and attachment by men, animals, and plants — all-sufficient — satisfies all desires	ib.
Pleasures are unlike to each other, and even opposite cognitions are so likewise	336
Whether Pleasure, or Wisdom, corresponds to this description? Appeal to individual choice	337
First Question submitted to Protarchus — Intense Pleasure, without any intelligence — He declines to accept it	338
Second Question — Whether he will accept a life of Intelligence purely without any pleasure or pain? Answer — No	ib.
It is agreed on both sides, That the Good must be a Tertium Quid. But Sokrates undertakes to show, That Intelligence is more cognate with it than Pleasure	339
Difficulties about Unum et Multa. How can the One be Many? How can the Many be One? The difficulties are greatest about Generic Unity — how it is distributed among species and individuals	ib.
Active disputes upon this question at the time	340
Order of Nature — Coalescence of the Finite with the Infinite. The One — The Finite Many — The Infinite Many	ib.
Mistake commonly made — To look only for the One, and the Infinite Many, without looking for the intermediate subdivisions	341
Illustration from Speech and Music	342
Plato’s explanation does not touch the difficulties which he had himself recognised as existing	343
It is nevertheless instructive, in regard to logical division and classification	344
At that time little thought had been bestowed upon classification as a logical process	ib.
Classification — unconscious and conscious	345
Plato’s doctrine about classification is not necessarily connected with his Theory of Ideas	ib.
Quadruple distribution of Existences. 1. The Infinite. 2. The Finient 3. Product of the two former. 4. Combining Cause or Agency	346
Pleasure and Pain belong to the first of these four Classes — Cognition or Intelligence belongs to the fourth	347
In the combination, essential to Good, of Intelligence with Pleasure, Intelligence is the more important of the two constituents	ib.
Intelligence is the regulating principle — Pleasure is the Indeterminate, requiring to be regulated	348
Pleasure and Pain must be explained together — Pain arises from the disturbance of the fundamental harmony of the system — Pleasure from the restoration of it	ib.
Pleasure presupposes Pain	349
Derivative pleasures of memory and expectation belonging to mind alone. Here you may find pleasure without pain	ib.
A life of Intelligence alone, without pain and without pleasure, is conceivable. Some may prefer it: at any rate it is second-best	ib.
Desire belongs to the mind, presupposes both a bodily want, and the memory of satisfaction previously had for it. The mind and body are here opposed. No true or pure pleasure therein	350
Can pleasures be true or false? Sokrates maintains that they are so	351
Reasons given by Sokrates. Pleasures attached to true opinions, are true pleasures. The just man is favoured by the Gods, and will have true visions sent to him	ib.
Protarchus disputes this — He thinks that there are some pleasures bad, but none false — Sokrates does not admit this, but reserves the question	352
No means of truly estimating pleasures and pains — False estimate habitual — These are the false pleasures	ib.
Much of what is called pleasure is false. Gentle and gradual changes do not force themselves upon our notice either as pleasure or pain. Absence of pain not the same as pleasure	353
Opinion of the pleasure-hating philosophers — That pleasure is no reality, but a mere juggle. There is no reality except pain, and the relief from pain	354
Sokrates agrees with them in part, but not wholly	ib.
Theory of the pleasure-haters — We must learn what pleasure is by looking at the intense pleasures — These are connected with distempered body and mind	355
The intense pleasures belong to a state of sickness; but there is more pleasure, on the whole, enjoyed in a state of health	356
Sokrates acknowledges some pleasures to be true. Pleasures of beautiful colours, odours, sounds, smells, &c. Pleasures of acquiring knowledge	ib.
Pure and moderate pleasures admit of measure and proportion	357
Pleasure is generation, not substance or essence: it cannot therefore be an End, because all generation is only a means towards substance — Pleasure therefore cannot be the Good	ib.
Other reasons why pleasure is not the Good	358
Distinction and classification of the varieties of Knowledge or Intelligence. Some are more true and exact than others, according as they admit more or less of measuring and computation	ib.
Arithmetic and Geometry are twofold: As studied by the philosopher and teacher: As applied by the artisan	359
Dialectic is the truest and purest of all Cognitions. Analogy between Cognition and Pleasure: in each, there are gradations of truth and purity	360
Difference with Gorgias, who claims superiority for Rhetoric. Sokrates admits that Rhetoric is superior in usefulness and celebrity: but he claims superiority for Dialectic, as satisfying the lover of truth	ib.
Most men look to opinions only, or study the phenomenal manifestations of the Kosmos. They neglect the unchangeable essences, respecting which alone pure truth can be obtained	361
Application. Neither Intelligence nor Pleasure separately, is the Good, but a mixture of the two — Intelligence being the most important. How are they to be mixed?	ib.
We must include all Cognitions — not merely the truest, but the others also. Life cannot be carried on without both	362
But we must include no pleasures except the true, pure, and necessary. The others are not compatible with Cognition or Intelligence — especially the intense sexual pleasures	ib.
What causes the excellence of this mixture? It is Measure, Proportion, Symmetry. To these Reason is more akin than Pleasure	363
Quintuple gradation in the Constituents of the Good. 1. Measure. 2. Symmetry. 3. Intelligence. 4. Practical Arts and Right Opinions. 5. True and Pure Pleasures	364
Remarks. Sokrates does not claim for Good the unity of an Idea, but a quasi-unity of analogy	365
Discussions of the time about Bonum. Extreme absolute view, maintained by Eukleides: extreme relative by the Xenophontic Sokrates. Plato here blends the two in part; an Eclectic doctrine	ib.
Inconvenience of his method, blending Ontology with Ethics	366
Comparison of Man to the Kosmos (which has reason, but no emotion) is unnecessary and confusing	367
Plato borrows from the Pythagoreans, but enlarges their doctrine. Importance of his views in dwelling upon systematic classification	368
Classification broadly enunciated, and strongly recommended — yet feebly applied — in this dialogue	369
What is the Good? Discussed both in Philêbus and in Republic. Comparison	370
Mistake of talking about Bonum confidently, as if it were known, while it is subject of constant dispute. Plato himself wavers about it; gives different explanations, and sometimes professes ignorance, sometimes talks about it confidently	ib.
Plato lays down tests by which Bonum may be determined: but the answer in the Philêbus does not satisfy those tests	371
Inconsistency of Plato in his way of putting the question — The alternative which he tenders has no fair application	372
Intelligence and Pleasure cannot be fairly compared — Pleasure is an End, Intelligence a Means. Nothing can be compared with Pleasure, except some other End	373
The Hedonists, while they laid down attainment of pleasure and diminution of pain, postulated Intelligence as the governing agency	374
Pleasures of Intelligence may be compared, and are compared by Plato, with other pleasures, and declared to be of more value. This is arguing upon the Hedonistic basis	375
Marked antithesis in the Philêbus between pleasure and avoidance of pain	377
The Hedonists did not recognise this distinction — They included both in their acknowledged End	ib.
Arguments of Plato against the intense pleasures — The Hedonists enforced the same reasonable view	378
Different points of view worked out by Plato in different dialogues — Gorgias, Protagoras, Philêbus — True and False Pleasures	379
Opposition between the Gorgias and Philêbus, about Gorgias and Rhetoric	380
Peculiarity of the Philêbus — Plato applies the same principle of classification — true and false — to Cognitions and Pleasures	382
Distinction of true and false — not applicable to pleasures	ib.
Plato acknowledges no truth and reality except in the Absolute — Pleasures which he admits to be true — and why	385
Plato could not have defended this small list of Pleasures, upon his own admission, against his opponents — the Pleasure-haters, who disallowed pleasures altogether	387
Sokrates in this dialogue differs little from these Pleasure-haters	389
Forced conjunction of Kosmology and Ethics — defect of the Philêbus	391
Directive sovereignty of Measure — how explained and applied in the Protagoras	ib.
How explained in Philêbus — no statement to what items it is applied	393
Classification of true and false — how Plato applies it to Cognitions	394
Valuable principles of this classification — difference with other dialogues	395
Close of the Philêbus — Graduated elements of Good	397
Contrast between the Philêbus and the Phædrus, and Symposion, in respect to Pulchrum, and intense Emotions generally	398



CHAPTER XXXIII.
MENEXENUS.
Persons and situation of the dialogue	401
Funeral harangue at Athens — Choice of a public orator — Sokrates declares the task of the public orator to be easy — Comic exaggeration of the effects of the harangue	401
Sokrates professes to have learnt a funeral harangue from Aspasia, and to be competent to recite it himself. Menexenus entreats him to do so	402
Harangue recited by Sokrates	403
Compliments of Menexenus after Sokrates has finished, both to the harangue itself and to Aspasia	ib.
Supposed period — shortly after the peace of Antalkidas	ib.
Custom of Athens about funeral harangues. Many such harangues existed at Athens, composed by distinguished orators or logographers — Established type of the harangue	404
Plato in this harangue conforms to the established type — Topics on which he insists	405
Consolation and exhortation to surviving relatives	407
Admiration felt for this harangue, both at the time and afterwards	407
Probable motives of Plato in composing it, shortly after he established himself at Athens as a teacher — His competition with Lysias — Desire for celebrity both as rhetor and as dialectician	ib.
Menexenus compared with the view of rhetoric presented in the Gorgias — Necessity for an orator to conform to established sentiments	409
Colloquial portion of the Menexenus is probably intended as ridicule and sneer at Rhetoric — The harangue itself is serious, and intended as an evidence of Plato’s ability	410
Anachronism of the Menexenus — Plato careless on this point	411



CHAPTER XXXIV.
KLEITOPHON.
Persons and circumstances of Kleitophon	413
Conversation of Sokrates with Kleitophon alone: he alludes to observations of an unfavourable character recently made by Kleitophon, who asks permission to explain	ib.
Explanation given. Kleitophon expresses gratitude and admiration for the benefit which he has derived from long companionship with Sokrates	414
The observations made by Sokrates have been most salutary and stimulating in awakening ardour for virtue. Arguments and analogies commonly used by Sokrates	ib.
But Sokrates does not explain what virtue is, nor how it is to be attained. Kleitophon has had enough of stimulus, and now wants information how he is to act	415
Questions addressed by Kleitophon with this view, both to the companions of Sokrates and to Sokrates himself	416
Replies made by the friends of Sokrates unsatisfactory	ib.
None of them could explain what the special work of justice or virtue was	417
Kleitophon at length asked the question from Sokrates himself. But Sokrates did not answer clearly. Kleitophon believes that Sokrates knows, but will not tell	417
Kleitophon is on the point of leaving Sokrates and going to Thrasymachus. But before leaving he addresses one last entreaty, that Sokrates will speak out clearly and explicitly	418
Remarks on the Kleitophon. Why Thrasyllus placed it in the eighth Tetralogy immediately before the Republic, and along with Kritias, the other fragment	419
Kleitophon is genuine, and perfectly in harmony with a just theory of Plato	420
It could not have been published until after Plato’s death	ib.
Reasons why the Kleitophon was never finished. It points out the defects of Sokrates, just as he himself confesses them in the Apology	421
The same defects also confessed in many of the Platonic and Xenophontic dialogues	422
Forcible, yet respectful, manner in which these defects are set forth in the Kleitophon. Impossible to answer them in such a way as to hold out against the negative Elenchus of a Sokratic pupil	423
The Kleitophon represents a point of view which many objectors must have insisted on against Sokrates and Plato	424
The Kleitophon was originally intended as a first book of the Republic, but was found too hard to answer. Reasons why the existing first book was substituted	ib.

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