| CHAPTER XII. |
| ALKIBIADES I.
AND II. |
| Situation
supposed in the dialogue. Persons — Sokrates and Alkibiades |
1 |
| Exorbitant
hopes and political ambition of Alkibiades |
2 |
| Questions
put by Sokrates, in reference to Alkibiades in his intended function as
adviser of the Athenians. What does he intend to advise them upon? What
has he learnt, and what does he know? |
ib. |
| Alkibiades
intends to advise the Athenians on questions of war and peace.
Questions of Sokrates thereupon. We must fight those whom it is better
to fight — to what standard does better refer? To just and
unjust |
3 |
| How, or
from whom, has Alkibiades learnt to discern or distinguish Just and
Unjust? He never learnt it from any one ; he always knew it, even as a
boy |
4 |
| Answer
amended. Alkibiades learnt it from the multitude, as he learnt to speak
Greek. — The multitude cannot teach just and unjust, for they
are at variance among themselves about it. Alkibiades is going to
advise the Athenians about what he does not know himself |
5 |
| Answer
farther amended. The Athenians do not generally debate about just or
unjust — which they consider plain to every one —
but about expedient and inexpedient, which are not coincident with just
and unjust. But neither does Alkibiades know the expedient. He asks
Sokrates to explain. Sokrates declines: he can do nothing but question |
6 |
| Comment on
the preceding — Sokratic method — the respondent
makes the discoveries for himself |
ib. |
| Alkibiades
is brought to admit that whatever is just, is good, honourable,
expedient: and that whoever acts honourably, both does well, and
procures for himself happiness thereby. Equivocal reasoning of Sokrates
|
7 |
|
Humiliation of Alkibiades. Other Athenian statesmen are equally
ignorant. But the real opponents, against whom Alkibiades is to measure
himself, are, the kings of Sparta and Persia. Eulogistic description of
those kings. To match them, Alkibiades must make himself as good as
possible |
8 |
| But good
— for what end, and under what circumstances? Abundant
illustrative examples |
9 |
|
Alkibiades, puzzled and humiliated, confesses his ignorance.
Encouragement given by Sokrates. It is an advantage to make such
discovery in youth |
10 |
| Platonic
Dialectic — its actual effect — its anticipated
effect — applicable to the season of youth |
11 |
| Know
Thyself — Delphian maxim — its urgent importance
— What is myself? My mind is myself |
ib. |
| I cannot
know myself, except by looking into another mind. Self-knowledge is
temperance. Temperance and Justice are the conditions both of happiness
and of freedom |
11 |
| Alkibiades
feels himself unworthy to be free, and declares that he will never quit
Sokrates |
12 |
| Second
Alkibiades — situation supposed |
ib. |
| Danger of
mistake in praying to the Gods for gifts which may prove mischievous.
Most men are unwise. Unwise is the generic word: madmen, a particular
variety under it |
ib. |
| Relation
between a generic term, and the specific terms comprehended under it,
was not then familiar |
13 |
| Frequent
cases, in which men pray for supposed benefits, and find that when
obtained, they are misfortunes. Every one fancies that he knows what is
beneficial: mischiefs of ignorance |
14 |
| Mistake in
predications about ignorance generally. We must discriminate. Ignorance
of what?
Ignorance of good, is always mischievous: ignorance of other things,
not always |
ib. |
| Wise
public counsellors are few. Upon what ground do we call these few wise?
Not because they possess merely special arts or accomplishments, but
because they know besides, upon what occasions and under what limits
each of these accomplishments ought to be used |
15 |
| Special
accomplishments, without the knowledge of the good or profitable, are
oftener hurtful than beneficial |
16 |
| It is
unsafe for Alkibiades to proceed with his sacrifice, until he has
learnt what is the proper language to address to the Gods. He renounces
his sacrifice, and throws himself upon the counsel of Sokrates |
ib. |
| Different
critical opinions respecting these two dialogues |
17 |
| Grounds
for disallowing them — less strong against the Second than
against the First |
18 |
| The
supposed grounds for disallowance are in reality only marks of
inferiority |
ib. |
| The two
dialogues may probably be among Plato’s earlier compositions |
20 |
| Analogy
with various dialogues in the Xenophontic Memorabilia —
Purpose of Sokrates to humble presumptuous young men |
21 |
| Fitness of
the name and character of Alkibiades for idealising this feature in
Sokrates |
ib. |
|
Plato’s manner of replying to the accusers of Sokrates.
Magical influence ascribed to the conversation of Sokrates |
22 |
| The
purpose proclaimed by Sokrates in the Apology is followed out in
Alkibiades I. Warfare against the false persuasion of knowledge |
24 |
|
Difficulties multiplied for the purpose of bringing Alkibiades to a
conviction of his own ignorance |
25 |
| Sokrates
furnishes no means of solving these difficulties. He exhorts to Justice
and Virtue — but these are acknowledged Incognita |
26 |
| Prolixity
of Alkibiadês I. — Extreme multiplication of
illustrative examples — How explained |
ib. |
|
Alkibiadês II. leaves its problem avowedly undetermined |
27 |
| Sokrates
commends the practice of praying to the Gods for favours undefined
— his views about the semi-regular, semi-irregular agency of
the Gods — he prays to them for premonitory warnings |
28 |
| Comparison
of Alkibiadês II. with the Xenophontic Memorabilia,
especially the conversation of Sokrates with Euthydemus. Sokrates not
always consistent with himself |
29 |
| Remarkable
doctrine of Alkibiadês II. — that knowledge is not
always Good. The knowledge of Good itself is indispensable: without
that, the knowledge of other things is more hurtful than beneficial |
ib. |
| Knowledge
of Good — appears postulated and divined, in many of the
Platonic dialogues, under different titles |
31 |
| The Good
— the Profitable — what is it? — How are
we to know it ? Plato leaves this undetermined |
ib. |
| |
| |
| |
| CHAPTER XIII. |
| HIPPIAS MAJOR
— HIPPIAS MINOR. |
| Hippias
Major — situation supposed — character of the
dialogue. Sarcasm and mockery against Hippias |
33 |
| Real debate
between the historical Sokrates and Hippias in the Xenophontic
Memorabilia — subject of that debate |
34 |
| Opening of
the Hippias Major
— Hippias describes the successful circuit which he had made
through Greece, and the renown as well as the gain acquired by his
lectures |
35 |
| Hippias had
met with no success at Sparta. Why the Spartans did not admit his
instructions — their law forbids |
ib. |
| Question,
What is law? The law-makers always aim at the Profitable, but sometimes
fail to attain it. When they fail, they fail to attain law. The lawful
is the Profitable: the Unprofitable is also unlawful |
36 |
| Comparison
of the argument of the Platonic Sokrates with that of the Xenophontic
Sokrates |
37 |
| The Just or
Good is the beneficial or profitable. This is the only explanation
which Plato ever gives and to this he does not always adhere |
38 |
| Lectures of
Hippias at Sparta not upon geometry, or astronomy, &c., but
upon the question — What pursuits are beautiful, fine, and
honourable for youth? |
39 |
| Question
put by Sokrates, in the name of a friend in the background, who has
just been puzzling him with it — What is the Beautiful? |
ib. |
| Hippias
thinks the question easy to answer |
40 |
| Justice,
Wisdom, Beauty must each be something. What is Beauty, or the
Beautiful? |
ib. |
| Hippias
does not understand the question. He answers by indicating one
particularly beautiful object |
ib. |
|
Cross-questioning by Sokrates — Other things also are
beautiful ; but each thing is beautiful only by comparison, or under
some particular circumstances — it is sometimes beautiful,
sometimes not beautiful |
41 |
| Second
answer of Hippias —
Gold, is that by the presence of
which all things become beautiful — scrutiny applied to the
answer. Complaint by Hippias about vulgar analogies |
ib. |
| Third
answer of Hippias — questions upon it — proof given
that it fails of universal application |
42 |
| Farther
answers, suggested by Sokrates himself — 1. The Suitable or
Becoming — objections thereunto — it is rejected |
43 |
| 2. The
useful or profitable — objections — it will not
hold |
44 |
| 3. The
Beautiful is a variety of the Pleasurable — that which is
received through the eye and the ear |
45 |
| Objections
to this last — What property is there common to both sight
and hearing, which confers upon the pleasures of these two senses the
exclusive privilege of being beautiful? |
ib. |
| Answer
— There is, belonging to each and to both in common, the
property of being innocuous and profitable pleasures — upon
this ground they are called beautiful |
46 |
| This will
not hold — the Profitable is the cause of Good, and is
therefore different from Good — to say that the beautiful is
the Profitable, is to say that it is different from Good but this has
been already declared inadmissible |
ib. |
| Remarks
upon the Dialogue — the explanations ascribed to Hippias are
special conspicuous examples: those ascribed to Sokrates are attempts
to assign some general concept |
47 |
| Analogy
between the explanations here ascribed to Sokrates, and those given by
the Xenophontic Sokrates in the Memorabilia |
49 |
| Concluding
thrust exchanged between Hippias and Sokrates |
51 |
| Rhetoric
against Dialectic |
52 |
| Men who
dealt with real life, contrasted with the speculative and analytical
philosophers |
ib. |
| Concrete
Aggregates — abstract or logical Aggregates. Distinct
aptitudes required by Aristotle for the Dialectician |
53 |
| Antithesis
of Absolute and Relative, here brought into debate by Plato, in regard
to the Idea of Beauty |
54 |
| Hippias
Minor — characters and situation supposed |
55 |
| Hippias
has just delivered a lecture, in which he extols Achilles as better
than Odysseus — the veracious and straightforward hero better
than the mendacious and crafty |
56 |
| This is
contested by Sokrates. The veracious man and the mendacious man are one
and the same — the only man who can answer truly if he
chooses, is he who can also answer falsely if he chooses, i.
e. the knowing man —
the ignorant man cannot make sure of doing either the one or the other |
57 |
| Analogy of
special arts — it is only the arithmetician who can speak
falsely on a question of arithmetic when he chooses |
ib. |
| View of
Sokrates respecting Achilles in the Iliad. He thinks that Achilles
speaks falsehood cleverly. Hippias maintains that if Achilles ever
speaks falsehood, it is with an innocent purpose, whereas Odysseus does
the like with fraudulent purpose |
58 |
| Issue here
taken — Sokrates contends that those who hurt, or cheat, or
lie wilfully, are better than those who do the like unwillingly
— he entreats Hippias to enlighten him and answer his
questions |
ib. |
| Questions
of Sokrates — multiplied analogies of the special arts. The
unskilful artist, who runs, wrestles, or sings badly, whether he will
or not, is worse than the skilful, who can sing well when he chooses,
but can also sing badly when he chooses |
59 |
| It is
better to have the mind of a bowman who misses his mark only by design,
than that of one who misses even when he intends to hit |
60 |
| Dissent
and repugnance of Hippias |
ib. |
| Conclusion
— That none but the good man can do evil wilfully: the bad
man does evil unwillingly. Hippias cannot resist the reasoning, but
will not accept the conclusion — Sokrates confesses his
perplexity |
61 |
| Remarks on
the dialogue. If the parts had been inverted, the dialogue would have
been cited by critics as a specimen of the sophistry and corruption of
the Sophists |
62 |
| Polemical
purpose of the dialogue — Hippias humiliated by Sokrates |
63 |
|
Philosophical purpose of the dialogue — theory of the
Dialogues of Search generally, and of Knowledge as understood by Plato |
ib. |
| The
Hippias is an exemplification of this theory — Sokrates sets
forth a case of confusion, and avows his inability to clear it up.
Confusion shown up in the Lesser Hippias — Error in the
Greater |
64 |
| The thesis
maintained here by Sokrates, is also affirmed by the historical
Sokrates in the Xenophontic Memorabilia |
66 |
| Aristotle
combats the thesis. Arguments against it |
67 |
| Mistake of
Sokrates and Plato in dwelling too exclusively on the intellectual
conditions of human conduct |
ib. |
| They rely
too much on the analogy of the special arts — they take no
note of the tacit assumptions underlying the epithets of praise and
blame |
68 |
| Value of a
Dialogue of Search, that it shall be suggestive, and that it shall
bring before us different aspects of the question under review |
69 |
| Antithesis
between Rhetoric and Dialectic |
70 |
| |
| |
| |
| CHAPTER XIV. |
| HIPPARCHUS
— MINOS. |
| Hipparchus
— Question — What is the definition of Lover of
Gain? He is one who thinks it right to gain from things worth nothing.
Sokrates cross-examines upon this explanation. No man expects to gain
from things which he knows to be worth nothing: in this sense, no man
is a lover of gain |
71 |
| Gain is
good. Every man loves good: therefore all men are lovers of gain |
72 |
| Apparent
contradiction. Sokrates accuses the companion of trying to deceive him
— accusation is retorted upon Sokrates |
73 |
| Precept
inscribed formerly by Hipparchus the Peisistratid — never
deceive a friend. Eulogy of Hipparchus by Sokrates |
ib. |
| Sokrates
allows the companion to retract some of his answers. The companion
affirms that some gain is good, other gain is evil |
74 |
| Questions
by Sokrates — bad gain is gain,
as much as good gain. What is the common property, in virtue of which
both are called Gain? Every acquisition, made with no outlay, or with a
smaller outlay, is gain. Objections — the acquisition may be
evil — embarrassment confessed |
ib. |
| It is
essential to gain, that the acquisition made shall be greater not
merely in quantity, but also in value, than the outlay. The valuable is
the profitable — the profitable is the good. Conclusion comes
back. That Gain is Good |
75 |
|
Recapitulation. The debate has shown that all gain is good, and that
there is no evil gain — all men are lovers of gain
— no man ought to be reproached for being so. The companion is
compelled to admit this, though he declares that he is not persuaded |
ib. |
| Minos.
Question put by Sokrates to the companion. What is Law, or The Law? All
law is the same, quatenus
law: what is the common constituent attribute? |
76 |
| Answer
— Law is, 1. The consecrated and binding customs. 2. The
decree of the city. 3. Social or civic opinion |
ib. |
|
Cross-examination by Sokrates — just and lawfully-behaving
men are so through law; unjust and lawless men are so through the
absence of law. Law is highly honourable and useful: lawlessness is
ruinous. Accordingly, bad decrees of the city — or bad social
opinion — cannot be law |
77 |
| Suggestion
by Sokrates — Law is the good
opinion of the city — but good opinion is true opinion, or
the finding out of reality. Law therefore wishes (tends) to be the
finding out of reality, though it does not always succeed in doing so |
77 |
| Objection
taken by the Companion — That there is great discordance of
laws in different places — he specifies several cases of such
discordance at some length. Sokrates reproves his prolixity, and
requests him to confine himself to question or answer |
78 |
| Farther
questions by Sokrates — Things heavy and light, just and
unjust, honourable and dishonourable, &c., are so, and are
accounted so everywhere. Real things are always accounted real. Whoever
fails in attaining the real, fails in attaining the lawful |
ib. |
| There are
laws of health and of cure, composed by the few physicians wise upon
those subjects, and unanimously declared by them. So also there are
laws of farming, gardening, cookery, declared by the few wise in those
respective pursuits. In like manner, the laws of a city are the
judgments declared by the few wise men who know how to rule |
79 |
| That which
is right is the regal law, the only true and real law — that
which is not right, is not law, but only seems to be law in the eyes of
the ignorant |
80 |
| Minos,
King of Krete — his laws were divine and excellent, and have
remained unchanged from time immemorial |
ib. |
| Question
about the character of Minos — Homer and Hesiod declare him
to have been admirable, the Attic tragedians defame him as a tyrant,
because he was an enemy of Athens |
81 |
| That Minos
was really admirable — and that he has found out truth and
reality respecting the administration of the city — we may be
sure from the fact that his laws have remained so long unaltered |
ib. |
| The
question is made more determinate — What is it that the good
lawgiver prescribes and measures out for the health of the mind, as the
physician measures out food and exercise for the body? Sokrates cannot
tell. Close |
81 |
| The
Hipparchus and Minos are analogous to each other, and both of them
inferior works of Plato, perhaps unfinished |
82 |
| Hipparchus
— double meaning of
φιλοκερδὴς
and κέρδος |
ib. |
| State or
mind of the agent, as to knowledge, frequent inquiry in Plato. No
tenable definition found |
83 |
| Admitting
that there is bad gain, as well as good gain, what is the meaning of
the word gain?
None is found |
ib. |
| Purpose of
Plato in the dialogue — to lay bare the confusion, and to
force the mind of the respondent into efforts for clearing it up |
84 |
| Historical
narrative and comments given in the dialogue respecting Hipparchus
— afford no ground for declaring the dialogue to be spurious |
ib. |
| Minos.
Question — What is the characteristic property connoted by
the word Νόμος or law? |
86 |
| This
question was discussed by the historical Sokrates, Memorabilia of
Xenophon |
ib. |
|
Definitions of law — suggested and refuted. Law includes, as
a portion of its meaning, justice, goodness, usefulness, &c.
Bad decrees are not laws |
86 |
| Sokrates
affirms that law is everywhere the same — it is the declared
judgment and command of the Wise man upon the subject to which it
refers — it is truth and reality, found out and certified by
him |
87 |
| Reasoning
of Sokrates in the Minos is unsound, but Platonic. The Good, True, and
Real, coalesce in the mind of Plato — he acknowledges nothing
to be Law, except what he thinks ought to be
Law |
88 |
| Plato
worships the Ideal of his own mind — the work of systematic
constructive theory by the Wise Man |
89 |
| Different
applications of this general Platonic view, in the Minos, Politikus,
Kratylus, &c. Natural
Rectitude of Law, Government, Names, &c |
ib. |
| Eulogy on
Minos, as having established laws on this divine type or natural
rectitude |
90 |
| The Minos
was arranged by Aristophanes at first in a Trilogy along with the Leges
|
91 |
|
Explanations of the word Law — confusion in its meaning |
ib. |
| |
| |
| |
| CHAPTER XV. |
| THEAGES. |
|
Theagês — has been declared spurious by some modern
critics — grounds for such opinion not sufficient |
98 |
| Persons of
the dialogue — Sokrates, with Demodokus and
Theagês, father and son. Theagês (the son), eager
to acquire knowledge, desires to be placed under the teaching of a
Sophist |
99 |
| Sokrates
questions Theagês, inviting him to specify what he wants |
ib. |
|
Theagês desires to acquire that wisdom by which he can govern
freemen with their own consent |
100 |
|
Incompetence of the best practical statesmen to teach any one else.
Theagês requests that Sokrates will himself teach him |
ib. |
| Sokrates
declares that he is not competent to teach — that he knows
nothing except about matters of love. Theagês maintains that
many of his young friends have profited largely by the conversation of
Sokrates |
101 |
| Sokrates
explains how this has sometimes happened — he recites his
experience of the divine sign or Dæmon |
ib. |
| The
Dæmon is favourable to some persons, adverse to others. Upon
this circumstance it depends how far any companion profits by the
society of Sokrates. Aristeides has not learnt anything from Sokrates,
yet has improved much by being near to him |
102 |
|
Theagês expresses his anxiety to be received as the companion
of Sokrates |
103 |
| Remarks on
the Theagês — analogy with the Lachês |
104 |
| Chief
peculiarity of the Theagês — stress laid upon the
divine sign or Dæmon |
ib. |
| Plato
employs this divine sign here to render some explanation of the
singularity and eccentricity of Sokrates, and of his unequal influence
upon different companions |
ib. |
| Sokrates,
while continually finding fault with other teachers, refused to teach
himself — difficulty of finding an excuse for his refusal.
The Theagês furnishes an excuse |
106 |
| Plato does
not always, nor in other dialogues, allude to the divine sign in the
same way. Its character and working essentially impenetrable. Sokrates
a privileged person |
ib. |
| |
| |
| |
| CHAPTER XVI. |
| ERASTÆ OR
ANTERASTÆ
— RIVALES. |
|
Erastæ — subject and persons of the dialogue
— dramatic introduction — interesting youths in the
palæstra |
111 |
| Two rival
Erastæ — one of them literary, devoted to
philosophy — the other gymnastic, hating philosophy |
ib. |
| Question
put by Sokrates — What is philosophy? It is the perpetual
accumulation of knowledge, so as to make the largest sum total |
112 |
| In the case
of the body, it is not the maximum of exercise which does good, but the
proper, measured quantity. For the mind also, it is not the maximum of
knowledge, but the measured quantity which is good. Who is the judge to
determine this measure? |
ib. |
| No answer
given. What is the best conjecture? Answer of the literary Erastes. A
man must learn that which will yield to him the greatest reputation as
a philosopher — as much as will enable him to talk like an
intelligent critic, though not to practise |
113 |
| The
philosopher is one who is second-best in several different arts
— a Pentathlus — who talks well upon each |
ib. |
| On what
occasions can such second-best men be useful? There are always regular
practitioners at hand, and no one will call in the second-best man when
he can have the regular practitioner |
114 |
| Philosophy
cannot consist in multiplication of learned acquirements |
ib. |
| Sokrates
changes his course of examination — questions put to show
that there is one special art, regal and political, of administering
and discriminating the bad from the good |
115 |
| In this
art the philosopher must not only be second-best, competent to talk
— but he must be a fully qualified practitioner, competent to
act |
ib. |
| Close of
the dialogue — humiliation of the literary Erastes |
116 |
| Remarks
— animated manner of the dialogue |
ib. |
| Definition
of philosophy — here sought for the first time —
Platonic conception of measure — referee not discovered |
117 |
| View taken
of the second-best critical talking man, as compared with the special
proficient and practitioner |
118 |
|
Plato’s view — that the philosopher has a province
special to himself, distinct from other specialties — dimly
indicated — regal or political art |
119 |
|
Philosopher — the supreme artist controlling other artists |
120 |
| |
| |
| |
| CHAPTER XVII. |
| ION. |
| Ion.
Persons of the dialogue. Difference of opinion among modern critics as
to its genuineness |
124 |
| Rhapsodes
as a class in Greece. They competed for prizes at the festivals. Ion
has been triumphant |
124 |
| Functions
of the Rhapsodes. Recitation — exposition of the poets
— arbitrary exposition of the poets was then frequent |
125 |
| The
popularity of the Rhapsodes was chiefly derived from their recitation
— powerful effect which they produced |
ib. |
| Ion both
reciter and expositor — Homer was considered more as an
instructor than as a poet |
126 |
| Plato
disregards and disapproves the poetic or emotional working |
ib. |
| Ion devoted
himself to Homer exclusively. Questions of Sokrates to him —
How happens it that you cannot talk equally upon other poets? The
poetic art is one |
127 |
| Explanation
given by Sokrates — both the Rhapsode and the Poet work, not
by art and system, but by divine inspiration — fine poets are
bereft of their reason, and possessed by inspiration from some God |
ib. |
| Analogy of
the Magnet, which holds up by attraction successive stages of iron
rings. The Gods first inspire Homer, then act through him and through
Ion upon the auditors |
128 |
| This
comparison forms the central point of the dialogue. It is an expansion
of a judgment delivered by Sokrates in the Apology |
129 |
| Platonic
Antithesis: systematic procedure distinguished from unsystematic: which
latter was either blind routine, or madness inspired by the Gods.
Varieties of madness, good and bad |
129 |
| Special
inspiration from the Gods was a familiar fact in Grecian life
— privileged communications from the Gods to Sokrates
— his firm belief in them |
130 |
| Condition
of the inspired person — his reason is for the time withdrawn
|
131 |
| Ion does
not admit himself to be inspired and out of his mind |
132 |
| Homer
talks upon all subjects — Is Ion competent to explain what
Homer says upon all of them? Rhapsodic art. What is its province? |
ib. |
| The
Rhapsode does not know special matters, such as the craft of the pilot,
physician, farmer, &c., but he knows the business of the
general, and is competent to command soldiers, having learnt it from
Homer |
133 |
|
Conclusion. Ion expounds Homer, not with any knowledge of what he says,
but by divine inspiration |
134 |
| The
generals in Greece usually possessed no professional experience
— Homer and the poets were talked of as the great teachers
— Plato’s view of the poet, as pretending to know
everything, but really knowing nothing |
ib. |
| Knowledge,
opposed to divine inspiration without knowledge |
136 |
|
Illustration of Plato’s opinion respecting the uselessness of
written geometrical treatises |
ib. |
| |
| |
| |
| CHAPTER XVIII. |
| LACHES. |
|
Lachês. Subject and persons of the dialogue —
whether it is useful that two young men should receive lessons from a
master of arms. Nikias and Lachês differ in opinion |
138 |
| Sokrates is
invited to declare his opinion — he replies that the point
cannot be decided without a competent professional judge |
139 |
| Those who
deliver an opinion must begin by proving their competence to judge
— Sokrates avows his own incompetence |
140 |
| Nikias and
Lachês submit to be cross-examined by Sokrates |
141 |
| Both of
them give opinions offhand, according to their feelings on the special
case — Sokrates requires that the question shall be
generalised, and examined as a branch of education |
141 |
| Appeal of
Sokrates to the judgment of the One Wise Man — this man is
never seen or identified |
142 |
| We must
know what virtue is, before we give an opinion on education —
virtue, as a whole, is too large a question — we will enquire
about one branch of virtue — courage |
ib. |
| Question
— what is courage? Laches answers by citing one particularly
manifest case of courage — mistake of not giving a general
explanation |
143 |
| Second
answer. Courage is a sort of endurance of the mind — Sokrates
points out that the answer is vague and incorrect — endurance
is not always courage: even intelligent endurance is not always courage
|
ib. |
| Confusion.
New answer given by Nikias. Courage is a sort of Intelligence
— the intelligence of things terrible and not terrible.
Objections of Lachês |
144 |
| Questions
of Sokrates to Nikias. It is only future events, not past or present,
which are terrible; but intelligence of future events cannot be had
without intelligence of past or present |
145 |
| Courage
therefore must be intelligence of good and evil generally. But this
definition would include the whole of virtue, and we declared that
courage was only a part thereof — it will not hold therefore
as a definition of courage |
146 |
| Remarks.
Warfare of Sokrates against the false persuasion of knowledge. Brave
generals deliver opinions confidently about courage without knowing
what it is |
ib. |
| No
solution given by Plato — apparent tendency of his mind, in
looking for a solution. Intelligence — cannot be understood
without reference to some object or end |
147 |
| Object
— is supplied in the answer of Nikias. Intelligence
— of things terrible and not terrible. Such intelligence is
not possessed by professional artists |
148 |
| Postulate
of a Science of Ends, or Teleology, dimly indicated by Plato. The
Unknown Wise Man — correlates with the undiscovered Science
of Ends |
ib. |
| Perfect
condition of the intelligence — is the one sufficient
condition of virtue |
149 |
| Dramatic
contrast between Lachês and Sokrates, as cross-examiners |
150 |
| |
| |
| |
| CHAPTER XIX. |
| CHARMIDES. |
| Scene and
personages of the dialogue. Crowded palæstra. Emotions of
Sokrates |
153 |
| Question,
What is Temperance? addressed by Sokrates to the temperate Charmides.
Answer, It is a kind of sedateness or slowness |
154 |
| But
Temperance is a fine or honourable thing, and slowness is, in many or
most cases, not fine or honourable, but the contrary. Temperance cannot
be slowness |
ib. |
| Second
answer. Temperance is a variety of the feeling of shame. Refuted by
Sokrates |
ib. |
| Third
answer. Temperance consists in doing one’s own business.
Defended by Kritias. Sokrates pronounces it a riddle, and refutes it.
Distinction between making and doing |
155 |
| Fourth
answer, by Kritias. Temperance consists in self-knowledge |
ib. |
| Questions
of Sokrates thereupon. What good does self-knowledge procure for us?
What is the object known, in this case ? Answer: There is no object of
knowledge, distinct from the knowledge itself |
156 |
| Sokrates
doubts the possibility of any knowledge, without a given cognitum
as its object. Analogies to prove that knowledge of knowledge is
impossible |
156 |
| All
knowledge must be relative to some object |
157 |
| All
properties are relative — every thing in nature has its
characteristic property with reference to something else |
ib. |
| Even if
cognition of cognition were possible, cognition of non-cognition would
be impossible. A man may know what he knows, but he cannot know what he
is ignorant of. He knows the fact that
he knows: but he does not know how much he knows, and how much he does
not know |
158 |
|
Temperance, therefore, as thus defined, would be of little or no value |
159 |
| But even
granting the possibility of that which has just been denied, still
Temperance would be of little value. Suppose that all separate work
were well performed, by special practitioners, we should not attain our
end — Happiness |
ib. |
| Which of
the varieties of knowledge contributes most to well-doing or happiness?
That by which we know good and evil |
160 |
| Without
the science of good and evil, the other special science will be of
little or of no service. Temperance is not the science of good and
evil, and is of little service |
161 |
| Sokrates
confesses to entire failure in his research. He cannot find out what
temperance is: although several concessions have been made which cannot
be justified |
ib. |
| Temperance
is and must be a good thing: but Charmides cannot tell whether he is
temperate or not ; since what temperance is remains unknown |
162 |
|
Expressions both from Charmides and Kritias of praise and devotion to
Sokrates, at the close of the dialogue. Dramatic ornament throughout |
ib. |
| The
Charmides is an excellent specimen of Dialogues of Search. Abundance of
guesses and tentatives, all ultimately disallowed |
163 |
| Trial and
Error, the natural process of the human mind. Plato stands alone in
bringing to view and dramatising this part of the mental process.
Sokrates accepts for himself the condition of conscious ignorance |
164 |
| Familiar
words — constantly used, with much earnest feeling, but never
understood nor defined — ordinary phenomenon in human society
|
165 |
| Different
ethical points of view in different Platonic dialogues |
167 |
|
Self-knowledge is here declared to be impossible |
ib. |
| In other
dialogues, Sokrates declares self-knowledge to be essential and
inestimable. Necessity for the student to have presented to him
dissentient points of view |
ib. |
| Courage
and Temperance are shown to have no distinct meaning, except as founded
on the general cognizance of good and evil |
168 |
|
Distinction made between the special sciences and the science of Good
and Evil. Without this last, the special sciences are of no use |
ib. |
| Knowledge,
always relative to some object known. Postulate or divination of a
Science of Teleology |
169 |
| Courage
and Temperance, handled both by Plato and by Aristotle. Comparison
between the two |
170 |
| |
| |
| |
| CHAPTER XX. |
| LYSIS. |
| Analogy
between Lysis and Charmides. Richness of dramatic incident in both.
Youthful beauty |
172 |
| Scenery and
personages of the Lysis |
ib. |
| Origin of
the conversation. Sokrates promises to give an example of the proper
way of talking to a youth, for his benefit |
173 |
|
Conversation of Sokrates with Lysis |
ib. |
| Lysis is
humiliated. Distress of Hippothalês |
177 |
| Lysis
entreats Sokrates to talk in the like strain to Menexenus |
ib. |
| Value of
the first conversation between Sokrates and Lysis, as an illustration
of the Platonico-Sokratic manner |
177 |
| Sokrates
begins to examine Menexenus respecting friendship. Who is to be called
a friend? Halt in the dialogue |
178 |
| Questions
addressed to Lysis. Appeal to the maxims of the poets. Like is the
friend of like. Canvassed and rejected |
ib. |
| Other
poets declare that likeness is a cause of aversion; unlikeness, of
friendship. Reasons pro
and con.
Rejected |
179 |
| Confusion
of Sokrates. He suggests, That the Indifferent (neither good nor evil)
is friend to the Good |
180 |
| Suggestion
canvassed. If the Indifferent is friend to the Good, it is determined
to become so by the contact of felt evil, from which it is anxious to
escape |
180 |
| Principle
illustrated by the philosopher. His intermediate condition —
not wise, yet painfully feeling his own ignorance |
181 |
| Sokrates
dissatisfied. He originates a new suggestion. The Primum Amabile, or
object originally dear to us, per
se: by relation or resemblance
to which other objects become dear |
ib. |
| The cause
of love is desire. We desire that which is akin to us or our own |
182 |
| Good is of
a nature akin to every one, evil is alien to every one. Inconsistency
with what has been previously laid down |
183 |
| Failure of
the enquiry. Close of the dialogue |
184 |
| Remarks.
No positive result. Sokratic purpose in analysing the familiar words
— to expose the false persuasion of knowledge |
ib. |
| Subject of
Lysis. Suited for a Dialogue of Search. Manner of Sokrates, multiplying
defective explanations, and showing reasons why each is defective |
185 |
| The
process of trial and error is better illustrated by a search without
result than with result. Usefulness of the dialogue for self-working
minds |
186 |
| Subject of
friendship, handled both by the Xenophontic Sokrates, and by Aristotle |
ib. |
| Debate in
the Lysis partly verbal, partly real. Assumptions made by the Platonic
Sokrates, questionable, such as the real Sokrates would have found
reason for challenging |
188 |
| Peculiar
theory about friendship broached by Sokrates. Persons neither good nor
evil by nature, yet having a superficial tinge of evil, and desiring
good to escape from it |
189 |
| This
general theory illustrated by the case of the philosopher or lover of
wisdom. Painful consciousness of ignorance the attribute of the
philosopher. Value set by Sokrates and Plato upon this attribute |
190 |
| Another
theory of Sokrates. The Primum Amabile, or original and primary object
of Love. Particular objects are loved through association with this.
The object is Good |
191 |
| Statement
by Plato of the general law of mental association |
ib. |
| Theory of
the Primum Amabile, here introduced by Sokrates, with numerous
derivative objects of love. Platonic Idea. Generic communion of
Aristotle, distinguished by him from the feebler analogical communion |
192 |
| Primum
Amabile of Plato, compared with the Prima Amicitia of Aristotle. Each
of them is head of an analogical aggregate, not member of a generic
family |
194 |
| The Good
and Beautiful, considered as objects of attachment |
ib. |
| |
| |
| |
| CHAPTER XXI. |
| EUTHYDEMUS. |
| Dramatic
and comic exuberance of the Euthydêmus. Judgments of various
critics |
195 |
| Scenery and
personages |
ib. |
| The two
Sophists, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus: manner in which they are here
presented |
196 |
|
Conversation carried on with Kleinias, first by Sokrates, next by the
two Sophists |
ib. |
| Contrast
between the two different modes of interrogation |
197 |
| Wherein
this contrast does not consist |
198 |
| Wherein it
does consist |
199 |
| Abuse of
fallacies by the Sophists — their bidding for the applause of
the by-standers |
ib. |
| Comparison
of the Euthydêmus with the Parmenidês |
200 |
| Necessity
of settling accounts with the negative, before we venture upon the
affirmative, is common to both: in the one the process is solitary and
serious; in the other, it is vulgarised and ludicrous |
201 |
| Opinion of
Stallbaum and other critics about the Euthydêmus, that
Euthydêmus and Dionysodorus represent the way in which
Protagoras and Gorgias talked to their auditors |
202 |
| That
opinion is unfounded. Sokrates was much more Eristic than Protagoras,
who generally manifested himself by continuous speech or lecture |
ib. |
| Sokrates
in the Euthydêmus is drawn suitably to the purpose of that
dialogue |
203 |
| The two
Sophists in the Euthydêmus are not to be taken as real
persons, or representatives of real persons |
204 |
| Colloquy
of Sokrates with Kleinias — possession of good things is
useless, unless we also have intelligence how to use them |
ib. |
| But
intelligence — of what? It must be such intelligence, or such
an art, as will include both the making of what we want, and the right
use of it when made |
205 |
| Where is
such an art to be found? The regal or political art looks like it; but
what does this art do for us? No answer can be found. Ends in puzzle |
206 |
| Review of
the cross-examination just pursued by Sokrates. It is very suggestive
— puts the mind upon what to look for |
207 |
| Comparison
with other dialogues — Republic, Philêbus,
Protagoras. The only distinct answer is found in the Protagoras |
208 |
| The talk
of the two Sophists, though ironically admired while it is going on, is
shown at the end to produce no real admiration, but the contrary |
ib. |
| Mistaken
representations about the Sophists — Aristotle’s
definition — no distinguishable line can be drawn between the
Sophist and the Dialectician |
210 |
|
Philosophical purpose of the Euthydêmus — exposure
of fallacies, in Plato’s dramatic manner, by multiplication
of particular examples |
211 |
| Aristotle
(Soph. Elench.) attempts a classification of fallacies: Plato
enumerates them without classification |
212 |
| Fallacies
of equivocation propounded by the two Sophists in the
Euthydêmus |
ib. |
| Fallacies
— à dicto
secundum quid, ad dictum simpliciter
— in the Euthydêmus |
213 |
| Obstinacy
shown by the two Sophists in their replies — determination
not to contradict themselves |
214 |
| Farther
verbal equivocations |
ib. |
| Fallacies
involving deeper logical principles — contradiction is
impossible. — To speak falsely is impossible |
215 |
|
Plato’s Euthydêmus is the earliest known attempt to
set out and expose fallacies — the only way of exposing
fallacies is to exemplify the fallacy by particular cases, in which the
conclusion proved is known aliunde
to be false and absurd |
216 |
| Mistake of
supposing fallacies to have been invented and propagated by Athenian
Sophists — they are inherent inadvertencies and liabilities
to error, in the ordinary process of thinking. Formal debate affords
the best means of correcting them |
217 |
|
Wide-spread prevalence of erroneous belief, misguided by one or other
of these fallacies, attested by Sokrates, Plato, Bacon, &c.,
— complete enumeration of heads of fallacies by Mill |
218 |
| Value of
formal debate as a means for testing and confuting fallacies |
221 |
| Without
the habit of formal debate, Plato could not have composed his
Euthydêmus, nor Aristotle the treatise De Sophisticis
Elenchis |
ib. |
| Probable
popularity of the Euthydêmus at Athens — welcomed
by all the enemies of Dialectic |
222 |
| Epilogue
of Plato to the Dialogue, trying to obviate this inference by opponents
— Conversation between Sokrates and Kriton |
223 |
| Altered
tone in speaking of Euthydêmus — Disparagement of
persons half-philosophers, half-politicians |
224 |
| Kriton
asks Sokrates for advice about the education of his sons —
Sokrates cannot recommend a teacher — tells him to search for
himself |
225 |
|
Euthydêmus is here cited as representative of Dialectic and
philosophy |
226 |
| Who is the
person here intended by Plato, half-philosopher, half-politician? Is it
Isokrates? |
227 |
| Variable
feeling at different times, between Plato and Isokrates |
228 |
| |
| |
| |
| CHAPTER XXII. |
| MENON. |
| Persons of
the Dialogue |
232 |
| Question
put by Menon — Is virtue teachable? Sokrates confesses that
he does not know what virtue is. Surprise of Menon |
ib. |
| Sokrates
stands alone in this confession. Unpopularity entailed by it |
233 |
| Answer of
Menon — plurality of virtues, one belonging to each different
class and condition. Sokrates enquires for the property common to all
of them |
ib. |
| Analogous
cases cited — definitions of figure and colour |
235 |
| Importance
at that time of bringing into conscious view, logical subordination and
distinctions — Neither logic nor grammar had then been cast
into system |
ib. |
| Definition
of virtue given by Menon: Sokrates pulls it to pieces |
236 |
| Menon
complains that the conversation of Sokrates confounds him like an
electric shock — Sokrates replies that he is himself in the
same state of confusion and ignorance. He urges continuance of search
by both |
237 |
| But how is
the process of search available to any purpose? No man searches for
what he already knows: and for what he does not know, it is useless to
search, for he cannot tell when he has found it |
ib. |
| Theory of
reminiscence propounded by Sokrates — anterior immortality of
the soul — what is called teaching is the revival and
recognition of knowledge acquired in a former life, but forgotten |
ib. |
|
Illustration of this theory — knowledge may be revived by
skilful questions in the mind of a man thoroughly untaught. Sokrates
questions the slave of Menon |
238 |
| Enquiry
taken up — Whether virtue is teachable? without determining
what virtue is |
239 |
| Virtue is
knowledge — no possessions, no attributes, either of mind or
body, are good or profitable, except under the guidance of knowledge |
ib. |
| Virtue, as
being knowledge, must be teachable. Yet there are opposing reasons,
showing that it cannot be teachable. No teachers of it can be found |
239 |
|
Conversation of Sokrates with Anytus, who detests the Sophists, and
affirms that any one of the leading politicians can teach virtue |
240 |
| Confused
state of the discussion. No way of acquiring virtue is shown |
ib. |
| Sokrates
modifies his premisses — knowledge is not the only thing
which guides to good results — right opinion will do the same
|
ib. |
| Right
opinion cannot be relied on for staying in the mind, and can never give
rational explanations, nor teach others — good practical
statesmen receive right opinion by inspiration from the Gods |
241 |
| All the
real virtue that there is, is communicated by special inspiration from
the Gods |
242 |
| But what
virtue itself is, remains unknown |
ib. |
| Remarks on
the dialogue. Proper order for examining the different topics, is
pointed out by Sokrates |
ib. |
| Mischief
of debating ulterior and secondary questions when the fundamental
notions and word are unsettled |
ib. |
| Doctrine
of Sokrates in the Menon — desire of good alleged to be
universally felt — in what sense this is true |
243 |
| Sokrates
requires knowledge as the principal condition of virtue, but does not
determine knowledge, of what ? |
244 |
| Subject of
Menon; same as that of the Protagoras — diversity of handling
— Plato is not anxious to settle a question and get rid of it
|
245 |
| Anxiety of
Plato to keep up and enforce the spirit of research |
246 |
| Great
question discussed among the Grecian philosophers — criterion
of truth — Wherein consists the process of verification? |
ib. |
| None of
the philosophers were satisfied with the answer here made by Plato
— that verification consists in appeal to pre-natal
experience |
247 |
|
Plato’s view of the immortality of the soul —
difference between the Menon, Phædrus, and Phædon |
249 |
| Doctrine
of Plato, that new truth may be elicited by skilful examination out of
the unlettered mind — how far correct ? |
ib. |
|
Plato’s doctrine about à
priori reasonings —
different from the modern doctrine |
251 |
|
Plato’s theory about pre-natal experience. He took no pains
to ascertain and measure the extent of post-natal experience |
252 |
| Little or
nothing is said in the Menon about the Platonic Ideas or Forms |
253 |
| What Plato
meant by Causal Reasoning — his distinction between knowledge
and right opinion |
ib. |
| This
distinction compared with modern philosophical views |
254 |
|
Manifestation of Anytus — intense antipathy to the Sophists
and to philosophy generally |
255 |
| The enemy
of Sokrates is also the enemy of the sophists — practical
statesmen |
256 |
| The Menon
brings forward the point of analogy between Sokrates and the Sophists,
in which both were disliked by the practical statesmen |
257 |
| |
| |
| |
| CHAPTER XXIII. |
| PROTAGORAS. |
| Scenic
arrangement and personages of the dialogue |
259 |
|
Introduction. Eagerness of the youthful Hippokrates to become
acquainted with Protagoras |
260 |
| Sokrates
questions Hippokrates as to his purpose and expectations from
Protagoras |
ib. |
| Danger of
going to imbibe the instruction of a Sophist without knowing beforehand
what he is about to teach |
262 |
| Remarks on
the Introduction. False persuasion of knowledge brought to light |
263 |
| Sokrates
and Hippokrates go to the house of Kallias. Company therein. Respect
shown to Protagoras |
264 |
| Questions
of Sokrates to Protagoras. Answer of the latter, declaring the
antiquity of the sophistical profession, and his own openness in
avowing himself a sophist |
ib. |
| Protagoras
prefers to converse in presence of the assembled company |
266 |
| Answers of
Protagoras. He intends to train young men as virtuous citizens |
ib. |
| Sokrates
doubts whether virtue is teachable. Reasons for such doubt. Protagoras
is asked to explain whether it is or not. |
ib. |
|
Explanation of Protagoras. He begins with a mythe |
267 |
| Mythe.
First fabrication of men by the Gods. Prometheus and Epimetheus. Bad
distribution of endowments to man by the latter. It is partly amended
by Prometheus |
267 |
| Prometheus
gave to mankind skill for the supply of individual wants, but could not
give them the social art — Mankind are on the point of
perishing, when Zeus sends to them the dispositions essential for
society |
268 |
| Protagoras
follows up his mythe by a discourse. Justice and the sense of shame are
not professional attributes, but are possessed by all citizens and
taught by all to all |
269 |
| Constant
teaching of virtue. Theory of punishment |
270 |
| Why
eminent men cannot make their sons eminent |
271 |
| Teaching
by parents, schoolmaster, harpist, laws, dikastery, &c. |
ib. |
| All learn
virtue from the same teaching by all. Whether a learner shall acquire
more or less of it, depends upon his own individual aptitude |
272 |
| Analogy of
learning vernacular Greek. No special teacher thereof. Protagoras
teaches virtue somewhat better than others |
273 |
| The sons
of great artists do not themselves become great artists |
274 |
| Remarks
upon the mythe and discourse. They explain the manner in which the
established sentiment of a community propagates and perpetuates itself |
274 |
| Antithesis
of Protagoras and Sokrates. Whether virtue is to be assimilated to a
special art |
275 |
| Procedure
of Sokrates in regard to the discourse of Protagoras — he
compliments it as an exposition, and analyses some of the fundamental
assumptions |
276 |
| One
purpose of the dialogue. To contrast continuous discourse with short
cross-examining question and answer |
277 |
| Questions
by Sokrates — Whether virtue is one and indivisible, or
composed of different parts? Whether the parts are homogeneous or
heterogeneous ? |
ib. |
| Whether
justice is just, and holiness holy? How far justice is like to
holiness? Sokrates protests against an answer, “If you
please” |
278 |
|
Intelligence and moderation are identical, because they have the same
contrary |
279 |
|
Insufficient reasons given by Sokrates. He seldom cares to distinguish
different meanings of the same term |
ib. |
| Protagoras
is puzzled, and becomes irritated |
280 |
| Sokrates
presses Protagoras farther. His purpose is, to test opinions and not
persons. Protagoras answers with angry prolixity |
ib. |
|
Remonstrance of Sokrates against long answers as inconsistent with the
laws of dialogue. Protagoras persists. Sokrates rises to depart |
281 |
|
Interference of Kallias to get the debate continued. Promiscuous
conversation. Alkibiades declares that Protagoras ought to acknowledge
superiority of Sokrates in dialogue |
282 |
| Claim of a
special locus standi
and professorship for Dialectic, apart from Rhetoric |
ib. |
| Sokrates
is prevailed upon to continue, and invites Protagoras to question him |
ib. |
| Protagoras
extols the importance of knowing the works of the poets, and questions
about parts of a song of Simonides. Dissenting opinions about the
interpretation of the song |
283 |
| Long
speech of Sokrates, expounding the purpose of the song, and laying down
an ironical theory about the numerous concealed sophists at Krete and
Sparta, masters of short speech |
283 |
| Character
of this speech — its connection with the dialogue, and its
general purpose. Sokrates inferior to Protagoras in continuous speech |
284 |
| Sokrates
depreciates the value of debates on the poets. Their meaning is always
disputed, and you can never ask from themselves what it is. Protagoras
consents reluctantly to resume the task of answering |
285 |
| Purpose of
Sokrates to sift difficulties which he really feels in his own mind.
Importance of a colloquial companion for this purpose |
287 |
| The
interrupted debate is resumed. Protagoras says that courage differs
materially from the other branches of virtue |
288 |
| Sokrates
argues to prove that courage consists in knowledge or intelligence.
Protagoras does not admit this. Sokrates changes his attack |
ib. |
| Identity
of the pleasurable with the good — of the painful with the
evil. Sokrates maintains it. Protagoras denies. Debate |
289 |
| Enquiry
about knowledge. Is it the dominant agency in the mind? Or is it
overcome frequently by other agencies, pleasure or pain ? Both agree
that knowledge is dominant |
290 |
| Mistake of
supposing that men act contrary to knowledge. We never call pleasures
evils, except when they entail a preponderance of pain, or a
disappointment of greater pleasures |
291 |
| Pleasure
is the only good — pain the only evil. No man does evil
voluntarily, knowing it to be evil. Difference between pleasures
present and future — resolves itself into pleasure and pain |
292 |
| Necessary
resort to the measuring art for choosing pleasures rightly —
all the security of our lives depend upon it |
293 |
| To do
wrong, overcome by pleasure, is only a bad phrase for describing what
is really a case of grave ignorance |
294 |
| Reasoning
of Sokrates assented to by all. Actions which conduct to pleasures or
freedom from pain, are honourable |
295 |
|
Explanation of courage. It consists in a wise estimate of things
terrible and not terrible |
ib. |
| Reluctance
of Protagoras to continue answering. Close of the discussion. Sokrates
declares that the subject is still in confusion, and that he wishes to
debate it again with Protagoras. Amicable reply of Protagoras |
297 |
| Remarks on
the dialogue. It closes without the least allusion to Hippokrates |
298 |
| Two
distinct aspects of ethics and politics exhibited: one under the name
of Protagoras; the other, under that of Sokrates |
299 |
| Order of
ethical problems, as conceived by Sokrates |
ib. |
| Difference
of method between him and Protagoras flows from this difference of
order. Protagoras assumes what virtue is, without enquiry |
300 |
| Method of
Protagoras. Continuous lectures addressed to established public
sentiments with which he is in harmony |
301 |
| Method of
Sokrates. Dwells upon that part of the problem which Protagoras had
left out |
ib. |
| Antithesis
between the eloquent lecturer and the analytical cross-examiner |
303 |
| Protagoras
not intended to be always in the wrong, though he is described as
brought to a contradiction |
ib. |
|
Affirmation of Protagoras about courage is affirmed by Plato himself
elsewhere |
ib. |
| The harsh
epithets applied by critics to Protagoras are not borne out by the
dialogue. He stands on the same ground as the common consciousness |
304 |
| Aversion
of Protagoras for dialectic. Interlude about the song of Simonides |
305 |
| Ethical
view given by Sokrates worked out at length clearly. Good and evil
consist in right or wrong calculation of pleasures and pains of the
agent |
ib. |
| Protagoras
is at first opposed to this theory |
306 |
| Reasoning
of Sokrates |
307 |
|
Application of that reasoning to the case of courage |
ib. |
| The theory
which Plato here lays down is more distinct and specific than any
theory laid down in other dialogues |
308 |
| Remarks on
the theory here laid down by Sokrates. It is too narrow, and
exclusively prudential |
309 |
| Comparison
with the Republic |
310 |
| The
discourse of Protagoras brings out an important part of the whole case,
which is omitted in the analysis by Sokrates |
311 |
| The
Ethical End, as implied in the discourse of Protagoras, involves a
direct regard to the pleasures and pains of other persons besides the
agent himself |
312 |
|
Plato’s reasoning in the dialogue is not clear or
satisfactory, especially about courage |
313 |
| Doctrine
of Stallbaum and other critics is not correct. That the analysis here
ascribed to Sokrates is not intended by Plato as serious, but as a
mockery of the sophists |
314 |
| Grounds of
that doctrine. Their insufficiency |
315 |
| Subject is
professedly still left unsettled at the close of the dialogue |
316 |
| |
| |
| |
| CHAPTER XXIV. |
| GORGIAS. |
| Persons who
debate in the Gorgias. Celebrity of the historical Gorgias |
317 |
|
Introductory circumstances of the dialogue. Polus and
Kalliklês |
318 |
| Purpose of
Sokrates in questioning. Conditions of a good definition |
ib. |
| Questions
about the definition of Rhetoric. It is the artisan of persuasion |
319 |
| The Rhetor
produces belief without knowledge. Upon what matters is he competent to
advise? |
319 |
| The Rhetor
can persuade the people upon any matter, even against the opinion of
the special expert. He appears to know, among the ignorant |
320 |
| Gorgias is
now made to contradict himself. Polus takes up the debate with Sokrates
|
321 |
| Polemical
tone of Sokrates. At the instance of Polus he gives his own definition
of rhetoric. It is no art, but an empirical knack of catering for the
immediate pleasure of hearers, analogous to cookery. It is a branch
under the general head flattery |
ib. |
| Distinction
between the true arts which aim at the good of the body and mind
— and the counterfeit arts, which pretend to the same, but in
reality aim at immediate pleasure |
322 |
| Questions
of Polus. Sokrates denies that the Rhetors have any real power, because
they do nothing which they really wish |
323 |
| All men
wish for what is good for them. Despots and Rhetors, when they kill any
one, do so because they think it good for them. If it be really not
good, they do not do what they will, and therefore have no real power |
324 |
| Comparison
of Archelaus, usurping despot of Macedonia — Polus affirms
that Archelaus is happy, and that every one thinks so —
Sokrates admits that every one thinks so, but nevertheless denies it |
325 |
| Sokrates
maintains — 1. That it is a greater evil to do wrong, than to
suffer wrong. 2. That if a man has done wrong, it is better for him to
be punished than to remain unpunished |
326 |
| Sokrates
offers proof — Definition of Pulchrum and Turpe —
Proof of the first point |
327 |
| Proof of
the second point |
ib. |
| The
criminal labours under a mental distemper, which though not painful, is
a capital evil. Punishment is the only cure for him. To be punished is
best for him |
328 |
| Misery of
the Despot who is never punished. If our friend has done wrong, we
ought to get him punished: if our enemy, we ought to keep him
unpunished |
329 |
| Argument
of Sokrates paradoxical — Doubt expressed by
Kalliklês whether he means it seriously |
330 |
| Principle
laid down by Sokrates — That every one acts with a view to
the attainment of happiness and avoidance of misery |
ib. |
| Peculiar
view taken by Plato of Good — Evil — Happiness |
331 |
| Contrast
of the usual meaning of these words, with the Platonic meaning |
ib. |
|
Examination of the proof given by Sokrates — Inconsistency
between the general answer of Polus and his previous declarations
— Law and Nature |
332 |
| The
definition of Pulchrum and Turpe, given by Sokrates, will not hold |
334 |
| Worse or
better — for whom? The argument of Sokrates does not specify.
If understood in the sense necessary for his inference, the definition
would be inadmissible |
ib. |
| Plato
applies to every one a standard of happiness and misery peculiar to
himself. His view about the conduct of Archelaus is just, but he does
not give the true reasons for it |
335 |
| If the
reasoning of Plato were true, the point of view in which punishment is
considered would be reversed |
336 |
| Plato
pushes too far the analogy between mental distemper and bodily
distemper — Material difference between the two —
Distemper must be felt by the distempered persons |
337 |
|
Kalliklês begins to argue against Sokrates — he
takes a distinction between Just by Law and Just by nature —
Reply of Sokrates, that there is no variance between the two, properly
understood |
338 |
| What
Kalliklês says is not to be taken as a sample of the
teachings of Athenian sophists. Kalliklês — rhetor
and politician |
339 |
|
Uncertainty of referring to Nature as an authority. It may be pleaded
in favour of opposite theories. The theory of Kalliklês is
made to appear repulsive by the language in which he expresses it |
340 |
| Sokrates
maintains that self-command and moderation is requisite for the strong
man as well as for others. Kalliklês defends the negative |
343 |
| Whether
the largest measure of desires is good for a man, provided he has the
means of satisfying them? Whether all varieties of desire are good?
Whether the pleasurable and the good are identical? |
344 |
|
Kalliklês maintains that pleasurable and good are identical.
Sokrates refutes him. Some pleasures are good, others bad. A scientific
adviser is required to discriminate them |
345 |
|
Contradiction between Sokrates in the Gorgias, and Sokrates in the
Protagoras |
ib. |
| Views of
critics about this contradiction |
346 |
| Comparison
and appreciation of the reasoning of Sokrates in both dialogues |
ib. |
| Distinct
statement in the Protagoras. What are good and evil, and upon what
principles the scientific adviser is to proceed in discriminating them.
No such distinct statement in the Gorgias |
347 |
| Modern
ethical theories. Intuition. Moral sense — not recognised by
Plato in either of the dialogues |
348 |
| In both
dialogues the doctrine of Sokrates is self-regarding as respects the
agent: not considering the pleasures and pains of other persons, so far
as affected by the agent |
349 |
| Points
wherein the doctrine of the two dialogues is in substance the same, but
differing in classification |
ib. |
|
Kalliklês, whom Sokrates refutes in the Gorgias, maintains a
different argument from that which Sokrates combats in the Protagoras |
350 |
| The
refutation of Kalliklês by Sokrates in the Gorgias, is
unsuccessful — it is only so far successful as he adopts
unintentionally the doctrine of Sokrates in the Protagoras |
351 |
| Permanent
elements — and transient elements — of human agency
— how each of them is appreciated in the two dialogues |
353 |
| In the
Protagoras |
ib. |
| In the
Gorgias |
354 |
| Character
of the Gorgias generally — discrediting all the actualities
of life |
355 |
| Argument
of Sokrates resumed — multifarious arts of flattery, aiming
at immediate pleasure |
357 |
| The
Rhetors aim at only flattering the public — even the best
past Rhetors have done nothing else — citation of the four
great Rhetors by Kallikles |
357 |
| Necessity
for temperance, regulation, order. This is the condition of virtue and
happiness |
358 |
| Impossible
to succeed in public life, unless a man be thoroughly akin to and in
harmony with the ruling force |
359 |
| Danger of
one who dissents from the public, either for better or for worse |
ib. |
| Sokrates
resolves upon a scheme of life for himself — to study
permanent good, and not immediate satisfaction |
360 |
| Sokrates
announces himself as almost the only man at Athens, who follows out the
true political art. Danger of doing this |
361 |
| Mythe
respecting Hades, and the treatment of deceased persons therein,
according to their merits during life — the philosopher who
stood aloof from public affairs, will then be rewarded |
ib. |
| Peculiar
ethical views of Sokrates — Rhetorical or dogmatical
character of the Gorgias |
362 |
| He merges
politics in Ethics — he conceives the rulers as spiritual
teachers and trainers of the community |
ib. |
| Idéal
of Plato — a despotic lawgiver or man-trainer, on scientific
principles, fashioning all characters pursuant to certain types of his
own |
363 |
| Platonic
analogy between mental goodness and bodily health —
incomplete analogy — circumstances of difference |
ib. |
| Sokrates
in the Gorgias speaks like a dissenter among a community of fixed
opinions and habits. Impossible that a dissenter, on important points,
should acquire any public influence |
364 |
| Sokrates
feels his own isolation from his countrymen. He is thrown upon
individual speculation and dialectic |
365 |
| Antithesis
between philosophy and rhetoric |
ib. |
| Position
of one who dissents, upon material points, from the fixed opinions and
creed of his countrymen |
366 |
| Probable
feelings of Plato on this subject — Claim put forward in the
Gorgias of an independent locus
standi for philosophy, but
without the indiscriminate cross-examination pursued by Sokrates |
367 |
| Importance
of maintaining the utmost liberty of discussion. Tendency of all ruling
orthodoxy towards intolerance |
368 |
| Issue
between philosophy and rhetoric — not satisfactorily handled
by Plato. Injustice done to rhetoric. Ignoble manner in which it is
presented by Polus and Kalliklês |
369 |
| Perikles
would have accepted the defence of rhetoric, as Plato has put it into
the mouth of Gorgias |
370 |
| The
Athenian people recognise a distinction between the pleasurable and the
good: but not the same as that which Plato conceived |
371 |
| Rhetoric
was employed at Athens in appealing to all the various established
sentiments and opinions. Erroneous inferences raised by the
Kalliklês of Plato |
373 |
| The
Platonic Idéal exacts, as good, some order, system,
discipline. But order may be directed to bad ends as well as to good.
Divergent ideas about virtue |
374 |
| How to
discriminate the right order from the wrong. Plato does not advise us |
375 |
| The
Gorgias upholds the independence and dignity of the dissenting
philosopher |
ib. |
| |
| |
| |
| CHAPTER XXV. |
| PHÆDON. |
| The
Phædon is affirmative and expository |
377 |
| Situation
and circumstances assumed in the Phædon. Pathetic interest
which they inspire |
ib. |
| Simmias and
Kebês, the two collocutors with Sokrates. Their feelings and
those of Sokrates |
378 |
| Emphasis of
Sokrates in insisting on freedom of debate, active exercise of reason,
and independent judgment for each reasoner |
379 |
| Anxiety of
Sokrates that his friends shall be on their guard against being
influenced by his authority — that they shall follow only the
convictions of their own reason |
380 |
| Remarkable
manifestation of earnest interest for reasoned truth and the liberty of
individual dissent |
381 |
|
Phædon and Symposion — points of analogy and
contrast |
382 |
|
Phædon — compared with Republic and
Timæus. No recognition of the triple or lower souls.
Antithesis between soul and body |
383 |
| Different
doctrines of Plato about the soul. Whether all the three souls are
immortal, or the rational soul alone |
385 |
| The life
and character of a philosopher is a constant struggle to emancipate his
soul from his body. Death alone enables him to do this completely |
386 |
| Souls of
the ordinary or unphilosophical men pass after death into the bodies of
different animals. The philosopher alone is relieved from all communion
with body |
387 |
| Special
privilege claimed for philosophers in the Phædon apart from
the virtuous men who are not philosophers |
388 |
| Simmias
and Kebês do not admit readily the immortality of the soul,
but are unwilling to trouble Sokrates by asking for proof. Unabated
interest of Sokrates in rational debate |
390 |
| Simmias
and Kebês believe fully in the pre-existence of the soul, but
not in its post-existence. Doctrine — That the soul is a sort
of harmony — refuted by Sokrates |
ib. |
| Sokrates
unfolds the intellectual changes or wanderings through which his mind
had passed |
391 |
| First
doctrine of Sokrates as to cause. Reasons why he rejected it |
ib. |
| Second
doctrine. Hopes raised by the treatise of Anaxagoras |
393 |
|
Disappointment because Anaxagoras did not follow out the optimistic
principle into detail. Distinction between causes efficient and causes
co-efficient |
394 |
| Sokrates
could neither trace out the optimistic principle for himself, nor find
any teacher thereof. He renounced it, and embraced a third doctrine
about cause |
395 |
| He now
assumes the separate existence of ideas. These ideas are the causes why
particular objects manifest certain attributes |
396 |
| Procedure
of Sokrates if his hypothesis were impugned. He insists upon keeping
apart the discussion of the hypothesis and the discussion of its
consequences |
397 |
| Exposition
of Sokrates welcomed by the hearers. Remarks upon it |
398 |
| The
philosophical changes in Sokrates all turned upon different views as to
a true cause |
ib. |
| Problems
and difficulties of which Sokrates first sought solution |
399 |
|
Expectations entertained by Sokrates from the treatise of Anaxagoras.
His disappointment. His distinction between causes and co-efficients |
400 |
| Sokrates
imputes to Anaxagoras the mistake of substituting physical agencies in
place of mental. This is the same which Aristophanes and others imputed
to Sokrates |
401 |
| The
supposed theory of Anaxagoras cannot be carried out, either by Sokrates
himself or any one else. Sokrates turns to general words, and adopts
the theory of ideas |
403 |
| Vague and
dissentient meanings attached to the word Cause. That is a cause, to
each man, which gives satisfaction to his inquisitive feelings |
404 |
| Dissension
and perplexity on the question. — What is a cause? revealed
by the picture of Sokrates — no intuition to guide him |
407 |
| Different
notions of Plato and Aristotle about causation, causes regular and
irregular. Inductive theory of causation, elaborated in modern times |
ib. |
| Last
transition of the mind of Sokrates from things to words — to the adoption
of the theory of ideas. Great multitude of ideas assumed, each fitting
a certain number of particulars |
410 |
| Ultimate
appeal to hypothesis of extreme generality |
411 |
|
Plato’s demonstration of the immortality of the soul rests
upon the assumption of the Platonic ideas. Reasoning to prove this |
412 |
| The soul
always brings life, and is essentially living. It cannot receive death:
in other words, it is immortal |
413 |
| The proof
of immortality includes pre-existence as well as post-existence
— animals as well as man — also the metempsychosis
or translation of the soul from one body to another |
414 |
| After
finishing his proof that the soul is immortal, Sokrates enters into a
description, what will become of it after the death of the body. He
describes a Νεκυία
|
415 |
| Sokrates
expects that his soul is going to the islands of the blest. Reply to
Kriton about burying his body |
416 |
|
Preparations for administering the hemlock. Sympathy of the gaoler.
Equanimity of Sokrates |
ib. |
| Sokrates
swallows the poison. Conversation with the gaoler |
417 |
|
Ungovernable sorrow of the friends present. Self-command of Sokrates.
Last words to Kriton, and death |
ib. |
| Extreme
pathos, and probable trustworthiness of these personal details |
419 |
| Contrast
between the Platonic Apology and the Phædon |
ib. |
| Abundant
dogmatic and poetical invention of the Phædon compared with
the profession of ignorance which we read in the Apology |
421 |
| Total
renunciation and discredit of the body in the Phædon.
Different feeling about the body in other Platonic dialogues |
422 |
|
Plato’s argument does not prove the immortality of the soul.
Even if it did prove that, yet the mode of pre-existence and the mode
of post-existence, of the soul, would be quite undetermined |
423 |
| The
philosopher will enjoy an existence of pure soul unattached to any body
|
425 |
|
Plato’s demonstration of the immortality of the soul did not
appear satisfactory to subsequent philosophers. The question remained
debated and problematical |
426 |